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I. INTRODUCTION
Long term care consists of services for the health and well-being of
chronically disabled persons, many of whom are elderly. Services include
nursing home care; congregate living arrangements with supportive per-
sonal care and homemaking assistance; community-based services such as
home health care, congregate and home-delivered meals, transportation,
and shopping assistance;1 and other services to help maintain quality of
life and to assist family care providers, such as visiting companions and
professional treatment for chronic illnesses.2 Services may be delivered for-
mally, by an agency or other licensed health care provider, or informally,
by family, friends, and neighbors.
1 CENTRE FOR POLICY ON AGING, COMMUNITY LIFE: A CODE OF PRACTICE FOR COMMUNITY
CARE 16 (1991) [hereinafter COMMUNITY LIFE].
2 SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1989, S. REP. No. 249,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1989) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING].
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Long term care presents such a variety of service options that choices
about its use are complex. They encompass value judgments about the
individual's right to self-determination and about society's willingness to
protect less capable members from harm and to invest scarce resources in
their well-being.
For people who rely on long term care, maintaining some degree of
self-determination depends upon the ability to make policy and individual
decisions regarding assistance, and upon the principles and values on
which those decisions are based. To the extent the decisions of the policy
makers or caregivers depart from the choices that recipients of assistance
would make. for themselves, the decision-makers engage in a form of
proxy, or substitute, decision-making. For example, third parties make
decisions that limit where an impaired person can live, who will provide
health care, how living assistance is provided, and what care is supported
from public funds.
Under the law, the wishes of a proxy decision-maker may be imposed
on a noncriminal adult only after an adjudication of incompetency or
when the interests of society or third parties outweigh the individual's
interest in autonomy. The principal area of law relating to -incompetency
in long term care is involuntary guardianship. Involuntary guardianship
requires a finding of incompetency, and after which a proxy decision-
maker, called a guardian, is appointed to manage the property and/or
personal affairs of the disabled person.
Many jurisdictions have reviewed their guardianship laws in the past
decade. The legislatures of some of the United States, European countries,
and provinces of Canada and Australia have enacted extensive reforms to
protect the human and civil rights of persons subject to competency pro-
ceedings and guardianship.' In other states, reforms are modest. In Eng-
land, the Law Commission began late in 1990 to study whether any re-
3 See the following articles in AN AGING WORLD - DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAW
AND SOCIAL POLICY (John M. Eekelaar & David Pearl eds., 1989) [hereinafter AN AGING WORLD]
(proceedings of the 1988 conference of the International Society on Family Law): Robin Creyke,
Guardianship: Protection and Autonomy - Has the Right Balance Been Achieved? at 545; Bernd
Schulte, Reform of Guardianship Laws in Europe - A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Ap-
proach at 591; Gisela Zenz, The End of Guardianship for the Elderly? Facts and Objectives in
Current Discussions on the Proposed Reform Legislation of the Federal Republic of Germany at 609.
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forms should be undertaken.4 The trend of the reforms is to provide more
legal rights to preserve remaining autonomy for wards and prospective
wards, and heightened procedural due process protection and judicial
oversight to safeguard those rights.
Reforms have been adopted in response to reports of financial and
physical abuse of elderly wards by their guardians.' In the United States
judicial system, courts frequently base judgments on faulty evidence,
which goes undiscovered because of careless procedures.6 In England, de-
spite fourteen major and numerous minor investigations of malpractice
and mistreatment since the implementation of the Mental Health Act of
1959, serious doubts about the Act's appropriateness have only recently
arisen.
Guardianship laws are intended to assure that an individual in need of
professional assistance can receive it as quickly and efficiently as possible.
The success of guardianship reform, however, is in doubt. In some juris-
dictions, changes seem more semantic than practical, while in others resis-
tance to change results in more blatant avoidance mechanisms. It is possi-
ble that the reforms fail accurately to reflect the needs of the participants
in the guardianship system, in which case more education or practice will
not improve compliance significantly.
Even if fully implemented, the reform of guardianship statutes would
clarify only one limited portion of law and policy on proxy decision-mak-
ing in long term care. Guardianship applies only to those individuals who
have inadequate voluntary or informal decision-making mechanisms in
place, and where the individual's circumstances allow time for court
process.
Laws addressing proxy decision-making in long term care often include
protective services statutes, which authorize intervention by the state in
cases of abuse or self-neglect; protective proceedings of conservatorship
and receivership, which authorize surrogate property management with-
4 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER No. 19, MENTALLY INCAPACITATED ADULTS
AND DECISION-MAKING: AN OVERVIEW (1991) [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION
PAPER].





out an adjudication of incompetency; durable or enduring powers of attor-
ney, which allow appointment of an agent to exercise surrogate property
management powers during incompetency; and advance directives for
health care, which enable an individual to provide written instructions to
guide health care decisions, or to designate a proxy to make such decisions
in the event of incompetency.
This Article will compare laws on proxy decision-making in Florida
and in England. Florida and England were chosen because they espouse
very different values and assumptions about the purposes and processes of
appointing proxy decision-makers. Florida passed guardianship reforms in
1988, adding extensive legal formality to competency proceedings. In con-
trast, England's competency proceedings rely on medical opinion; no legal
process is required before a proxy decision-maker can be appointed and
individual liberty can be limited. Also, Florida was chosen because its
population includes a proportion of elderly persons to the overall popula-
tion similar to that which is anticipated to exist early in the next century
in other states in the United States, England, and many other countries.
Florida's laws are a response to circumstances that are likely to be wide-
spread in the future. A comparison of guardianship and other proxy deci-
sion-making laws yields insights into the way long term care decisions are,
and should be, made.
In the first section, this Article will describe the social and economic
circumstances of the elderly, and their need for assistance and rights simi-
lar to those accorded other disabled persons. The second section will ex-
plain current laws in England and Florida. The third section will com-
pare their underlying principles and procedures for implementation. The
fourth section will recommend a system of substitute decision-making for
long term care.
A. An Aging Society
The laws on proxy decision-making must be reexamined in light of
worldwide changes in demographics, medical technology, and social ser-
vices. The law must respond to society's changing view of elderly persons
and its responsibilities to them.
The population of the world, and of most nations, is older than it has
been in any historical era, and the current generation of elderly people is
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the first to experience an extended old age in significant numbers.' Life
expectancy in the United States, for example, has risen from 68.2 years in
1950, to 74.9 years in 1985.8 The figures reflect the fact that a substantial
population is living well into their nineties, since life expectancy indicates
the number of years an individual at birth is expected to live (it rises
throughout the life span as contemporaries who die prematurely are omit-
ted from the calculation). Women who are age sixty-five today, for exam-
ple, will live an average of 83.6 years.9
The elderly population continues to grow, both in proportion to other
age groups and in absolute numbers. In England, between 1981 and 2001,
the number of people over age seventy-five is expected to increase from
three million to four million." Growth in the population over age eighty-
five is expected to be even more dramatic, increasing from 552,000 to
1,030,000 in the same time frame." Statistics are similar in the United
States, where the population age eighty-five and over is projected to in-
crease at about twice the rate of the age sixty-five to seventy-five group. 2
When all the post-war baby boomers reach age sixty-five around the year
2030, the elderly population will have grown approximately 140% and
will begin to progress from the relative self-sufficiency of early retirement
years to the more prevalent impairment of extreme old age. 3
Extreme old age is frequently marked by chronic impairments of health
and function. Arteriosclerosis tends to diminish energy, muscle-skeletal
' The world's population age 65 and older is growing at a rate of 2.4% per year, much faster
than the global population as a whole. The growth rate of older populations in developing countries
is, on the whole, higher than that for developed countries (i.e., all nations in Europe, including the
former Soviet Union, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) The age 85 and over
population is growing faster than the elderly population in general in developed and most developing
nations. KEVIN G. KINSELLA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AGING IN THE THIRD WORLD vii, 1-2
(1988); BARBARA B. TORREY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AN AGING WORLD: ADVANCE
REPORT 4-5 (1987).
" Charles Longino et al., Demography of Aging in the United States, in GERONTOLOGY: PER-
SPECTIVES AND ISSUES (Kenneth F. Ferraro ed., 1990). Figures for England are similar. See Brenda
Hoggett, The Elderly MentallyIll and Infirm: Procedures for Civil Commitment and Guardian-
ship, in AN AGING WORLD, supra note 3, at 517.
' Longino et al., supra note 8, at 25.
o Hoggett, supra note 8.
21 Id.
22 TASK FORCE ON LONG TERM HEALTH CARE POLICIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND




problems such as arthritis tend to decrease mobility, and sensory loss
makes interaction with the world more difficult. 4 Almost all the elderly
suffer from some loss of vision, including a loss of ability to see close
objects, increased sensitivity to glare, and loss of peripheral vision, and
have difficulty adjusting from light to dark. Loss of vision is not an illness
and may not be correctable. In addition, some individuals experience di-
minished mental ability because of infectious disease, lowered resistance to
toxic substances, including prescribed drugs, and degenerative conditions
of the brain. 5 While severe memory loss is a sign of illness, mild memory
loss is commonplace among those in their seventies and eighties, and may
be due to a gradual loss of neurons or a decrease of blood flow to the
brain. Loss usually occurs in the capacity to retrieve information; the
mind is fine, new facts can be learned, but the capacity to recall is dimin-
ished. Older events, on the other hand, may become more vivid, suggesting
to an untrained interviewer that the older person is disoriented in time.
The chronic impairments of extended old age increase the need for as-
sistance with the activities of daily life. For example, an elderly widow
may be living in a single family dwelling in which she raised her family.1 6
When driving becomes dangerous or threatening, she will need, at the
very least,'shopping and errand-running assistance, and transportation to
the doctor. When she is unable to fully perform household maintenance,
she will need occasional help with strenuous tasks. When she is ill or
becomes extremely frail, she will need daily assistance with cleaning, meal
preparation, and personal grooming. If she becomes forgetful or disori-
ented, she will need assistance with money management. Possibly, she can
no longer live alone.
These impairments, experienced in the context of today's society, have
changed the typical pattern of a lifespan. In the past, a typical life course
14 See George J. Ale:ander et al., Surrogate Management of Property of the Aged, 21 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 87 (1969).
"a OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., LOSING A MILLION
MINDS: CONFRONTING THE TRAGEDY OF ALZHEIMERS DISEASE AND OTHER DEMENTIAS 12-16
(1987) [hereinafter LOSING A MILLION MINDS] (defining dementia and listing 70 disorders causing
or simulating dementia).
" The typical client is a white female age 75 or older with limited education and limited income.
JOHN J. REGAN, NAT'L COUNCIL OF SENIOR CITIZENS LEGAL RESEARCH AND SERVS. FOR THE
ELDERLY PROJECT, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY, A WORK-
ING PAPER 19-20 (1977) [hereinafter PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY].
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included productive employment up to a period of acute illness, sudden
decline, and death." In the final illness, families usually took responsibil-
ity for their elders' care. i" Today, the very elderly may need care for a
period of years, or even for decades - beyond many adult children's abil-
ity to provide care and also to meet other responsibilities of working or
rearing children. 9 Substantially more adults have living parents who may
need care. In 1980, for example, more than forty percent of Americans in
their late fifties had a living parent, as compared with twenty-five percent
in 1940.20
There are likely to be fewer adult children to share the burden of care.
A low birthrate throughout the 1930s and early 1940s produced a cohort
of octagenarians who are likely to have one or no surviving children. Be-
cause of current low birth rates, a larger cohort of people with few or no
children will reach retirement between the years 2015 and 2035.
In addition, many family members are unsuited by location, training, or
inclination to provide direct assistance. Because society is more mobile,
children are more likely to live too far away to be of help. Women, who
most often are the caregivers, have undertaken nondomestic roles in sub-
stantial numbers, which may leave them unwilling and financially unable
to devote time to elder care. Although younger family members might
purchase care rather than provide it themselves, this is not a typical pat-
tern. Instead, elders are more likely to provide financial assistance to their
children, and governments are reluctant to compel families to pay the costs
of elder care because of the risks of intrafamily stress, dissension, and
elder abuse.2
17 CHARLENE HARRINGTON ET AL, LONG TERM CARE OF THE ELDERLY: PUBLIC POLICY
ISSuEs 25-26 (1985).
18 SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN SERVS. OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 100TH CONG.,
IsT SEss., EXPLODING THE MYTHS: CAREGIVING IN AMERICA (Comm. Print 1987) (study by Robyn
I. Stone).
9 See id. at 22 (duration of caregiving in the sample ranges up to 43 years with 20% providing
care for five years or more).
20 Id. at 8.
21 States generally fail to enforce a federal option to require family members to pay for the care
of their elderly. Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 435.602 forbids state agencies to
consider the income and resources of anyone except a spouse, or parent of a minor or disabled child,
available to an individual or to require reimbursement from such family members. However, federal
regulations do not preempt state law outside the application of the state Medicaid plan. A 1983
Medicaid transmittal (HCFA, Pub. 45-3, § 3812) stated that states can require the adult children or
1992]
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B. The Need for Substitute Decision-Making
Just as many elderly are unable to fulfill their needs for practical assis-
tance, many are unable to make decisions about their needs because of
dementia, a decline in mental function. The prevalence of severe dementia
rises from approximately one percent for persons age sixty-five to seventy-
four, to seven percent among those age seventy-five to eighty-four.2 2 At
least twenty-five percent of those over age eighty-five suffer from some
form of dementia.23 Although there are more than sixty causes that pro-
duce similar mental disabilities, the principal cause of chronic dementia in
the elderly is Alzheimer's Disease, an organic condition that causes a de-
cline of intellectual and emotional function and motor skills over a period
of years.24 The disease is irreversible and, at present, incurable.
Because of the prevalence of chronic impairment and dementia in a
growing population of the very aged, the need for substitute decision-mak-
ing inevitably will grow. Decisions about care customarily were made by
family members. Now, these decisions are likely to be complicated by a
variety of health and long term care options and a confusion of interested
professional parties. In community-based long term care, for example, the
options include home care on an around-the-clock, a daytime, or a visiting
basis; adult day care in which the elderly person might have available
recreation, meals, and companionship during the workday; 25 and board
and care facilities that provide personal assistance, meals, and living facili-
ties for ambulatory residents. 2' All of these options must be contrasted
with the option of institutionalization in a nursing home or mental health
facility.
other relatives of adult Medicaid claimants to provide financial support to these claimants under state
support statutes of general application. Medicaid's third party liability and collection requirements do
not apply to relatives under a state's support statute of general application. Approximately half of the
United States have "relative responsibility" statutes. See Catherine D. Byrd, Relative Responsibility
Extended: Requirement of Adult Children to Pay for Their Indigent Parent's Medical Needs, 22
FAM. L.Q. 87 (1988).
22 LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 15, at 9.
22 LOSING A MILLIO1 MINDS, supra note 15, at 6.
24 James Willot, Neurogerontology: The Aging Nervous System, in GERONTOLOGY: PERSPEC-
TIVES AND ISSUES 77 (Kenneth Ferraro ed., 1990).
25 See generally NATIONAL COUNCIL ON AGING, STANDARDS FOR ADULT DAY CARE (1984).
2 See generally MARILYN MOON ET AL., AMERICAN ASS'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, PRESERV-
ING INDEPENDENCE, SUPPORTING NEEDS: THE ROLE OF BOARD AND CARE HOMES 3-19 (1989).
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The process of choosing among options involves a highly personal eval-
uation of a number of important factors. Institutionalization assures that
certain services are readily available when needed, and reduces the risk of
accidents, such as falls, through protective supervision and a controlled
institutional environment. The disadvantages of institutionalization are its
high cost and the residents' loss of privacy and individuality. Residents
typically also lose physical and mental capability when living in a shel-
tered environment.2 7 The advantages of community-based long term care,
on the other hand, are the likelihood of greater self-reliance, limited costs,
and the positive physical and emotional effects of remaining in one's own
home.28 There is, however, a greater risk of accidents and of having needs
that are temporarily or permanently unmet. This risk is particularly great
when visiting caregivers provide services because the elderly person spends
a substantial part of the time alone.
The choice between institutional and community-based care involves
complex questions about the elderly individual's commitment to indepen-
dence and willingness to cooperate with care providers, the strength and
resources of the family, and the desire to take risks. With community-
based care, these decisions are complicated by the safety of the neighbor-
hood and housing, the helpfulness of friends and neighbors, and the avail-
ability of government or privately paid assistance. As the person's capabil-
ities change, the adequacy of community-based care must be reassessed
and the choice made over again.
Until recently, particularly in the United States,29 nursing home care
has been favored as a definitive solution when home care was inadequate
because institutional care tends to solve the problem of services once and
for all. Institutionalization substitutes in large part for management of
personal decisions since housing and services choices disappear into the
limited options of the institutional routine. In addition, institutionalization
largely solves property management questions by making the sole expen-
diture the cost of institutional housing and care. Assets that are not de-
27 For an insightful discussion of the impact of institutional care on the individual, see SISSELA
BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 12-13 (1982).
"8 See Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 719, 728 (1991) (elderly prefer home care to other forms of assistance).
19 See WILLIAM LAMMERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE AGING 158 (1983) (nursing home beds
increased from 510,000 in 1963 to 1,349,000 in 1978).
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voted to the cost of care can be managed with little concern for unexpected
needs.
Institutionalization, however, is no longer an affordable option as the
number of elderly grows. The cost of institutional care has risen faster
than any other type of service, at eighteen percent per year in the United
States throughout the 1980s, reaching an average cost in 1989 of $25,000
per year. Very few families can afford to pay for extended stays."0 Gov-
ernment benefits provide only a stopgap, since rising costs would merely
be shifted to taxpayers rather than contained. Consequently, in England,
social services authorities have placed heavy emphasis on limited visiting
home care.3
1
The explosion of medical technology has also increased the need for
substitute decision-making. There were once few treatment choices, and
the difference between them was insignificant because none were very ef-
fective. Today, surgery and drug therapies offer great promise and differ-
ing risks. Medical expertise provides only part of the knowledge necessary
to make many of these choices. The nature of the risk and the acceptabil-
ity of the likely results are moral choices and personal preferences that
only the patient can make (or, if the patient is too impaired to make treat-
ment decisions, by someone who can represent his or her individual point
of view). Although traditionally the proxy has been a family member, this
tradition lacks a firm basis in the law in both the United States and the
United Kingdom. In an increasingly litigious environment, health care
providers become unwilling to rely on customary family consent, particu-
larly when competency is at issue.
Lastly, an increase in the number of elderly property owners creates the
need for more substitute decision-makers for property management. After
World War II, ownership of real estate and other real property became
far more common in the United States and England. Many who became
property owners at that time are "house rich" elderly today, holding un-
mortgaged dwellings that have riseA in value over decades."2 Many elderly
30 See DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 2, at 240.
" England maintains a number of levels of assisted and sheltered living environments to meet
the needs of all but the extremely disabled elderly. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON AGING, AGE CON-
CERN ENGLAND, FACT SHEET No. 29: FINDING RESIDENTIAL AND NURSING HOME ACCOMMODA-
TION (1991).
32 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, Supra note 4, 2.12; SENATE SPECIAL COMM.
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also have savings, and some receive private pension funds which help as-
sure that routine expenses will not consume assets."3 Most of the elderly
have public pensions that guarantee a meager independent subsistance
level.3" Although most of the elderly are not rich, many are comfortable.
All elderly unable to control their assets and pay their bills require a
proxy to do so.
C. The Right to Choose
The right of disabled persons to pursue independent lifestyles and
health care choices is an established value in English and American socie-
ties. Beginning with the civil rights movements of the 1960s, advocates for
the disabled have sought to set standards for decisions regarding assistance
by establishing legal rights and policies, and goals based on professional
standards. Legal rights are provided to compensate for lost abilites or
choices that may have been overruled by caregivers.
The reforms with the broadest implications for the general population
are those regarding informed consent to medical treatment. The doctrine
of informed consent seeks to counter the traditional authority of the medi-
cal practitioner by giving the patient the right to choose and direct the
course of care.3 It has h~d a great impact in the United States, and was
spurred on by the rising number of malpractice suits since the 1960s.36 In
England, where the exceptions of necessity and emergency are far more
broadly interpreted, the fundamental doctrine is nevertheless growing in
importance.3 7
Other reform movements have addressed the needs of persons with spe-
cific disabilities. For example, advocates for the mentally ill in the United
States'effected changes in the law on involuntary commitment to mental
ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., TURNING HOME EQUITY INTO INCOME FOR OLDER HOMEOWN-
ERS 1 (Comm. Print 1984).
3 See Hoggett, supra note 8, at 523; Timothy M. James, The Trade, WILSON Q. REV. 107,
115-16 (1985).
31 James, supra note 33; see also Hoggett, supra note 8, at 523.
31 Margaret A. Somerville, Structuring the Issues in Informed Consent, 26 McGILL L.J. 740,
742-52 (1981).
3e See generally HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (Comm. Print 1990).
a See IAN KENNEDY & ANDREW GRUBB, MEDICAL LAW 458-68 (1989).
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hospitalization. The current standards limit the group of persons who are
subject to commitment and the type and extent of services that may be
provided without their consent. 8 For the developmentally disabled (called
the mentally disabled in England), the movement for reform has pursued
goals of growth, learning, and development for every disabled person in
order to achieve and maintain maximum capabilities." To achieve the
goals of the movement, advocates secured government funding for commu-
nity-based social services to replace widespread institutionalization.40
The movement's ideals emphasize assistance in accord with the personal
preferences of the impaired individual. Reformers assert that community-
based long term care is always to be preferred to institutional care because
it gives greater opportunity for self-determination. 4 The right to auton-
omy for many disabled persons has evolved from simply a right to be left
alone to the right to assistance in achieving personal objectives.
D. The Exclusion of the Elderly
Mentally impaired elderly people have lagged behind other groups in
securing the full benefits of rights of the disabled. In the United States, for
example, even where over eighty percent of wards are elderly, guardian-
ship laws are only now approaching the civil commitment reforms of
twenty years ago. In England, many of the mentally impaired elderly still
are civilly committed because guardianship is seldom considered an op-
tion.42 The impact of commitment is greater on the elderly, however, be-
cause most cannot receive appropriate treatment in a facility for the men-
tally ill.
"8 See David S. Douglas et al., Note, Rxfor the Elderly: Legal Rights (and Wrongs) Within the
Health Care System, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 425, 429-33 (1985) [hereinafter Rxfor the Eld-
erly]; cf. Robert Bluglass, The Origins of the Mental Health Act of 1983: Doctors in the House, in
BULLETIN OF THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 127 (1984) (extending due process protection
in civil commitment in England).
39 See Elias S. Cohen, The Elderly Mystique: Constraints on the Autonomy of the Elderly With
Disabilities, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 24, 27 (June Supp. 1988).
40 Id.
41 See Brian F. Hofland, Autonomy in Long Term Care: Background Issues and a Program-
matic Response, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 3-4 (June Supp. 1988).
42 In England and in the United States, a disproportionate number of mental patients are eld-
erly. See Hoggett, supra note 8", at 519; Elizabeth Jones & Arlene S. Kanter, Advocating for Free-




Civil commitment is not the most common form of institutionalization
for the elderly. In both the United States and England, many mentally
impaired elderly are admitted by others to nursing homes, where, despite
recent United States legislation,'43 little or no attempt is made to restore or
to maintain their capabilities. Once institutionalized, the elderly are likely
to remain so for the rest of their lives. 44
The goals of typical care providers for the aged differ significantly from
those of advocates for the developmentally and physically disabled. While
younger disabled persons are encouraged to participate in as many "main-
stream" activities as possible, including travel, shopping, and learning, the
elderly disabled person is provided home services primarily for the pur-
pose of avoiding institutionalization as long as possible. Younger disabled
persons are encouraged to choose and to manage their own care, while
elderly people receive services directed by the provider agency. The
agency-directed model was designed to meet acute, post-hospital care
needs. When long term care is agency-directed, the consumer's lack of
control may be expected to have negative effects on happiness, alertness,
socialization, health, and mortality rates. 45 A poor prognosis becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy rather than a valid generalization justifying an
age-specific difference in the goals of care.
The disparate treatment of older disabled people is based to some de-
gree on ageism, a negative perception of individuals due solely to their
chronological age. A more recent outgrowth of ageism is directed specifi-
cally toward the ill and disabled elderly. Particularly in America, society
has responded to physical impairment and emotional need among the eld-
, See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r (1988) (requirements for nursing home
participation and quality assurance in Medicare and Medicaid federal reimbursement programs).
" See ROBERT FRIEDLAND, FACING THE COSTS OF LONG TERM CARE 48 (1990) (policy study
by the Employee Benefit Research Institute; majority of elderly nursing home patients who stay be-
yond three months are unlikely to return home).
,5 Jerry Avorn & Ellen Langer, Induced Disability in Nursing Home Patients: A Controlled
Trial, 30 J. OF THE AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 397 (1982); Ellen J. Langer & Judith Rodin, The
Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal Responsibility For The Aged: A Field Experiment in an
Institutional Setting, 34 J. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 191 (1976); Judith Rodin & Edith
J. Langer, Long Term Effects of a Control-Relevant Intervention with the Institutionalized Aged, 35
J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 897 (1977); Richard Schulz & Barbara H. Haiusa, Long
Term Effects of Control and Predictability-Enhancing Interventions: Findings and Ethical Issues,
36 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1194 (1978).
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erly with a denial of full personhood and respect,46 a view that has been
termed "gerontophobia." 47 As a result, elderly people are more likely to
receive inferior quality professional services, particularly in health care.48
There is some evidence that health care providers are more likely to im-
pose unwanted services and institutional care on the elderly than on other
disabled persons, even' in the face of an elderly person's adamant
objection.49
Elderly people also may be mistreated out of ignorance; the needs and
abilities of elderly people are poorly understood. Alzheimer's disease pa-
tients, cut off by their growing inability to communicate with others, re-
ceive still less understanding.50 Many elderly cannot express their wishes
quickly or well, making it virtually impossible for an individual to effec-
tively assert his or her own interests contrary to family or professional
advice and assistance. Although caregivers may wish to help and to please
the older person, they may be unable to distinguish agreement and under-
standing from the passive acquiescence that is the hallmark of depression,
the most common emotional disorder among the elderly.
E. The Failure of Guardianship Reform
The reform of guardianship statutes is failing in a number of jurisdic-
tions and in a number of different ways. In the United States, many states
have considered guardianship reform and passed statutory amendments,
but only a few have passed comprehensive reform bills. Many states do
not require consideration of a limited guardianship, but instead leave such
an option to the courts-an option that is virtually never used if plenary
guardianship is available.51 In states that have adopted limited guardian-
40 Madelyn A. Iris, Guardianship and the Elderly: A Multi-Perspective View of the Decision-
Making Process, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 39, 44 (June Supp. 1988).
41 Cohen, supra note 39, at 24.
48 DIANA CRANE, THE SANCTITY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSICIANS' TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY
ILL PATIENTS 82 (1975) (equating advanced age with a decline in social value); DAVID SUDNOW,
PASSING ON: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF DYING 104-05 (1967).
"' See, e.g., HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 100TH CONG., IST SESS., ABUSES IN GUARDI-
ANSHIP OF THE ELDERLY AND INFIRM: A NATIONAL DISGRACE: A REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING
12-14 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter ABUSES IN AGING) (elderly cancer patient testifies he was
transported from his home and admitted to a nursing home over his vehement objection).
10 LOSING A MILLION MINDS, supra note 15, at 52-59.
"1 MADELYN A. IRIS, ERICKSON INST., CHICAGO, FINAL REPORT, THE USE OF LIMITED
[Vol. 41
BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP REFORM
ship, many courts fail to implement fully the spirit of the law and some
also fail to abide by the practical requirements of the statute. Insufficient
funding, as well as lack of understanding and resistance to change, is a
significant problem because limited guardianship requires more time and
effort on the part of judges, court personnel, counsel, and parties. In the
future, the courts may be overwhelmed with guardianship cases as the
number of very elderly, impaired persons grows. Even if one cannot say
that too much money, in absolute terms, will be required to conduct com-
petency proceedings because such proceedings are necessary for fairness to
respondents and prevention of deterioration and abuse of vulnerable peo-
ple, it is possible to predict that the costs of unnecessarily cumbersome
procedural requirements will be multiplied many times over in the grey-
ing society of the future.
In some states, petitioners can circumvent guardianship reform statutes
by using conservatorship statutes that allow informal proceedings that can
grant broad property management powers. Guardianship of property,
which falls under the more stringent procedural requirements, and conser-
vatorship, are identical in practical effect. When a conservator is ap-
pointed, a guardian of the person is seldom necessary because the conser-
vator can control personal decisions by financial constraints. 2 Hence, one
who wishes to avoid the time, expense, and scrutiny of limited guardian-
ship proceedings may do so without penalty by seeking conservatorship,
which gives the conservator broad powers.
Even if guardianship reform were fully implemented for every mentally
impaired elderly person, it would not create a system of decision-making
and care that fulfills its own goal of providing the least restrictive form of
assistance. Competency proceedings either result in the appointment of a
plenary or limited guardian, or the impaired person receives no assistance
or ongoing protection from authorities. Yet, permanent guardianship may
not be the optimum form of care. For many elderly impaired persons, a
period of stabilization followed by a reliable program of assistance from
family and friends might provide enough support to allow the individual
to make decisions necessary for life in the community. Often, the principal
GUARDIANSHIP AS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE FOR THE IMPAIRED ELDERLY: AN ETH-
NOGRAPHIC EXAMINATION OF THE PROBATE COURT AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (1986).
52 Richard W. Effland, Caring for the Elderly Under the Uniform Probate Code, 17 ARIz. L.
REV. 373, 378-79 (1975).
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need is a change of housing, regular meals, and companionship to effect a
significant improvement in capabilities. In order to make such services
available under protective supervision, guardianship must become part of
a system of long term, care decision-making options and supportive ser-
vices. Otherwise, it is likely that guardianship will be overused through
imposition on competent persons who come to the court's attention, but
need only practical, not decision-making, assistance, and underused, in
cases of incompetent persons who fail to receive medical care, housing, or
services appropriate to their condition and needs, because they have no
competent proxy decision-maker. Guardianship reform, therefore, is a
necessary step in correcting the effects of ageism and providing appropri-
ate rights to the disabled elderly. Guardianship reform alone, however, is
not sufficient.
In the following section, the provisions of guardianship and other laws
on proxy decision-making will be described. While the law alone cannot
determine attitudes toward the elderly, it can have a significant effect by
endorsing and implementing values that promote their well-being. 3 The
law first must determine who, among the impaired elderly, can be subject
to limits on the right to self-determination, and when third parties can
control an individual's lifestyle or decisions. The law must provide proce-
dures by which competency decisions can be made and supply values to
guide long term care decisions. The law must identify who is best suited
to make decisions of one type or another. When considered together, a
system of legal devices for proxy decision-making should provide an effi-
cient means for making and implementing long term care decisions, giving
due consideration to the ethical values of autonomy and to the protection
of vulnerable persons.
II. THE LAWS OF PROXY DECISION-MAKING IN
ENGLAND AND FLORIDA
It is useful to understand the origin and purposes of the law regarding
the mentally impaired- before considering the statutory provisions. The
guardianship laws by which all proxy decision-making devices are mea-
' On the effects of changes in the law on attitudes toward the mentally disordered, see Bruce D.




sured originated in English common law and were founded on a statute,
De Praerogativa Regis, from the reign of Edward II at the beginning of
the 14th century.5" This statute recognized that the sovereign was respon-
sible for the property of any individual found to be a lunatic "whose wit
and memory had failed."55 Lunacy was determined by an inquisition5"
and an investigation of the facts before an impaneled jury. Because inqui-
sitions were costly and rarely convened, guardianship applied only to a
few wealthy persons whose relatives were interested in the preservation of
hereditary lands and privileges. The sovereign was to manage the prop-
erty and return it to the lunatic upon his recovery, or to the heir and
creditors upon the lunatic's death, without taking any profits.
57
Early laws showed little concern with the well-being of the person, al-
though the royal prerogative undoubtedly could extend to personal protec-
tion. Indeed, the prerogative originally was exercised by the Exchequer as
an aspect of tax collection.5" It could be assumed that the church and the
family filled the need for care, although it became common practice to
appoint a committee of the person when a committee of the property was
found to be necessary.
Historically, the great majority of mentally disordered persons were not
the subject of any law. The treatment of the mentally disordered was first
addressed in the Vagrancy Act of 1714 regarding "wandering lunatics,"
and in 1744 when two justices of the peace were authorized to direct the
detention of those who were "ferociously mad." The control of the men-
tally ill sprang from an interest in protecting others from their dangerous
acts. Mentally impaired persons were detained in prisons, such as
Bethlam Hospital (from which the word bedlam is derived), and private
asylums run for profit. By 1774, the deplorable conditions in such institu-
tions prompted the passage of the Act Regulating Private Madhouses,
which attempted to control the worst abuses.
54 H.S. THEOBALD, THE LAw RELATING TO LUNACY (1924). The statute possibly was written
early in the reign of Edward I. See The Praerogativa Regis, in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND 182-89 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
'B See Hoggett, supra note 8, at 89-93; see also Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doc-
trine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978).
THEOBALD, supra note 54, at 1-2.
I' d.
58 1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 474 (7th ed. -rev. 1966).
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In the American colonies, the laws followed a similar pattern, though
the mentally impaired poor probably fared worse than in England. The
mentally ill often were left destitute to wander and beg. As in England,
the conditions in madhouses led to reform movements active throughout
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, prompting repeated legislative at-
tempts to create humane conditions. In America, the Society of Friends,
Quakers, was particularly active in educating and rehabilitating the men-
tally ill.
In the late 1800s, changes in society and treatment practices produced
changes in the law. In England, the increasing use of institutional care led
to passage of the Lunacy Act of 1890, which consolidated mental health
legislation and attempted to limit the number of individuals subject to
compulsory services by narrowing legal definitions and increasing legal
barriers. For the first time, the treatment of the mentally ill was subject to
legal constraints regardless of the need for property management.
The authority to manage property became subject to an uneasy blend of
mental health and guardianship laws. In the United States, the first con-
servatorship statutes were enacted in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts and
provided for property management for persons impaired by old age; the
statutes did not include the legal process usually required for a determina-
tion of incompetency. 9 Guardianship continued to require a formal deter-
mination of competency and usually addressed the needs of the person
who had property in need of management. The courts left the care of the
person to the family, and family members were strongly preferred as
guardians. The motives and practices of proxy decision-making had be-
come confused.
In 1959, after extensive consultation, Parliament enacted a radically
different mental health statute. -Advocates for change believed that the de-
velopment of a social services system, combined with advances in psychia-
try and in attitudes toward mental illness, offered all mentally impaired
persons useful treatment and services, and that these should not be denied
by the law. The Mental Health Act of 1959 provided separate procedures
for property management through the Court of Protection and for per-
sonal care by compulsory admission to a mental institution or guardian-
59 See Patrick J. Rohan, Caring for Persons Under a Disability: A Critique of the Role of the
Conservator and the "Substitution of Judgment Doctrine," 52 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1977).
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ship in the community. 60 This Act was intended to provide persons subject
to its provisions, who were called patients, the freedom to be cared for
informally to the greatest extent possible.61 The law was generally consid-
ered to be a successful reform, despite criticisms of medical paternalism,
malpractice, and abuse of individual patients' rights.62 The amendments
of 1982 and 198363 had only a modest effect, Some notable changes were
made, however: the definition of mental disorder was revised to limit the
institutionalization of the developmentally disabled; patients in mental in-
stitutions were provided procedural protection concerning consent to treat-
ment; the power of a guardian to compel a ward to accept medical treat-
ment was limited.
64
In the United States, guardianship became an increasingly informal le-
gal process, dominated by medical opinion, without the principled adop-
tion of new law as in England. Despite the existence of detailed statutes,
the requirements of a hearing and proof of incompetency were treated so
casually in most courts that virtually all guardianship petitions were ap-
proved. In Florida, for example, a petition for guardianship typically con-
sisted of a general statement of the nature of the disability, such as old
age, accompanied by a physician's report that could be as brief as a cor-
roborating conclusion about the reasons for the disability, such as senility.
As the respondent usually was not represented by counsel and frequently
did not appear, many hearings were completed in a matter of minutes. If
a plenary guardian was appointed, the ward usually lost all civil rights,
including the rights to vote, to marry, to enter into contracts, to hold li-
censes, and to choose housing, associates and service providers, although
some wards were capable of making decisions in exercise of these rights.
Most importantly, under plenary guardianship, the ward lost the right to
petition the court for review of the guardian's actions or for restoration of
legal competency.6 5
60 Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 72, §§ 100-121 (Eng.).
61 Buglass, supra note 38, at 127. Informal and voluntary are not identical. See infra notes 419-
26 and accompanying text.
62 See generally 1 LAWRENCE A. GOSTIN, A HUMAN CONDITION: THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT
FROM 1959 TO 1975: OBSERVATIONS, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (1975).
13 Mental Health (Amendment) Act, 1982, ch. 51 (Eng.); Mental Health (Amendment) (Scot-
land) Act, 1983, ch. 39 (Eng.); Bluglass, supra note 38, at 130.
" Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, §§ 7-10 (Eng.); Willis J. Spaulding, Mapping the "New
Legalism" of English Mental Health Law, 17 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 187, 188-90 (1989).
65 FLA. STAT. ch. 744.331(8) (1987).
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To compensate for legal disability, courts took responsibility for protect-
ing the ward from harm. Unfortunately, the trend of treating guardian-
ship as a private matter made supervision of guardians' actions so mini-
mal as to be ineffective. Although placed under the protection of the
courts in the United States, the guardianship process has been controlled
by medical opinion. As a result, traditional guardianship in the United
States and guardianship under the Mental Health Act in England have
much in common.
History suggests the ambivalence of the law and of society as a whole
towards the treatment of incompetent individuals who are not so impaired
as to require confinement. The Lunacy Act of 1890, like recent United
States reforms, reveals that the law's role has sometimes been the protec-
tion of persons from unwarranted assistance. The conservatorship statutes
and the Mental Health Act, by contrast, display the strong motivation to
provide help.
A. Guardianship of the Person
1. Florida Law
Under Florida's limited guardianship statute, passed in 1989 and
amended in 1990 and 1991, a person may be declared incompetent if he
or she lacks the capacity to manage at least some of his or her property or
to meet at least some of the requirements for health and safety.6 The
term incapacitated is preferred to incompetent because it suggests a dis-
crete area of disability. Notice of a petition for competency determination
and appointment of a guardian must be hand-delivered and explained to
the prospective ward and must also be mailed to family members and
significant friends.6 7 A prospective ward is entitled to legal counsel, and
an attorney is to be appointed by the court unless private counsel is re-
tained." At the hearing, the rules of evidence apply, and clear and con-
vincing proof of incompetency-greater than the civil standard of prepon-
derance of the evidence, but less than the criminal standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt-is required.69 Expert evidence of disability is provided
I d. ch. 744.102(10).
6 Id. ch. 744.331(1).
68 Id. ch. 744.331(2).
09 Id. ch. 744.331(5)(c).
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by a three .member examining committee that must include a psychiatrist
or other physician7 ' as well as other experts who can provide information
necessary for an accurate determination. One member of the examining
committee must have knowledge of the alleged area of disability.
The court is required to find the exact nature and scope of the person's
incapacities, to specify the legal disabilities to which the person is to be
subject, and to identify the rights the person is incapable of exercising.7 1
There are twenty-eight enumerated areas of rights and powers of the indi-
vidual. These areas are divided into three categories: those that may not
be removed,72 those that may be removed and can no longer be exer-
cised,73 and those that may be delegated to a guardian. 4 Fifteen rights are
listed in.the first category, six in the second, and seven in the third.
In determining competency, the court must consider a report based on
an examination by the committee members that includes results of a phys-
ical examination, a mental health examination, and a functional assess-
ment.7 5 The report must provide a diagnosis, a prognosis, and a recom-
mended course of treatment. It must also provide an evaluation of the
person's ability to exercise rights such as the right to manage property, to
determine, residence, to consent to medical treatment, and to make deci-
sions affecting the social environment.7 6 The report must also describe any
matters in which the person lacks capacity, explain the extent of incapac-
ity, and give the factual basis for the determination." The respondent has
the right to be present and to cross-examine experts as well as the right to
present opposing testimony.
Rights that may be transferred to a guardian include the right to make
contracts, to sue, to defend law suits, to apply for government benefits, to
manage property or make any gift or disposition of property, to determine
residence, to consent to medical treatment, and to make decisions about
social environment or other aspects of daily life.78 Non-delegable powers,
70 Id. ch. 744.331(3)(a).
71 Id. ch. 744.331(6)(a).
72 Id. ch. 744.3215(1).
71 Id. ch. 744.3215(2).
7' Id. ch. 744.3215(3).
71 Id. ch. 744.331(3)(c).
78 Id. ch.,744.331(3)(d)(1)-(2).
77 Id. ch. 744.331 (3)(d)(4).
71 Id. ch. 744.3215(3).
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which the court may remove, include the right to marry, to vote, to apply
personally for government benefits, to have a driver's license, to travel,
and to seek or retain employment. 9 Rights the court may not remove
include the right to retain counsel, to have access to the courts, to remain
as independent as possible, and to have one's preference as to place and
standard of living honored as long as the preference is reasonable.80
2. English Law
Under the Mental Health Act of 1983, an approved social worker or
the infirm person's nearest relative may apply to the social service author-
ity to have a guardian appointed."" The social service authority, however,
must concur for an application to proceed. 2 Only persons determined to
have a "mental disorder" may be subject to guardianship. "Mental disor-
der" has been interpreted to include elderly dementia as well as mental
illness.83 Persons with mental handicaps-that is, persons having incom-
plete or arrested development of the mind-cannot be subject to guardian-
ship unless they exhibit abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible
conduct. 4 The application must be supported by two doctors, 5 one of
whom must be a specialist in the field of the patient's disability."' For an
elderly person, an application is usually supported by a general practi-
tioner and a geriatric consultant or psychiatrist. Under the Mental Health
Act of 1959, a guardian's powers included all those a parent could exer-
cise over a child age fourteen or older. These included medical decision-
making powers, but not necessarily property management powers. A
guardian's powers were severely limited by the amendments of 1982 and
1983. The guardian mhay now require only that the ward reside at a spe-
cific place, be present at specified places and times for the purpose of
medical treatment (but the guardian may not mandate unwanted treat-
" Id. ch. 744.3215(2).
:o Id. ch. 744.3215(l).
8 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 11(1) (Eng.).
82 See id. § 11(2); RICHARD JONES, MENTAL HEALTH ACT MANUAL 36 (2d ed. 1988) (guardi-
anship application does not take effect until it is accepted by the authority).
82 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 1(2) (Eng.); JONES, supra note 82, at 14.
84 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 1(2) (Eng.); LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER,
supra note 4, 3.21; Bluglass, supra note 38, at 131 (describing the process of change in 1982 that
created this standard).
85 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 7(3) (Eng.).
0e See id. § 7(3)(a)-(b).
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ment), and be accessible at home to the guardian, social workers, or medi-
cal personnel.8
Guardianship is initially effective for six months. For civil commit-
ment,88 guardianship is renewable for an additional six months upon
medical recommendation, and annually thereafter. 9 The appointment of a
guardian is formally reviewed only upon a petition for discharge." A
hearing on a petition for discharge is held before one of the Mental
Health Review Tribunals, 1. which were established in 1959 to provide
local review from both medical and nonmedical perspectives.9" Appeals
thereafter are made to the High Court.93
B. Substitute Property Management
1. English Law
English law provides for substitute property management without an
adjudication of incompetency through the legal device of receivership. Re-
ceivership comes under the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection,94 which
was established by the Mental Health Act of 195998 to appoint and over-
see the work of receivers. A receiver may be a family member, a solicitor,
the court's administrative division serving in the role of Public Trustee,98
or, as a last resort, a district social services director.97
Property management can be provided to any person who is "incapable
by reason of mental disorder of managing and administering his property
and affairs."9 8 An application, usually initiated by the subject's nearest
87 Id. § 8(l).
8 See LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 11 2.10-3.17.
89 See Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 3 (Eng.); JONES, supra note 82, at 19.
90 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 69(1)(b) (Eng.).
9, See id. § 65.
JONES, supra note 82, at 119.
93 Id. at 120.
1, Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, §§ 93-121 (Eng.); LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PA-
PER, supra note 4, 3.6-3.9.
"See LARRY 0. GOSTIN, THE COURT OF PROTECTION: A SPECIAL REPORT 12 (1983).
o JONES, supra note 82, at 152.
97 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 99 (Eng.); JONES, supra note 82, at 159-60.
11 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 94(2) (Eng.).
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relative, requires the support of one medical practitioner,"9 not necessarily
a mental health specialist. Notice of the petition is sent to the nearest
relatives, who have a limited time in which to make objections. If there is
any objection, a closed hearing' 00 may be held before a judge nominated
from the Chancery Division of the High Court.' If there is no objection,
the court normally appoints a receiver without any intervening process.
Alternatively, if the requested action requires only a court order and the
person's assets are £5000 or less, or the assets are securely invested and
devoted to the person's maintenance, a Short Protection Order can be is-
sued comparatively quickly and inexpensively. 1 2
The court does not require the parties to attend the hearing, and al-
though it is authorized to send a visitor to investigate the circumstances of
the petition, it seldom does so. Usually, notice to interested parties is
marked, "This application will be dealt with by post unless otherwise
notified." 0 3
The appointment of a receiver by a Master of the Court may be ap-
pealed to a judge of the court within eight days of the decision or entry of
the order by applying for a hearing as prescribed by the Rules of the
Court.' 4 A hearing will be scheduled at which the judge can conduct a de
novo review.
The receiver's powers are limited to financial and legal matters. How-
ever, power to do what is "necessary or expedient" for the maintenance or
benefit of the patient, his or her family, or other dependents may extend
the receiver's powers to related matters.' 0 5 A receiver needs specific au-
thority to bring or to defend any related law suit 0 6 or to make a statutory
will if the individual is unable to make a will.0 7
Court of Protection Rules, 1984, S.I. 1984, No. 2035, Rule 32 (Eng.).
109 Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, § 12(1)(b) (Eng.); JONES, supra
note 82, at 153.
101 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 93 (Eng.).
.o Court of Protection Rules, 1984, S.I. 1984, No. 2035, Rule 7 (Eng.) (short procedure
orders).
'0' GOS-rIN, supra note 95, at 18.
o ' Court of Protection Rules, 1984, S.I. 1984, No. 2035, Rules 53 & 54 (Eng.); Mental Health
Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 105 (Eng.).
'' In re E (Mental Health Patient), [1985] 1 W.L.R. 245.
... Gos-rN, supra note 95, at 42-43.
1 7 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, §§ 96(e), 97 (Eng.).
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The court normally charges fees for the commencement of receivership
proceedings and for various other transactions authorized by it.108 The
court also charges an annual administration fee that is calculated as a
percentage of the subject's annual income.109
2. Florida and the Uniform Probate Code
Florida does not have a statute providing an alternative procedure for
substitute property management, so the requirements described above for
guardianship of the person must be followed in every case. However,
many states have conservatorship statutes that, like receivership in the
Court of Protection, provide for property management without an adjudi-
cation of incompetency. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC), 0 a model
code that United States jurisdictions may adopt or adapt, is an example.
Under the UPC, a conservator may be appointed for any person who is
unable to manage property and business affairs effectively due to mental
illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of
drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, detention by a foreign power, or
disappearance. 11 The petition must state the approximate value of the
property to be managed and the reasons assistance is necessary. 1 2 Notice
must be served personally on the respondent, it also may be served on
close relatives personally or by mail.11 The respondent is entitled to
counsel and the court may appoint an attorney for one who does not have
private counsel;114 this counsel may have the role of guardian ad litem
rather than advocate. 5 The court may send a visitor or physician to in-
terview the respondent.11 ' The respondent is entitled to a number of hear-
ing rights, including presentation of evidence, cross-examination, and trial
by jury. Upon finding a basis for the appointment of a conservator, the
court will appoint a person to hold all the powers that the respondent
08 Court of Protection Rules, 1984, S.I. 1984, No. 2035, Rule 78 (Eng.).
'09 Id. Rule 79.
"10 UNIF. PROBATE CODE Part 4, §§ 5-401 to 431 (1988).
"I Id. § 5-401(c).
112 Id. § 5-404.
113 Id. § 5-405.





could have exercised over his or her estate and business affairs.117
C. Protective Services
Protective services include a spectrum of legal, medical, and social ser-
vices, from guardianship to voluntary community-based services such as
counseling and home care.1 18 With the development of the social services
system, statutes providing such services have been enacted in each of the
United States and in England. The statutes define the role of social ser-
vices agencies with regard to individuals who need, but refuse, assistance.
Generally, the law authorizes emergency intervention to remove an infirm
person from home when he or she is suffering from abuse or neglect by a
caregiver or is deteriorating from self-neglect.
Protective services statutes typically include one procedure for routine
intervention that requires at least the formalities of notice and the sub-
ject's presence at the hearing. However, the statutes also provide an ab-
breviated emergency procedure. In practice, an emergency provision is
preferred for two reasons: first, when abuse is suspected, it is inappropri-
ate' to provide advance notice to the possibly abusive caregiver that plans
are being made to remove the vulnerable person from the home; and, sec-
ond, such a draconian form of intervention is not undertaken until an
emergency actually arises. The state serves as the petitioner in a protective
services action and is likely to become, at least temporarily, the caregiver
and substitute decision-maker as well. Nonemergency protective services
provisions are really an alternative form of guardianship, differing only in
the level of involvement by the state. Thus, this Article focuses upon the
emergency provisions.
1. English Law
In England there are two provisions authorizing protective services: the
National Assistance Act and the Mental Health Act. Under section forty-
seven of the National Assistance Act of 1948, as amended in 1951, a per-
son may be removed from his residence upon certification from a commu-
nity physician that removal is necessary either to serve the person's own
117 Id. § 5-407.
... PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY, supta note 16, at 18.
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interests or to prevent "injury to the health of, or serious nuisance to,
other persons."' 19 The application must allege that due to grave chronic
disease, age, infirmity, or physical incapacity, a person is living in unsani-
tary conditions and is neither able to care for himself or herself nor able to
- receive proper care and attention from others.120 Both procedures for ob-
taining an order seem to contemplate an emergency: the physician alone
may apply with the support of another physician,12 1 or the justice of the
peace may issue a warrant for removal.122 A hearing is held ex parte
before a single justice rather than the full court, and all notice require-
ments are waived.123 To "secure the necessary care and attention,"' 24 the
order directs the person's removal from the residence to a suitable hospital
or other place within a convenient distance. The order is effective for a
maximum period of three months but can be renewed. 125 Although the
individual has a right of appeal to the Mental Health Review Tribu-
nal,12  no action can be undertaken until six months after the
intervention. 21
Section 135 of the Mental Health Act of 1983 provides for an alterna-
tive procedure. An approved social worker may apply to a magistrate for
a warrant to search for and remove to a place of safety a person believed
to be suffering from a mental disorder where there is reasonable cause to
suspect such person has been ill-treated, neglected, or not kept under
proper control.' 28 If the person is living alone, he or she must be unable to
provide adequate personal care. Once removed to a place of safety, per-
sons may be detained, but cannot be treated without consent. A place of
safety is defined as a hospital, police station, mental nursing home or resi-
dential home for mentally disordered persons, or any other suitable resi-
dential accommodation approved by a local authority that is prepared to
", National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 29, § 47(1) (Eng.).
Id:
1 National Assistance (Amendment) Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 57, § 1 (Eng.).
122 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 135(1)-(2) (Eng.).
123 National Assistance (Amendment) Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 57, § 1(3) (Eng.).
"" National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 29, § 47(3) (Eng.).
126 Id. § 47(4).
128 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, §§ 65-79 (Eng.) (authorizing mental health review
tribunals).
127 Id. § 66(2)(g).
228 Id. § 135(1).
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receive the patient. 2 ' A person may be held for up to seventy-two hours
pending a decision to seek civil commitment, guardianship, or other
disposition.' 3
2. Florida Law
Under Florida law,' 3 ' the Department of Social Services may initiate a
protective services investigation when there is reason to believe that an
aged or disabled person is suffering from abuse or neglect that presents a
substantial risk of death or immediate and serious physical harm to that
person.' 2 Neglect is defined as the failure or omission on the part of the
caregiver or the impaired person to provide the care and services necessary
to maintain the impaired person's physical and mental health. Necessary
care and services include food, clothing, medicine, shelter, supervision, and
medical services that a prudent person would deem essential for an indi-
vidual's well-being.' 3 Immediate is defined as within twenty-four
hours. 3 The individual must lack the capacity to consent to emergency
protective services."' The law specifically states that no services can be
provided if the person has the capacity to consent but refuses; however, no
judicial determination of legal capacity is required before the intervention
takes place.
A social worker must seek permission to investigate the suspected abuse
or neglect. If refused, however, a social worker may forcibly enter the
premises, accompanied by a law enforcement officer, 3" and, if appropri-
ate, medical personnel. 13 7 If all investigators agree that the disabled per-
son is in substantial risk of death or immediate and serious physical harm
and is incapable of consenting to protective services, the person is to be
removed to a medical or protective services facility. 3 Medical services
that are necessary to prevent serious physical harm or death can be pro-
12. Id. § 135(6).
... Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 135(3) (Eng.).
.. Protection from Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation, FLA. STAT. ch. 415 (1987).
... Id. ch. 415.105(5).
... Id. ch. 415.102(12).
... Id. ch. 415.105(5).
235 Id.
:30 Id. ch. 415.105(5)(a).




vided despite lack of consent from the patient or a responsible person." 9
Other services that may be provided include community-based care, legal
advice, financial assistance, and aid in obtaining government benefits."4
Within twenty-four hours of removing of the patient, the Department
of Social Services must petition the court for an emergency order authoriz-
ing protective services and issued without a hearing.14 However, a hear-
ing must be held within forty-eight hours of the emergency order to estab-
lish probable cause to continue services for up to four days.14 2 The only
services that may be provided during this interval are those necessary to
remove the conditions creating the emergency. 4 3 The court must make a
specific finding of the need to change the individual's residence.144
At the end of the four days, another hearing is held to determine
whether protective services should be continued.4 5 At least twenty-four
hours notice of the hearing is given to the individual as well as to any
spouse, guardian, legal counsel, and adult children or next of kin.14 1 Upon
finding clear and convincing evidence of need, the court may authorize up
to sixty days of specified additional or continuing services4' by a desig-
nated service provider.14 1 Within this time, a hearing should be held to
determine whether services should be discontinued; if not, services should
be continued upon consent of the recipient, or a petition for guardianship
should be filed.'4 9 Services may continue by court order while such a peti-
tion is pending.'5 0
D. Powers of Attorney
At common law, a power of attorney is a form of agency created by one
person, the grantor, to authorize another person, the attorney-in-fact, to
139 Id.
"0 Id. ch. 415.102(14).
141 Id. ch. 415.105(5)(b).
" Id. ch. 415.105(5)(e)(1)-(2).
143 Id. ch. 415.105(5)(e)(2)(a).
144 Id. ch. 415.105(5)(e)(2)(b).
145 Id. ch. 415.105(5)(g).141 Id. ch. 415.105(5)(0.






manage his or her property and financial affairs. The power may be gen-
eral or specific; it is automatically revoked upon the death or incapacity of
the grantor. Clearly, this is an inappropriate result when a grantor is
planning for the possibility of dementia in later life. Durable or enduring
powers created by statute, on the other hand, continue unless supplanted
by a guardianship or other action of the court.
1. Enduring Powers in English Law
Enduring powers of attorney are authorized in England under the En-
during Powers of Attorney Act, implemented in March 1986.151 The Act
provides a procedure whereby a power of attorney, if executed with the
required formalities, remains in effect after the grantor becomes mentally
incapacitated. 152 The power conveyed may provide general authority for
property management or may be limited by restrictions or conditions.
The power takes effect immediately, functioning as an ordinary power
of attorney in that the grantor retains powers simultaneously with the
attorney-in-fact. However, when the grantor becomes incompetent, his or
her powers cease. To establish that the grantor is incompetent, the attor-
ney-in-fact must register the power with the Court of Protection, 5 3 which
is authorized to investigate by sending a Visitor.1 54 Notice of the applica-
tion for registration is sent to the grantor and his or her relatives. Once
the instrument is registered, the grantor cannot exercise, revoke, or amend
the powers conveyed by the instrument. The attorney-in-fact is overseen
by the Court of Protection, which may direct the attorney-in-fact regard-
ing the property management and may also remove an attorney-in-fact
who is found to be unsuitable.1 55
151 1985, ch. 29 (Eng).
152 Id. § 1()(a).
153 Enduring Powers of Attorney (Prescribed Form) Regulations, S.I. 1986, No. 126, § 4(2)-(6)
(Eng.).
15 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 103 (Eng.).
' Id. § 8(4)(g).
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2. The Durable Power of Attorney in Florida
The Florida durable power of attorney provision operates much like the
English enduring power."' 6 The document describing the power to be
conveyed includes .statutorily-prescribed language and is signed by the
grantor and the attorney-in-fact. 57 Once the durable power takes effect,
the authorized acts of the attorney-in-fact are effective as though they had
been the acts of the grantor.1 58 A key difference in the Florida provision,
however, is that no registration with the court is required in order for the
durable power to become effective.
E. Health Care Directives
Similarly, in the health care field, two legal devices have been created to
enable an individual to direct his or her personal and medical decisions in
the event of incompetency. First, the durable power of attorney for health
care is a device that permits appointment of another person to make medi-
cal decisions. Second, living wills, when executed in accordance with spec-
ified formalities, direct health care providers to provide or to withhold life-
sustaining procedures. These directives, like the durable powers of attor-
ney for property, may be self-executing or may require approval and
oversight by a professional or by the court.
1. Florida Law
Florida's living will statute applies only to life-prolonging procedures
for persons who have been diagnosed as terminally ill.159 In 1990, the
definition of life-prolonging procedures was expanded to include suste-
nance necessary to survival.'6 Artificial nutrition and hydration may be
withheld or withdrawn, according to the patient's directive, if the attend-
1"8 FLA. STAT. ch. 709.08 (1987).
187 Id.
188 Id.
188 Id. ch. 765.03(3), (6) (defining "life-prolonging procedure" as "any medical procedure, treat-
ment, or intervention which [u]tilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or sup-
plant a spontaneous vital function, and [w]hen applied to a patient in a terminal condition, serves only
to prolong the process of dying," and defining "terminal condition" as "a condition caused by injury,
disease, or illness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there can be no recovery
and which makes death imminent").
'60 Id. ch. 765.075.
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ing physician and one other physician, neither of whom have a financial
interest in the health care facility in which the patient is receiving care,
certify that sustenance is a life-prolonging procedure and that death is
imminent. The patient's next of kin can prevent the withdrawal of artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration for a reasonable period of time.
To enable a patient to direct such actions, the statute permits instruc-
tions to the physician'.' or designation of a substitute decision-maker." 2
A competent patient can make a declaration at any time by signing a
written statement in the presence of two witnesses. 63 One of the witnesses
must be unrelated to the declarant by blood or marriage. 4 If the declar-
ant is unable to write, the declaration may be dictated and one of the
witnesses can inscribe the declarant's name in the declarant's presence and
at his or her direction.' The declaration then must be given to the physi-
cian for entry into the patients medical record."" If the recording physi-
cian refuses to comply with the direction, the patient must be transferred
to another physician.'6 7
The Florida statute further provides that any person who withholds
life-sustaining treatment in accordance with a declaration is immune from
criminal prosecution and civil liability' unless it can be shown that
treatment was not performed in good faith compliance with the declara-
tion's terms. 69 A person who provides life-sustaining procedures, despite
knowledge of a declaration to refuse them, is guilty of a third degree fel-
ony.17 0 One who withholds life-prolonging procedures, despite knowledge
that a declaration has been revoked, is guilty of a second degree felony.17 '
Florida's health care surrogate legislation provides powers similar to
those available under a living will, but the statute applies regardless of
whether the patient is terminally ill. The health care surrogate document
10' Id. ch. 765.02.
:62 Id. ch. 765.05(2).
"63 Id. ch. 765.04(1).
:64 Id.
65 Id.
606 Id. ch. 765.04(2).
"8 Id. ch. 765.09.
100Id. ch. 765.10(1).
69 Id. ch. 765.10(2)..
11 Id. ch. 765.13(1).
'" Id. ch. 765.13(2).
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may grant the authority to make decisions regarding all medical proce-
dures, with some important exceptions: abortion, sterilization, electroshock
therapy, psychosurgery, experimental treatments, and admission to a
mental health facility, all of which must be approved by a court.' 72 Fur-
thermore, unlike the designee under a living will, the health care surro-
gate cannot make decisions regarding life-sustaining procedures. Appar-
ently, if the declarant wishes to direct life-prolonging procedures, the
statement must be executed in accordance with the living will statute de-
scribed above.173
The declaration of a health care surrogate must be in writing and
signed by the declarant in the presence of two attesting witnesses.17 4 One
of the witnesses may not be a spouse, blood relative, heir to the estate, or
person financially responsible for care.1 75 The health care surrogate is the
final authority regarding health care decisions, even if a guardian is ap-
pointed.17 The surrogate's authority and right to information is equal to
that of the patient, 7 and the surrogate must decide as he or she reasona-
bly believes the patient would decide. 78 Any interested party may request
a review of the surrogate's decisions . 79 The physician and surrogate must
reconsider the patient's competency every thirty days of a hospital stay.'
After seven years, a designation expires unless the patient is incompetent,
in which case it continues for the duration of the incompetency.' 8'
Both the living will and health care surrogate statutes include priority
lists that determine who is empowered to make decisions when the patient
has not designated a decision-maker. The lists are essentially the same,
designating first the legally appointed guardian, followed by the spouse,
an adult child or children, and a parent or parents. If none of these per-
sons are available and willing to serve, the living will statute directs the
designation of the nearest living relative, while the health care surrogate
,71 S. 748, 10th Leg., 1990 Fla. Leg., § 17(1)-(6).
M, Id. § 17(7).
174 Id. § 13(1)-(2).
176 Id. § 13(2).
176 Id. § 16(1)(a).
177 Id. § 21(1).
178 Id. § 16(1)(b).
179 Id. § 18(1).
:10 Id. § 19(2).
81 Id. § 20.
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statute refers the matter to a court.18 2
2. The Gap in English Law
English law does not provide a way for individuals to assure that their
health care choices will be followed during a period of incompetency.
Some commentators attribute the absence of such legislation to fear that
living wills could be produced by coercion or forgery by relatives who
stand-to inherit from the patient, or wish to be free of the burden of
caring for the patient. It is very important that the British Medical Asso-
ciation has opposed the use of advanced directives; instead, physicians
favor the continuation of their authority to determine the choice of treat-
ment. Although family members typically are consulted, they have no le-
gal right to direct care in opposition to professional opinion. Because the
frequency of malpractice claims has only recently begun to rise, English
practitioners have not needed to protect themselves from suits by patients
and families dissatisfied with their choices.
III. DISCUSSION OF THE LAWS
The laws described above represent two fundamentally different ap-
proaches to proxy decision-making. The Florida laws are rooted in the
principle of autonomy, while the principle of beneficence is central to the
English system. Autonomy includes an individual's right to form, to re-
vise, and to pursue personal plans for life."8" It relies on subjective, indi-
182 FLA. STAT. ch. 765.07 (1987); S. 748, supra note 172, § 15(2)(a).
'ss See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND Bi-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 44
(1982) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]. John Mill has stated that "the sole end for
which mankind are warranted ... in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection .... The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute." JOHN S. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 5 (John Gray ed.,
1991); see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (James W. Ellington
trans., 1981); IMMANUEL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE - PART II OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS (Mary J. Gregor trans., 1964).
In both the United States and England, the principal cases have involved contraception and abor-
tion rather than guardianship. See, e.g., Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth.,
[1985] 3 All E.R. 402 (right of a minor to receive contraceptives without knowledge of the parent);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a wonman's right to decide whether to terminate
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vidual standards that are identified on a case by case basis. In contrast,
beneficence seeks to prevent harm and to remove harmful conditions."" It
prompts the benevolent actor to provide the assistance deemed appropriate
by a collective, objective standard with which the recipient may or may
not agree. Benevolent assistance is strongly associated with the professions
of medicine, psychology, and social work.
A. Legal and Medical Authority
1. Medicalization and Beneficence
The English system takes no position on rights so much as it deems
them irrelevant for purposes of guardianship and civil commitment. Ac-
cording to its proponents, there are no significant adverse interests be-
tween the care provider and the recipient.' 85 Any legal process interposed
between them is an expensive waste of time because it will not result in
any desirable changes in the course of action. The Mental Health Act, a
legislative effort to provide quick and efficient help to those who need it,
has been widely regarded as sound, effective legislation. 8
It may be difficult for American lawyers, and perhaps Americans gen-
erally, to imagine a point of view from which the difficulties in the En-
glish proxy decision-making system are not obvious. This is because
Americans are more inclined to see interactions in terms of individual
rights.' 17 It is helpful to view the Mental Health Act as an example of the
traditional perspective of the law regarding the mentally ill: they are not
free, so their liberty interests cannot be diminished. Theoretically and his-
torically, an inquisition imposed guardianship only when its members be-
lieved that the person before it had already lost his or her autonomy. The
'pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state law prohibiting the
distribution of contraception information and devices). The concept of fundamental liberties for the
mentally impaired has been developed in the context of civil commitment. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), rein-
stated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
184 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 194-
215 (1989).
181 See Spaulding, supra note 64, at 187.
'8 Bluglass, supra note 38, at 128.




question is whether the patient's autonomy has diminished to the point
that the medical professional's view is deemed to represent the patient's
interests in care and treatment.
A heated debate has ensued over the past decade concerning the nature
of the patient's best interests and the physician's determination and imple-
mentation of those interests.188 Beneficence, according to some commenta-
tors, has become paternalism, interfering in the life or decisions for the
benefit of an individual independent of the individual's wishes.18 9 This
paternalism may be positive, prompting physicians to use their skills to
optimize their patients' well-being. Yet, paternalism implicitly overrides
patients' wishes,19 and possibly their express preferences as well.
Some commentators argue that physician paternalism is necessary be-
cause physical and mental illnesses result in diminished autonomy." 1 Ac-
cording to this view, the effect of illness on decision-making capacity can-
not be ameliorated by giving a patient information about his or her
diagnosis and prognosis given alternative treatments, as required by the
doctrine of informed consent. Rather, illness creates an existential condi-
tion, related to mortality, that "gently or harshly impinges on the human
soul. 1 92 Physician paternalism fills the vacuum in decision-making left by
receding autonomy. Therefore, paternalistic action is, by definition, for the
good of the patient. Paternalism, it is argued, minimizes the future auton-
omy of the patient.
Physicians have argued for the recognition of "real will" to supplant
the weakness of will that causes a patient to refuse recommended treat-
ment."' Accordingly, the choice a patient expresses in these circumstances
does not represent a genuine autonomous choice because it is based on
misunderstanding or erroneous beliefs, and is not in accord with the indi-
"' See generally JAMES F. CHILDRESS, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?: PATERNALISM IN HEALTH
CARE (1982).
'89 Clifton B. Perry & William B. Applegate, Medical Paternalism and Patient Self-Determi-
nation, 33 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 353, 353 (1985).
190 Patricia Parmalee & William Altman, Discrimination Based on Age: The Special Case of
Institutionalized Aged, in THE HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW (1990).
191 Mark S. Komrad, A Defence of Medical Paternalism: Maximizing Patients' Autonomy, .9 J.
MED. ETHICS 38 (1983).
192 Id. at 41.
'9' See CHILDRESS, supra note 188, at 186-211.
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vidual's values.""' The physician substitutes "real will," that is, decision-
making in accordance with the patient's actual values and wishes, until
genuine will returns and the patient's choice again becomes clear.'95
It cannot be denied that such exchanges of will commonly take place in
acute and long term care. Real lapses of will arise from fear or misunder-
standing that might be discerned and, it is hoped, acted upon. As Jay
Katz observed, "There are considerable barriers, conscious and uncon-
scious, intellectual and emotional, to understanding proposed treat-
ments."1 96 In long term care, the more common patient response may be
acquiescence or apathy, so a choice must be imposed.
The loss of decision-making capacity in illness has been demonstrated
in studies of hypothetical treatment decisions by elderly medical patients.
In one study, elderly patients tended to reach decisions similar to those of
younger patients regarding risks and benefits, but had a poorer compre-
hension of consent information, making the reliability of their final choices
questionable. 97 This was especially true with individuals in the early
stages of Alzheimer's disease.' Diminished decision-making capability
has also been demonstrated in long term care. In addition, an English
study showed that elderly patients interviewed on the eve of hospital re-
lease frequently could not assess their own capabilities to perform some
aspects of self-care at home.' 99
On the other hand, there is a strong sense that a significant loss of
autonomy is not caused by illness itself, but by the failure of caregivers to
allow patients to participate in the decision-making process. "° ° The cause,
194 See MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 183, at 57-62 (real versus express au-
tonomy); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 184, at 212-15 (the nature of paternalism).
195 See CHILDRESS, supra note 188, at 186-211. An alternative view proposes categories of hard
and soft paternalism. See JoEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 12-16 (1984). Soft paternalism deems
intervention to be morally justified only when an individual's conduct is substantially involuntary or
when intervention is needed to establish whether conduct is voluntary. This is the proponent's vision
of the exchange described above. Hard paternalism deems intervention morally justified to protect
competent adults, against their will, from harmful consequences. Id.
'"JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION wiTH HUMAN BEINGS 609-73 (1972).
'9' See Barbara Stanley et al., Functional Competency of Elderly at Risk, 28 GERONTOLOGIST
53, 54 (June Supp. 1988).
198 Id.
'99 Interview with Oliver Corrado, M.D., Geriatric Consultant, University of Leeds (Nov. 8,
1990).
200 The distinction between collaboration and coercion is a fine one, particularly when the pa-
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it is proposed, has its roots in the drastic changes in physicians' perspec-
tives and in the delivery of medical care in the last twenty-five years,
which have made medicine less capable of addressing the full range of a
patient's interests. The medical view has become artificially fixed on ob-
jective scientific criteria, often manipulated by specialists who have not
had sufficient communication with patients to establish a relationship.
William Donnelly discusses this objective focus in the process of
caregiving, observing that the history of the present illness (HPI) compo-
nent of every medical record has changed."'1 Traditionally, there was a
painstaking inquiry resulting in a diagnostically convincing narrative of
the patient's symptoms. Today, the HPI consists of a chronology of events
and facts without information about the ideas or feelings of the patients.2 2
Physicians, Donnelly asserts, have stopped listening to the element of the
patient's consciousness that they deem irrelevant. The physician has
learned not to relate to the patient as a whole; this failure exacerbates the
undervaluation and destruction of relationships that stem from systems of
specialist care.
Even if changes in medical education reestablished the traditional medi-
cal narrative, 03 it is doubtful that the medical system could meet the
needs of today's long term care recipients because of medicine's focus on
health as the central concern. Chronically impaired persons, who are
struggling to survive with their remaining capabilities, have more impor-
tant concerns than the pursuit of elusive health. Therefore, choices made
by health care providers may completely ignore factors such as family dy-
namics, finances, and psychology that are important to the patient.204 Un-
like the artificial restriction of information described above, this focus on
health is not necessarily a shortcoming in medical care. Instead, it suggests
tient's choice develops from opposition to accord with professional recommendation. See infra part
III.D.2 (voluntary services within official proxy decision-making proceedings).
'01 William J. Donnelly, Righting the Medical Record: Transforming Chronicle into Story, 260
JAMA 823 (1988).
202 Id. It is not incidental that a significant cause of the cost explosion in medicine is due to the
cost of diagnostic testing for all remote illnesses (rather than careful physician inquiry that would
eliminate remote illnesses from consideration).
203 See Sonia L. Nazario, Medical Science Seeks a Cure for Doctors Suffering from Boorish
Bedside Manner, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1992, at BI (medical schools respond to criticism of physi-
cians' ability to communicate with patients by instituting instruction and testing).
204 See MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 183, at 139-45 (discussing medical cur-
riculum innovations regarding assessment of patient needs).
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that health is not the only concern that requires attention, even during
illness.
The medical model also tends to institutionalize patients who could live
in the community with appropriate assistance, 0 5 especially mentally ill
patients who are often uncooperative in treatment. 06 Institutional care
maximizes the opportunities for health care and minimizes the risks of
undertreatment or accident. The provision of unnecessary services in an
institution runs contrary to current social policy favoring deinstitutional-
ization for ecomonic and humane reasons.2"' The institutional environ-
ment tends to discount remaining aspects-of health and capability, labeling
each person a patient suffering from, or characterized by, disability.
The drastic change in the recipients of mental health services in this
century, particularly over the past twenty years, is the most compelling
development indicating that the medical model for competency determina-
tion should be discarded. Today, recipients of mental health services in-
clude persons who are far more capable than the "lunatics" of the past.2 °0
The small number of lunatics under the sovereign's care in early modern
England sharply contrasts with the substantial number of persons with
various disabilities that exist today.209 With the growth of social service
states, advocates for the disabled have, somewhat paradoxically, increased
the number of partially capable persons who receive involuntary services.
The goal of services to partially disabled persons is to encourage and pro-
tect their remaining capabilities in their present state, rather than in an-
ticipation of eventual recovery.
The heavy costs of error must be weighed in light of the significant risk
of incorrect decisions. The patient's expression of wishes may not be be-
205 See Patricia Parmalee, Protective Services for the Elderly: Do We Deal Competently with
Incompetency?, L. & POL. Q. 397, 404-05 (Oct. 1980) (merger of competency and commitment
statutes).
206 Grant H. Morris, The Use of Guardianships to Achieve - or to Avoid - the Least Restric-
tive Alternative, 3 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 97, 113 (1980).
207 Id. at 104 (number of people in state mental hospitals in the United States declined from over
550,000 in 1955 to 200,000 in 1975).
'" Regarding the statutory definitions of appropriate wards in the past, see Gerry W. Beyer,
Enhancing Self-Determination Through Guardian Self-Declaration, 23 IND. L. REv. 71, 74 n.22
(1990); Peter M. Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40
Mo. L. REv. 215, 231-59 (1975).
29 See Beyer, supra note 208, at 74-76.
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lieved or respected because of misperception. Physician or service provid-
ers may impose their own personal or professional values, perhaps with-
out even being aware that an alternative view is valid for the disabled
person.21 0 The result will be coerced compliance,21 either with protest or
'acquiescence. The patient's real will is ignored, not achieved, in a decision
that may determine the health or the lifestyle of the patient for the rest of
his or her life.
The value of beneficence should not be abandoned in favor of an adver-
sarial system. It is, as it should be, the principal value motivating proxy
decision-making in health services. On the other hand, the beneficence-
only model is inappropriate for all but the never-competent and the com-
pletely incapacitated person because this model de-emphasizes to the point
of extinction the person's own point of view and participation in deter-
mining his or her own fate.212 The desire to do good, in any case, need not
be the sole value underlying substitute decision-making procedures be-
cause it is not incompatible with a weighing of the conflicting interests of
the respondent and other parties or the state.21 '
2. Collaborative Decision-Making
Social work is also involved in intervention for protective services and
the determination of competency for guardianship.214 The principles of
social work, while reflecting the goal of helping the disabled or disadvan-
taged, differ from those of health care in that they include concern with
the autonomy of the client. Assistance for the disabled is provided with the
goal of social independence, built on the assumption that all citizens
should have the opportunity to undertake, or have undertaken for them,
210 See Box, supra note 27 (discussing the compelling nature of values learned by the
professional).
"I See MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 183, at 63-68; KENNEDY & GRUBB,
supra note 37, at 277; Rxfor the Elderly, supra note 38, at 434.
212 But see Komrad, supra note 191 (paternalism is a response to decreased autonomy rather
than a negation of rights).
212 See Elaine B. Krasik, Note, The Role of the Family in Medical Decision-Makingfor Incom-
petent Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. Pirr. L. REv. 539, 562
(1987) (assuming that courts in actions based on the states parens patriae power should consider
conflicting interests presented in the case).
2'14 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (English guardianship must be approved by
the social services authority, and social services agencies are petitioners in protective services actions).
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the basic activities of daily life, such as bathing, grooming, cooking, eating,
and mobility.2" 5 In both the United States and in England, a basic goal of
social work, sometimes endorsed in law, is to provide the least restrictive
means of assistance that will enable the individual to achieve an accept-
able standard of living in the community. 1
In order to determine the least restrictive alternative, social workers rely
on a functional assessment, a process by which factors affecting an indi-
vidual's ability to succeed in non-institutional living, such as informal and
formal support services and the condition and security of housing arrange-
ments, are evaluated. The performance of a functional assessment typi-
cally involves observation of the individual in a number of representative,
common tasks. In emergency intervention, the assessment may apply only
to tasks or abilities that are alleged to create risk of harm. In non-emer-
gency proceedings, a detailed inventory cataloging the person's observed or
self-assessed ability to undertake a range of activities necessary for inde-
pendent living may be completed.21 7 These activities of daily living include
bathing, dressing, preparing and eating food, and walking. They also in-
clude tasks necessary to obtain information or services, called instrumental
activities of daily living, such as paying bills, making doctor appointments,
and obtaining transportation.21
A system for determining competency that includes the social worker's
perspective is more complete and more accurate than one confined only to
medical and psychological views. The evidence considered relevant to the
case includes the results of medical, psychological, and functional assess-
ments, as required by Florida's reform statute.21 9 Possibly, professionals
could arrive at appropriate conclusions about the impaired person's need
518 COMMUNITY LIFE, supra note 1, at 16.
2 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 415.101 (1987) (The purposes of the adult protective services act
include placing the fewest possible restrictions on personal liberty and the exercise of constitutional
rights consistent with due process and protection from abuse, neglect, and exploitation.); LAW COM-
MISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 1 4.20, at 104; Alison P. Barnes, Florida Guardian-
ship and the Elderly: The Paradoxical Right to Unwanted Assistance, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 949, 968-
69 (1988).
2" Rudy Abrahams & Sara Lamb, Developing Reliable Assessment in Case-Managed Geriatric
Long Term Care Programs, in CASE MANAGEMENT: GUIDING PATIENTS THROUGH THE HEALTH
CARE MAZE 118-19 (Karen Fisher & Ellen Weisman eds., 1988) (Joint Commission on Accredita-
tion of Healthcare Organizations); COMMUNITY LIFE, supra note 1, at 21-24.
218 Abrahams & Lamb, supra note 217, at 118-19; COMMUNITY LIFE, supra note 1, at 21-24.
SIB FLA. STAT. ch. 744.331 (1987) (calling for three types of assessment).
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for a proxy decision-maker without court proceedings. A system based on
the interaction of professionals is an attractive idea, promising to avoid the
unpleasantness, delay, and expense of legal proceedings. Such a system is,
perhaps naturally, favored by the professionals themselves. The Mental
Health Act Commission calls for a continuation of the current English
system, which seeks to assure "good practice" in the care of the mentally
impaired by means of interaction among health care and social services
professionals in the form of consulting opinions and discussions with fam-
ily members rather than legal proceedings.22 Certainly, such interaction
is essential for an accurate disposition of mental health cases.
The consultation system in England is not working effectively.221 The
lines of communication between social services and medical authorities
vary from locality to locality and from time to time. There is no clearly
established procedure or forum for interaction and resolution of genuine
differences of opinion. The time and effort required for consultation is not
adequately recognized or rewarded and, in any case, the consultation sys-
tem conflicts with pressing demands to provide direct medical or social
services to individuals in need.
It is doubtful whether such a system could work consistently because of
the imbalance of power between medical personnel, other professionals,
and family members. The medical profession holds disproportionate au-
thority because of tradition and entrenched power. In a conflict of opinion,
the medical professional will almost always prevail. Even if professionals
in community-based care commanded similar respect, it is likely that med-
ical recommendations for more complete or more aggressive care would
often prevail because of the threat of public censure and legal liability that
exists when a care plan of substantially greater risk is undertaken. From
the perspective of risk prevention, guardianship is an inferior adjunct to
civil commitment because the individual receives much less care and pro-
tection from accidental harm.222 Unfortunately for the patient, protection
disables any remaining potential for self-determination.
A very significant difficulty in collaboration is the failure of medicine,
220 See Hoggett, supra note 8, at 520.
221 Id. at 524 (asserting the system has failed).
222 On categories of law and their influence on attitudes toward legal proceedings, see Sales &
Kahle, supra note 53, at 398-99.
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psychology, and law to develop a common language that would allow
communication among the disciplines.223  Altman and Parmalee observe
that the medical and psychological evidence fails to provide the informa-
tion about a respondent that is needed for limited guardianship. 224 First,
the commonly used tests fail to distinguish degrees of mental impairment
or to indicate likely causes.225 The early stages of Alzheimer's disease, for
example, are difficult to distinguish from other, reversible disorders.226 In
addition, psychiatric testing results shed little light on the respondent's
ability to perform tasks of living.227 As a result, courts continue to depend
heavily on the opinions of experts, despite the concerns expressed by the
experts themselves about the validity of their opinions. 228
It is also likely that private consultation among professionals is too in-
herently uncertain and too unregulated a process to justify the imposition
of compulsory powers. The minimal use of guardianship under the
Mental Health Act provides an illustration. The provisions of the 1982
and 1983 Mental Health Act Amendments that restricted guardians' pow-
ers were enacted because experts believed the powers provided by the
1959 statute were too broad to be justified when dealing with an adult
capable of living in the community. The restrictions did not increase the
use of guardianship, however. Only twenty-four guardianships per year
223 See Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise,
53 YALE L.J. 271, 276-78 (1944) (insanity is not an operative legal fact).
2. Parmalee & Altman, supra note 190, at 16.
225 The categories of tests include psychiatric ratings, psychometric instruments, and neuro-
psychological tests. Parmalee and Altman observe that psychiatric ratings, based on subjective evalua-
tions by respondents or informants, have little to contribute to a legal proceeding. Psychometric instru-
ments, including short mental status tests most commonly used in competency evaluations, reliably
distinguish gross impairment, but are insensitive to finer levels of dysfunction. Neuropsychological
tests, which are longer and more focused, distinguish different types of errors associated with specific
degrees and locales of brain dysfunction, but also fail adequately to distinguish degrees of impairment.
Also, because the tests are specific, a thorough examination requires a battery of tests that may fatigue
the respondent. All three types of tests have been developed using younger adult respondents, so their
validity for the elderly is questionable. Finally, results that identify lesser degrees of impairment fail
to make a differential diagnosis indicating the likely prognosis. Id.
212 Arnold J. Rosoff & Gary L. Gottlieb, Preserving Personal Autonomy for the Elderly: Com-
petency, Guardianship, and Alzheimer's Disease, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (1987).
22 Parmalee & Altman, supra note 190, at 16-19. Although there are several measures of func-
tional capability in the elderly, they distinguish poorly between physical and mental dysfunction.
'2 See, e.g., Ronald Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of
Incompetency: A Sceptical [sic] Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 564, 570 (1984).
1992]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
were created in England from 1973 to 1977 .229 By contrast, California,
which has less than half the population of England, created 9113 guard-
ianships from 1976 to 1977.210 Since the powers could not be further re-
duced and still provide any practical decision-making assistance to the
ward, it appears the scope of powers is not the problem. Instead, it is the
fault of the private consultation process used to justify them, which is too
variable from case to case, too cursory, or too secretive to be considered
accurate and fair. In order to enable other professionals to give an in-
formed opinion, the disciplines of medicine and psychology must develop
testing that permits insight into the concerns of the competency determina-
tion, including the relationship of diagnosis, function, and prognosis.
The purpose of the medicalized system is to provide assistance in order
to maximize the likelihood that the impaired person will return to a de-
gree of self-determination. The collaboration of professionals is the best
forum for assessing the individual's capabilities. However, in order to pro-
tect an individual's interest in autonomy, experts must be held accountable
for their conclusions and reasoning. Opinions rendered in an accountabil-
ity environment form the basis from which principles of decision-making,
and legal procedures, can be derived.
3. Judicialization and Autonomy
Legal process requirements promote autonomy by acting as a check on
medical authority or other professional assistance. The legal perspective
recognizes that substitute decision-making has a severe effect on personal
liberty and cannot be considered entirely good so long as the individual
has some capacity to determine his or her own actions. Indeed,' advocates
of full legal process in guardianship assert that informal incompetency
proceedings work effectively as a form of oppression and social control.231
Legal process, then, seeks to protect the disabled person from an unneces-
2129 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 3.20.
211 Morris, supra note 206, at 113.
"' See Annina M. Mitchell, Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guard-
ianshipfor Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405 (1979). But see John J. Regan, Protective Services
for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship and Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569 (1972)
(arguing that guardianship without the stigma of incompetency is a form of help that should be




sary declaration of incompetency and unwanted, unwarranted assistance.
a. Legal Process
The addition of legal process to involuntary proxy decision-making
promises an increasing refinement of efforts to balance the'values of be-
neficence and autonomy by identifying the types' and degrees of mental
disabilities and the functional symptoms that are severe enough to warrant
the appointment of a proxy. It provides the procedure for notifying all
who have an interest in the outcome of the proceeding and for allowing
them to be heard. The addition of legal process promises an objective
weighing of various types of information and would provide an effective
forum for objectively balancing competing interests and drawing dispas-
sionate conclusions.23 2 Courts use procedural due process safeguards de-
veloped explicitly to assure the accuracy and credibility of decisions.233 In
addition, the rule of stare decisis leads to the development of principles for
future decision-making, and to similar treatment of individuals in similar
circumstances. In short, the purpose of legal process is the fair resolution
of important matters in dispute. Applying all the requirements of due pro-
cess to proxy decision-making could resolve the problems of determining
limited competency.
The use of legal process and accountable conclusions present a number
of specific disadvantages in proxy decision-making. For example, the use
of legal process limits guardians' usefulness by allowing only a narrow
latitude of responsibility. On the one hand, the guardian cannot act with-
out specific legal authority, although changing conditions may require it.
On the other hand, the guardian is responsible as a fiduciary for the
ward's well-being and cannot withdraw from the responsibility without
leave of court, even if the ward regains capabilities. When the guardian
receives broad discretionary powers, by contrast, he or she can relinquish
increasing responsibility to the ward who regains capability. Unfortu-
12" See Charles H. Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Relman,
4 AM. J.L. & MED. 337, 353 (1979); see also Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass. 1977) (stating that only duly established courts of proper jurisdiction
have ultimate decision-making responsibility, and that courts can undertake "the process of detached
but passionate investigation and decision" required to determine case of treatment to an incompetent
person).
"' Baron, supra note 232, at 353.
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nately for the elderly, unlike the young, this almost never happens in
practice, although it is possible. From a legal point of view, rights have
been removed and legal action is required to restore them. From a social
services perspective, the inflexibility of the law would be less important if
a more comprehensive range of community-based care were available, al-
lowing changes in the ward's capabilities to be accommodated without ab-
rupt leaps from minimal care to institutional care. However, the home
care system in England is quite limited and is virtually nonexistent in
many regions of the United States.
Legal process is time consuming and expensive. Based on an informal
polling of attorneys, the cost for the creation of a limited guardianship is
$4000 to $6000 for elderly people with modest, typical assets. The time
from petition to adjudication varies, but is seldom less than two months.
Reform statutes typically set a minimum interval between petition and
hearing to allow the respondent time to prepare a case.
Another factor that might weigh against the use of formal legal process
is the possibility that legal formality creates or intensifies a sense of stigma
for the ward and the family, leading to a variety of negative attitudes and
attributions.13 4 Stigma is undoubtedly an aspect of incompetency and
mental illness; it can result in others interpreting even normal behavior as
aberrant.23 5 Stigma might be associated with, or aggravated by, the re-
quirements for formal proceedings, which emphasize the importance of a
change in status from competency to incompetency. The right to be free
from stigma has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as
fundamental in civil commitment proceedings. For the individual, the
stigma from a declaration of incompetency can be so traumatic as to cause
deterioration and even death.2"'
There is considerable doubt whether formal legal proceedings are likely
to increase stigma. Although opponents of guardianship reforms in the
United States have asserted that due process requirements cause more
stigma to attach to the adjudication, other commentators maintain that
lack of due process is the real source of vague, negative attributions of the
234 See OXFORD CONCISE DIcTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 1197 (8th ed. 1990).
235 See Michael Kindred, Guardianship and Limitations Upon Capacity, in THE MENTALLY
RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 62, 82 n.89 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976).
23 Bobbe S. Nolan, Functional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings, 12
LAW, MED. & HEALTiH CARE 210, 217 n.19 (Oct. 1984).
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individual's separateness from competent persons.2 "7 To reach a conclu-
sion regarding stigma and legal process, one must carefully examine
American attitudes towards autonomy and disability.
b. Legal Autonomy and Real Autonomy
The American legal view of autonomy fails accurately to reflect the
persons and relationships in long term care because it requires that a per-
son have the capacity for independent, rational choice. This view arose
from the philosophy and politics of the 17th century; it was a basis for
resisting the oppressive use of power by an enemy or a sovereign. The
American legal view of autonomy asserts that people are free to act ac-
cording to their rational beliefs and desires, provided only that those ac-
tions do not harm others. This view is at odds with the nature of auton-
omy as it exists in much of our lives and where the interchange with
others cannot be reduced to transfers of information from which flow a
reasonable sequence of actions.288 The American view completely fails to
recognize the nature of important relationships for impaired individuals
who need assistance to live.
The legal view of autonomy has shaped the doctrine of informed con-
sent, which requires the disclosure of particular information to elicit a
decision from the patient based on personal concerns and medical pos-
sibilities. 2 0 Although there is much debate on the nature of the informa-
tion to be revealed and the decision-making process, the emphasis is on
objective information regarding the medical procedure and rational deci-
277 See Sales & Kahle, supra note 53, at 395-96.
"' Liberal individualism, which envisions society's basic unit as the rational, self-interested per-
son, views society as a compromise undertaken by the individual to gain protection, bargaining power,
or other advantages. This view informs relationships between persons, making them adversarial, al-
though they may be private in nature.
29 The literature on informed consent is extensive. See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., IN-
FORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); MARTIN S. PERNICK, THE PATIENT'S
ROLE IN MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL
THERAPY (1981); ROBERT M. VEATCH, NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, BELMONT REPORT, THREE THEORIES OF
INFORMED CONSENT: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13 (1978); Alex-
ander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 340 (1974); Jay Katz, Informed Consent - - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PrrT. L.
REV. 137 (1977); Somerville, supra note 35.
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sion-making. The doctrine of informed consent has been called an "ethics
of strangers, 2 4° a vision of interaction that discounts the importance of an
ongoing relationship of trust that allows the patient to rely upon the
choices of another decision-maker. Instead of considering all aspects of the
relationship, informed consent acknowledges only the power of the
caregiver over the care recipient and the recipient's right to resist that
power. This view, while undeniably valid, represents only a small legal
slice of the entire ethical pie.241
The imbalance of power is so great in acute care situations that the
legal doctrine of informed consent is probably an appropriate balancing
mechanism. 242 Patients are subject to the depersonalizing hospital milieu,
and receive care from specialists whom the, do not know and may never
see again. They often cannot ascertain that their values are held in com-
mon with their health care providers; it must be assumed the relationship
is an adversarial one in which either the health care provider's goal or the
patient's goal will prevail. The doctrine of informed consent rejects the
assumption of shared values and empowers the patient's autonomy to
"trump" all other values. 24' The legal view of autonomy has been applied
to long term care relationships, with results ranging from ineffective to
alarming. Attempts to provide assistance have been crude and haphazard;
the options have been all or nothing. For example, if an elderly person is
the subject of a guardianship petition, a proxy decision-maker is almost
certain to be appointed and the likelihood of institutionalization is very
high.244 An equally impaired person who escapes the attention of authori-
ties may be left to cope with no decision-making assistance or protection at
all.
Long term care relationships are depicted as adversarial. In guardian-
ship reforms and regulation of other care relationships, for example, lists
of rights resistant to unwanted assistance are enacted as law245 and pro-
24O Robert J. Levine, Medical Ethics and Personal Doctors: Conflicts Between What We Teach
and What We Want, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 351 (1981); Stephen Toulmin, The Tyranny of Principles,
11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31 (Dec. 1981).
"' See Bart Collopy et al., The Ethics of Home Care: Autonomy and Accomodation, 20 HAs-
TINGS CENTER REP. 3 (Mar.-Apr. Supp. 1990).
242 Id. at 7.
243 Id.
244 See Good & King, supra note 5, at 58 (all but 7 of 408 petitions for guardianship approved).
245 See 42 C.F.R. § 483.10 (1991) (nursing home must protect and promote the rights of each
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vide access to advocates to enforce them.24 The use of advance directives
is authorized so that, even while incompetent, an individual can require
others to desist from interfering.,
47
An acceptance of the American view of autonomy has negative effects
on the psychological well-being of disabled individuals and their
caregivers. In order to fit the rational model of independent actors, care
recipients must deny their needs and reject assistance. Many disabled in-
dividuals express hostility toward their helpers and all who need help,
including themselves. This attitude has been called counterdependence, a
rejection of dependency of any kind. A similar attitude is reflected in sus-
picious oversight of caregivers by professionals and authorities. The inti-
mate relationship of trust necessary for respect and self-respect in chronic
care, which can only thrive in privacy, is vulnerable to the intrusions of
critical outsiders.
Two trends in public policy in the past decade illustrate the negative
effects and the gathering momentum of this adversarial view. One is the
mistrust of caregivers as potentially abusive. Beginning in 1981,248 con-
gressional committees periodically have convened hearings on the physical,
financial, and emotional abuse of the elderly.2 49 Early studies showed that
the victims were likely to be disproportionately female and very old.
There was no agreement on other aspects of the problem, including the
degree of physical and mental impairment of the victims, the characteris-
tics of the perpetrators, or the dynamics of the relationships. In addition,
resident). This is not intended to underestimate the usefulness of a general statement of rights to
establish the type of treatment the ward is entitled to receive. Under Florida guardianship law, for
example, these include the right to regular reconsideration of the need to continue the guardian's
duties; to humane treatment; to remain independent as long as possible, having the ward's preference
as to place and standard of living honored; to be informed as to how property is being managed; to
have access to courts and counsel; and to privacy. The enforceability of such ideals in court is, needless
to say, problematic. See Makas v. Hillhaven Inc., 589 F. Supp. 736 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
248 See discussion infra part III.B.5.b.
247 See discussion supra part II.E.
248 HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A HIDDEN PROB-
LEM, H.R. Doc. No. 277, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981).
249 See, e.g., HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, ELDER ABUSE: A DEC-
ADE OF SHAME AND INACTION, H.R. Doc. No. 997, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter
SHAME AND INACTION]; Elder Abuse: An Assessment of the Federal Response: Hearings Before the
House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Federal Response]; HOUSE
SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND LONG TERM-CARE, ELDER ABUSE: A NATIONAL DISGRACE, H.R.
Doc. No. 83, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2926 (1985) [hereinafter NATIONAL DISGRACE].
19921
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
the studies were criticized for using small, unrepresentative samples, rely-
ing only on retrospective case records, omitting control groups, and lump-
ing together various types of maltreatment.2 50 Nevertheless, the worst of-
fenders identified in the hearings were over-stressed caregivers. One
congressional report stated that "[t]he horrifying conclusion to be drawn
was that elder abuse, . . . breaking the bond between parent and child,
was everywhere. '25
1
Despite the absence of studies attempting to identify the scope of the
problem, it was claimed at the 1985 congressional hearings that about a
million elderly were abused annually. More recent hearings conclude,
with little basis, that the incidence of abuse may have doubled. 5 Estimat-
ing the incidence of abuse is difficult because definitions vary from state to
state and abuse report records are incomplete. One survey, polling 2020
respondents in the Boston area about their experience with physical and
psychological abuse and neglect, found that slightly more than three per-
cent of the sixty-five-and-over population reported having been so mis-
treated. If this study is representative of the nation, then between 700,000
and 1,094,000 elderly people have been abused.2 53 Another study esti-
mates that if state statutes were standardized, between 51,000 and
186,000 persons age sixty and older would have been reported to public
agencies in 1985 as possible victims of abuse and neglect.254
While any incidence of abuse of a vulnerable person is cause for con-
cern, the alarmist nature of the congressional hearings has caused wide-
spread mistrust of caregivers, most of whom are family members. Forty-
three states passed mandatory reporting laws, modeled on child abuse
statutes, that require health care providers and social workers to report
bruises, fractures, or other possible evidence of abuse. These new laws
remain controversial because they intrude on elderly persons' privacy and
2,0 Federal Responre, supra note 249 (statement of Rosalie S. Wolf, President, National Com-
mittee for the Prevention of Elder Abuse and Associate Director, University Center on Aging, Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Medical Center).
251 NATIONAL DISGRACE, supra note 249, at I.
212 See, e.g., SHAME AND INACTION, supra note 249.
'53 Karl Pillemer & David Finkelhor, The Prevalence Of Elder Abuse: A Random Sample Sur-
vey, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 51 (Feb. 1988).
254 Toshio Tatara, Toward the Development of Estimates of the National Incidence of Reports
of Elder Abuse Based on Currently Available State Data: An Exploratory Study, in ELDER ABUSE:
PRACTICE AND POLICY (Rachel Filinson & Stanley R. Ingman eds., 1989).
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autonomy.255
Advocates and congressional inquiries continue to inflate the incidence
of elder abuse and call for more data and investigation with little regard
to more recent empirical studies.25 At the May 1990 hearing, for exam-
ple, Representative Mary R. Oakar introduced legislation authorizing the
creation of a national data bank to consolidate and analyze existing infor-
mation on elderly abuse2 57 despite unabated criticism of state data banks.
Exploitation and similar maneuvers to get political attention is likely to
continue.258
Another destructive result of adversarial characterizations in long term
care is the mistrust of family members in proxy decision-making roles.
2 See Dyana Lee, Note, Mandatoy Reporting of Elder Abuse: A Cheap but Ineffective Solu-
tion to the Problem, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723 (1986).
258 The second wave of studies was more rigorous than the first and painted a very different
picture. Federal Response, supra note 249, at 4. The second study concluded that most elder abuse is
financial rather than physical, and most perpetrators are door-to-door salesmen or bunco artists rather
than relatives. Three different profiles of caregiver/perpetrators emerged. One identifies perpetrators
with histories of alcoholism or mental illness who are likely to subject their victims, physically capable
elderly who often suffer from emotional problems, to physical and psychological abuse. The perpetra-
tor is likely to live with the victim and depend upon the victim for support. A second profile describes
perpetrators with financial problems, possibly stemming from substance abuse, who find unmarried,
isolated elderly to be easy targets for exploitation. The third profile, which most closely resembles the
caregiver abuse model, differs in that the wrongdoing consists of neglect rather than aggressive or
exploitative acts. Perpetrators neither have psychological problems nor depend upon the victims finan-
cially, but find the victim to be a source of stress. The victim is likely to be very old, with cognitive
and functional problems, and with little social support. Id.
257 H.R. 4863, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
2158 The problem of alarmist reports will continue, and will spread to other issues, because of the
convergence of several forces in the political sphere. Legislators today face an acute need to distinguish
themselves from other legislators and potential opponents for election by solving serious problems for
their constituents. Many of the greatest problems, such as economic well-being and health care cover-
age, defy simple solutions, particularly in a time of extremely scarce resources for new initiatives.
Thus, legislators downplay these problems by calling attention to a real but less global need, such as
the prevention of elder abuse. In order to make the problem seem as serious as possible, they empha-
size the most alarming estimates of frequency and the most egregious incidents (such as abuse by an
adult child caregiver), if not plainly inflate the statistics beyond the limits of truthfulness. Policy is
dictated by "four-alarm cases," although it fails to encourage good caregiving relationships. L.B. Mc-
Collough & Stephen Wear, Respect for Autonomy and Medical Paternalism Reconsidered, 6 THEO-
RETICAL MED. 295 (1985).
Even many of the solutions for minor problems cost more than the deficit reduction budget will
allow, so legislators choose the least costly alternatives. These alternatives include collection and anal-
ysis of statistical information, dissemination of reports, and sponsorship of public information pro-
grams. Such programs are also least likely to spark political opposition, so the legislator offering a bill
to promote these alternatives will find many cosigners who will be pleased to lend their support.
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Elderly people are encouraged to execute advance directives, such as living
wills and durable powers of attorney, in order to avoid the need for proxy
decision-making by health care providers and family members. Studies
support the need for such strategies to preserve autonomy, which is nar-
rowly defined as independence from outside decision-makers. Finding that
many family members would not make the same treatment choices for
their elderly relatives as the elderly would make for themselves, commen-
tators reason that families lack the necessary knowledge to serve as their
charges' proxy decision-makers.259 These commentators found that rela-
tives cannot predict what elderly people would choose since few of the
elderly ever discuss such choices with their relatives.280 As in the case of
informed consent, the general commentaries substitute the individual's
right to decide independently for a meaningful discussion between the pa-
tient and proxy.
More recent studies reveal the errors of the earlier conclusions, finding
little evidence that families hinder autonomy or that conflicts of interests
and goals occur to any significant extent.2"' Instead, these studies show
that an overwhelming majority (approximately ninety percent) of citizens,
including the elderly, prefer that family members serve as health care
proxies"' and that elderly people without family members to~ assist them
are bewildered about who would serve as proxy.268 Apparently, the eld-
erly generally would reject a right to independent decision-making and
would rely on the social network of family ties.264 That is, impaired indi-
viduals normally exercise their -autonomy by choosing a trusted family
member to make choices for them.
Autonomy for the care recipient is an important value that should not
219 See Richard F. Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients'
Resuscitation Preferences, 43 J. OF GERONTOLOGY: MED. SCI. M115 (1988); Nancy Zweibel &
Christine Cassel, Treatment Choices at the End ofLife: A Comparison of Decisions by Older Patients
and Their Physician-Selected Proxies, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 615 (1989).
260 Zweibel & Cassel, supra note 259, at 620-21.
261 See Amy Horowitz et al., A Conceptual and Empirical Exploration of Personal Autonomy
Issues Within Family Caregiving Relationships, 31 GERONTOLOGIST 23 (1991).
262 See Dallas M. High, All in the Family. Extended Autonomy and Expectations in Surrogate
Health Care Decision-Making, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 46 (Supp. 1988).
262 See Dallas M. High, Old and Alone. Surrogate Health Care Decision-Making for the Eld-
erly Without Families, 4 J. AGING STUD. 277 (1991).




be rejected because of distaste for the inaccuracy and ill will inherent in
adversarial models. At the same time, the relationship between the care
provider and care recipient in a long term care situation is quite different
from the adversarial stance in an acute care situation because the imbal-
ance of powers between provider and recipient is not so great in the for-
mer. The provider and recipient are engaged primarily in ordinary tasks
of daily living that the recipient once did independently, and about which
he or she has legitimate personal preferences and opinions. The home
environment, unlike the institution, reflects the impaired person's person-
ality and control and requires more involvement and activity from him or
her. The provider and recipient of care are engaged in a joint task, main-
taining social independence despite disability.
A broader definition of autonomy better reflects the actors in chronic
care and the relationships that exist between them. An action is autono-
mous if the actor can identify with the elements from which the action
flows. Autonomy exists only if the actor possesses a relatively stable con-
cept of characteristics that comprise an identity (the self), and if the action
flows from the context of people, institutions, and society with which the
actor identifies. This definition takes into account the critical significance
of a trusting relationship to successful long term care. Therefore, the ap-
propriate proxy decision includes the assistance of actors with which the
impaired person identifies, provided they intend to help. The elderly could
find support in their frequent desire to make decisions in light of their
impact on the family as a whole or on particular members. This does not
open the way to providing assistance over objection, however, since only
the individual can say whether he or she identifies with others' concerns.
In light of these views, the onus of stigma arises from a more funda-
mental source than mere formality in proceedings. It arises from Ameri-
can embarrassment about disability and ambivalence regarding depen-
dency.265 Vague, global attributions of difference from others are the most
pernicious. Yet, making a precise determination of the nature and extent
of the incapacity should result in a decrease in stigma, as should the crea-
tion of a system which assumes that some dependency is wholesome and
acceptable, rather than conflicting with a fully human existence.
2U Katz, sup ra note 239. The author observed that the perception of stigma comes from "funda-




The current reform statutes may be necessary as an affirmative action
for the disabled elderly that raises society's awareness of the importance of
elderly peoples' rights and of practical options for implementing them.
The type of autonomy implemented by the reform statutes is too narrow,
however, since it is based on freedom from interference, the right to be left
alone. Simply leaving the impaired elderly alone is inadequate. Rather,
autonomy should be encouraged by a system of proxy appointments; deci-
sion-making should take into account the relative and transient nature of
incompetency, which depends on the assistance available from those whom
the elderly person trusts. Legal formality is not in itself objectionable, so
arguments for informality in order to reduce stigma to the ward should
not impede the use of requirements for careful, public review of the evi-
dence. However, a cost-efficient system should be devised and tested now
to prepare for the growing numbers of elderly impaired persons in the
future.
c. Failure in the Probate Courts
The forum normally associated with formal legal process is the court
system. Unfortunately, courts have a poor record in handling mental
health cases generally and competency cases in particular. They have
acted too often as a rubber stamp for the proposals in the petition,2 6 so
that an overwhelming proportion of petitions result in guardianship. 2 7 In
the United States in 1987 and 1988, the press exposed deplorable results
of negligent court practices in guardianship: inaccurate evidence, sloppy
procedure, and erroneous orders.268
Although recent reforms provide an opportunity for reevaluation and a
new commitment to sound practices, a number of factors suggest any im-
provements will be modest. First, the role of the court in competency cases
differs from its role in adversarial cases in which each party is capable of
presenting opposing views. The respondent in a competency proceeding
268 See Hoggett, supra note 8, at 522.
267 A study of 300 involuntary commitment actions in the United States revealed that 98% of
court findings agree with psychiatric recommendation. Dale A. Albers & Richard Pasewark, Involun-
tary Hospitalization: Surrender at the Courthouse, 2 AM. J. OF COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 287-89
(1974); see also Michael L. Perlin, Are the Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?:
Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 KAN. L. REv. 957 (1990).
266 See Good & King, supra note 5.
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often has difficulty simply identifying an acceptable alternative to the pro-
posals for guardianship. To compensate for the respondent's disability, the
court must take an inquisitorial role, gather essential information, assure
its review at the hearing, consider alternative plans on its own initiative if
the respondent does not present them, and supervise the activities of proxy
decision-makers. Most courts are poorly equipped to fulfill this role.
Courts usually are passive reviewers of evidence brought to the courtroom
and have no personnel to undertake such time-consuming tasks.
It is difficult for individuals, including those on the bench, to fully un-
derstand that a competency determination is a process that depends upon
expert evaluation.2" 9 The continuing confusion seems to arise largely be-
cause of hazy concepts of mental disability and its diagnosis, which as-
sume that a layperson can determine by observation whether a person is
legally competent. This may be true in extreme circumstances: an individ-
ual who is raving violently or is comatose is observably incompetent at
least while the condition persists. For individuals capable of living with
assistance in the community, however, mental disability is a complex, rel-
ative state that requires careful examination of expert evidence before a
legal decision can be reached. Limited guardianship requires such- evi-
dence; this gives the court something to consider besides the respondent's
demeanor. The tenacity of the layperson's determination is shown by cur-
rent advice to legal counsel for a prospective ward, which warns that the
client must attend the hearing in order to avoid guardianship. Although
one might argue thaf a judge has no more justification for deciding that a
respondent looks incompetent than for concluding that a criminal defend-
ant looks guilty, it is likely to be some time before judicial education is
effective.
Certainly, guardianship cases would benefit if removed from their
anachronistic placement in the probate courts, with its slow processing of
the estates of the dead. Whether due to superstitious dislike by the public
and the bar or disdain for their notorious slowness and cost, probate
courts tend to be a low priority when funds and bench assignments are
distributed.270 The probabe court is not an appropriate place for those
269 See, e.g., MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 183, at 172-73 (assessment of
decision-making can be done by a layman). But see BRENDA M. HOGGETT, MENTAL HEALTH LAW
46 (2d ed. 1984) (calling this theory "the-man-must-be-mad"test of competency).
270 See, e.g., LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 3.9, at 65.
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under limited guardianships and others no longer deprived of their legal
personhood. A shift away from the probate courts sends a strong message
indicating change in the personal and property management of wards.
B. A System for Long Term Care Decision-Making
Neither the medical view nor a limited legal version of autonomy are
adequate to produce a working system of decision-making in long term
care. Medical dominance diminishes to the point of extinction any re-
maining capabilities of an impaired person while an autonomy of rights
and powers erodes beneficial relationships. The determination of compe-
tency requires a balancing of the two perspectives. It requires recognition
and encouragement of the interdependence of impaired persons and their
caregivers by providing a range of community-based assistance.
Two impediments exist to creating a new system that utilizes the best of
each view. One is that law, medicine, and psychology have failed to find a
common language that would allow even a modicum of precision in a
competency determination. Another is that the trier of fact remains insti-
tution-bound in a courtroom or a hospital rather than going to the site of
the mental or functional failure to investigate, does not allow equal access
to all parties, and does not assure ongoing quality and appropriateness of
care. A new system must include procedures that require the disciplines to
identify and use common concepts of the nature and significance of vari-
ous types of impairment and must also give the trier bf fact the capability
for community investigation and oversight.
The following proposal is intended to provide a single forum for every
type of proxy decision, with procedures that enable expertise from the
professions of health, social work, and law to be brought to bear on the
problem quickly and without unnecessary procedural obstacles or expense.
1. A New Jurisdiction
All proxy decision-making matters should be removed from the regular
court docket to a specialized tribunal. 21 Alternatives to court proceedings
211 Mediation was an option strongly favored by the respondents at the 1992 Thrower Sympo-
sium on Elder Law. The specific type and administrative structures for mediation in proxy decision-
making were not discussed and are beyond the scope of this Article. It will be sufficient to observe that
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are introduced mainly to divert an unwieldy volume of cases that would
cause congested dockets and extend the time from filing to disposition. A
special tribunal is more efficient because it hears the same type of case
repeatedly, so that a basic body of evidence need not be reintroduced at
each hearing because it is already known to the fact finder and advocates.
In addition, other litigants would enjoy better access to the courts by the
removal of the special cases from the docket.
The efficiency of a special tribunal is appropriate in the context of
proxy decision-making. Demographic information suggests that there will
be a considerable increase in the volume of cases over the next few years,
and the limited guardianship reforms may result in competency proceed-
ings for relatively capable persons who are excluded from the current pro-
jections of growth.
Cost savings is another justification cited for creating specialized or al-
ternative proceedings. It might be argued with regard to alternative pro-
ceedings that a reduction in the cost per case is unlikely because legal
process has generally not led to accurate resolutions. This, however, is a
false comparison. The cost of the alternative should be compared with the
cost of limited guardianship proceedings in the probate courts. Costs that
might not be paid from court funds, but are expenses of a competency
determination, include salaries for investigators and advocates who assist
in the preparation of cases and conduct oversight activities throughout the
time the court has jurisdiction. Although it is impossible to determine an
accurate total cost for processing a case, it is notable that alternative dis-
pute resolution in other types of cases has been found to offer three- to
five-fold savings over traditional civil case processing27
The principal impediment to success in the use of alternative dispute
resolution in the United States is the high rate of appeals to the general
courts, because of the lack of full credibility and finality of administrative
an imbalance of power between parties to a dispute creates a risk of unfairness in mediation that must
be recognized and controlled by a skillful, informed mediator.
.. See Deborah Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbitra-
tion, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986). Examples of administrative costs for alternative dispute resolution
include a California system in which an arbitrator receives an honorarium of $150 per day, and a
Pennsylvania system in which three-person panels hear three to four cases for $100 each per day, for
an average cost of $65 in fees. Id. at 4. The difference would be much greater, of course, if the
respondent chose a jury trial as permitted in many jurisdictions. Id.
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court and alternative process decisions. If the case is appealed, the total
cost of disposition includes both alternative and ordinary processes. The
right to appeal cannot'be restricted unreasonably without infringing on
the constitutional right of access to the courts. It is unlikely, however, that
many proxy decision-making cases will be appealed. There is no incentive
to get before a jury to elicit a sympathetic determination as there is in a
malpractice or benefits case, since the impaired person is not seeking dam-
ages. Indeed, a jury may be more likely than a panel of experts to find an
inarticulate, elderly person unable to manage his or her own affairs. If an
unsuccessful petitioner appeals, the record of expert evidence in the spe-
cial tribunal will weigh heavily against reversal by the general courts.
The special tribunal's lesser status also might be a positive attribute in
mental health cases if it results in a reduction of stigma from the adjudica-
tion. The finding of incompetency could become more like a diagnosis of
physical disability, which has much less stigma than a diagnosis of mental
illness. One might imagine circumstances in which the petitioner/
caregiver and physically impaired respondent collude to attain access to
long term care services that are available only by order of the court for
individuals found to be so impaired as to require limited guardianship.
Although such manipulation is certainly not desirable, a declaration of
limited incapacity is desirable when contrasted with the long-standing fear
of being considered mentally ill. It is to be hoped that the reduction in
stigma will be accompanied by an increase in accuracy, or consistency in
determinations of competency, so that few will receive services to which
they are not entitled under the eligibility criteria of social services
programs.
A problem resulting from the use of alternative dispute resolution is the
risk of tying the adjudication too closely to the level of government services
funding if the trier of fact is closely associated with the social services
agency. The difficulty is illustrated in social services systems in England
and the United States. In England, commentators have encouraged the
creation of guardianships as part of an effort to deinstitutionalize some
mental hospital patients. However, the government has failed to require
the National Health Service to release a portion of funding currently
spent on institutionalization for use by social services authorities.2" 3 It is a
273 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 1 3.32, at 85.
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risky policy to create only a few guardianships since the creation of any
implies that other patients with similar disabilities should be treated the
same. Regardless of the benefits of guardianship for particular individuals,
therefore, England has created none because social services authorities
cannot afford them.
In the United States, the difficulty is illustrated by the adjudication rec-
ord of the administrative courts run by the Social Security Administration
to hear claims for disability income and Medicare benefits that have been
denied. Because of internal agency policy limiting the funding level for
such benefits, the administrative courts have interpreted some eligibility
provisions so narrowly that the result is clearly contrary to Congress' in-
tent in creating the benefits.2"4 For example, Medicare home care benefits
theoretically are available under a liberal scheme to encourage discharge
from hospitals and nursing homes by providing an unlimited number of
visits for skilled care and certain contemporaneous non-skilled care with-
out co-payments,275 provided the patient is homebound and adequate care
can be provided on a intermittent basis.27 Throughout the early 1980s,
the volume of Medicare home health care visits grew rapidly; reimburse-
ments increased from $662 to $1398 million.2 7' To control costs, the
Health Care Financing Administration, which is responsible for the ad-
ministration of the program, reinterpreted several eligibility factors so
fewer services would be delivered under the same legislation. While "in-
termittent care" formerly could be provided seven days a week, it was
limited to less than five days a week.278 Similarly, the indications that a
patient is homebound have been manipulated without due regard for Con-
gress' instruction that an individual is homebound who leaves home infre-
quently and needs assistance from another person or a supportive device
or finds leaving home to require considerable and taxing effort.2 9 To
avoid such problems in a new system, the trier of fact should not be sub-
ject to or receive funding through any agency that provides community-
271 See Duggan v. Bowen, 691 F. Supp. 1487 (D.D.C. 1988) (restricting interpretation of the
part-time and intermittent requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (1990) and 42 C.F.R. §§ 409-410
(1990)).
"I See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m) (1990); 42 C.F.R. §§ 409.40, 410.80 (1990).
270 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(D) (1990).
277 DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 2, at 160, 191.
278 See, e.g., Duggan, 691 F. Supp. 1487.
270 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a) (1990).
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based social services upon which the. success of limited guardianship
depends.
It is extremely unlikely that a new tribunal can or should be created as
a freestanding entity. It would require too great a proportion of funding
devoted to administrative costs to be politically acceptable, and a free-
standing entity would be in a poor position to absorb funding cuts. Both
problems could be greatly reduced if the tribunals were established as part
of a larger entity.
The office of the public guardian and the long term care ombudsman
are examples of entities with similar conflicts of interest. They are closely
allied with social services, but must act in the interests of impaired per-
sons without undue regard for the burden created on social service provid-
ers. In Florida, after a period of dissatisfaction and dispute, the-long term
care ombudsman was removed from the Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services Division of Aging and Adult Services and placed under
the new Office of Elderly Affairs, which was originally conceived as an
advocate for the elderly and not a direct service provider. Predictable
changes in the state administrative structure have recreated the original
problem, however, since responsibility for direct services is likely to be
transferred to the upgraded Office of Elderly Affairs.
The public guardian, by contrast, is an officer of the courts.28 Al-
though the office's funding level is set by the legislature, the allocation is
part of the budget for the judicial circuit in which it is located.28 Al-
though the public guardian's close relationship with and dependence on
social services bears observation, independent decisions are fostered by its
distinct authority and funding source.
If the proposed tribunals are to be part of the court system, political
resistance to their creation might be reduced still further by placing them
within an existing branch of the judiciary. The proposed procedures most
closely resemble juvenile courts, which use relaxed procedural rules and
examine social and interpersonal issues in fashioning a response to a
280 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.701 (West 1991) (public guardian is an officer of the court).
281 Florida's public guardian program, created more than a decade ago as a demonstration pro-
gram in two judicial circuits, has not been funded statewide. Additional state funds have been allo-




young person's misbehavior. The similarities between care of juveniles
and the elderly already tend to be overstated,2"2 so this solution is not
ideal. Those few jurisdictions that have separate family courts might find
that those courts provide a suitable affiliation for the tribunals.
To ensure adequate, ongoing funding of the proxy decision-making
tribunals, assurances should be offered that the tribunals meet a far-
reaching and significant societal need. Such assurances would focus on the
intent and the capabilities of the tribunals described above to address all
types of proxy decision-making questions, including appointment of prox-
ies and specific orders for' care, for all persons rather than only for the
elderly.283 Once properly funded and fully operational, these new tribu-
nals would allow comparison between the treatment that younger disabled
persons receive and that received by the elderly. This would reveal how
the former receive significant support for self-determination and encour-
agement to achieve what they can despite their disabilities, while the latter
receive disapproval and discouragement. The result of this juxtaposition of
analogous cases would be a society-wide reevaluation of self-determination
by the elderly. 84
It is proposed that a Court of Proxies be created within the existing
courts, if possible, with jurisdiction over all types of proxy decision-mak-
ing issues and actions for impaired or disabled persons of all ages. An
important distinction between this court and typical courts should be the
hiring of staff capable of investigating each case.
2. Who Should be the Judge?
The most efficient and accurate trier of fact for such a proceeding re-
mains to be determined. The options include charging a tribunal of ex-
2 See supra note 255 and accompanying text (mandatory reporting of elder abuse modeled on
child abuse statutes, with the caveat that elderly people have autonomy rights that cannot be
disregarded).
18 MENCAP proposes that a tribunal should address all types of decision-making regardless of
the reason for impairment. The Scottish proposal is not limited to the elderly. But see Hoggett, supra
note 8, at 524 (calling for special proceedings to address the special needs of the elderly).
284 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (advocacy movements for education and self-
determination for the developmentally disabled); see also Joanne Lynn, A Service Provider's Perspec-
tive on Alzheimer's & Aids, GENERATIONS, Fall 1989, at 67 (choices offered AIDS patients con-
trasted with those offered elderly patients).
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perts with reaching agreement on the need for services and producing a
single order for any appropriate services; appointing a chair from the
members of the committee; or appointing an independent trier of fact, a
judge, to consider expert and other testimony and to reach a decision.
The use of a multidisciplinary tribunal has received favorable attention
in proposals by English advocates for various groups representing the
mentally disabled.28 Indeed, it is an attractive idea to eliminate the ex-
pense of a judge if the experts can come to a decision. One group of advo-
cates for the mentally handicapped, MENCAP, proposes that such a tri-
bunal must have a quorum of five members, including not less than two
nonhealth care professionals, and must be large enough to include a suffi-
cient number of disciplines in the decision-making process, yet small
enough such that decisions are made efficiently.2 8'
The Rights and Legal Protection Subcommittee of Scottish Action on
Dementia has proposed a sort of mental health court. The proposal calls
for three-member tribunals, with members selected from regional Mental
Health Panels, chosen for their interest in or experience with the
problems of mental disorder.28 The tribunal could appoint a guardian
with general or specific powers, issue orders for residential care, consent
to medical treatment, require supervision by the social work department,
and order property or financial management.
The need for a lawyer in any role is not entirely clear. Laypersons have
been permitted to sit as judges in many lower courts in the United States;
their counterparts in England, the justices of the peace, are often
nonlawyers, so the idea of a court without a lawyer presiding is not revo-
lutionary. Yet, in this evolving area of the law, both sound legal develop-
ment and application of the existing law are necessary; consequently, a
I'l LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 1 6.41, at 166. In accord with the
existing system, the proposals may not include a lawyer, even in a large committee. MENCAP, for
example, suggests that the committee include a consultant psychiatrist specializing in mental handi-
caps; a representative from the Social Services Department Mental Handicap Service; a psychologist;
a social worker or community nurse; a medical consultant from a relevant specialty; a representative
from a local advocacy group or voluntary organization; a parent, caregiver, friend, or advocate; an
informed nonhealth care professional such as a chaplain; and a general practitioner.
'8' Respondents at the Thrower Symposium called for the participation of clergymen and
ethicists, as well as physicians, psychologists, and attorneys.
287 RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION SUBCOMM., SCOTrISH ACTION ON DEMENTIA, DEMEN-
TIA AND THE LAW-THE ScoTrISH EXPERIENCE (1987).
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strong argument can be made for including a lawyer who is familiar with
mental health cases.2"' In the United States, appointment of an attorney to
the panel undoubtedly will be necessary to provide adequate protection for
respondents' autonomy rights and to contribute to the legal findings.
It is also debatable whether a chairperson must be appointed or elected
from among the members of a tribunal to assure that procedural and re-
porting requirements are met, as well as to contribute to the decision-
making process; and, if chosen, what the chairperson's qualifications
should be. Other areas of alternative dispute resolution provide little guid-
ance. In medical malpractice claims, for example, the American Medical
Association (AMA) would require the appointment of an individual
trained in the rules of law relevant to the proceedings, but not necessarily
an attorney.2 9 In contrast, proponents (both of whom are lawyers) of an-
other scheme for health claims arbitration assert that the chair must be an
attorney in order to effectively preside over the hearing and resolve issues
of law.2 90 The Scottish proposal and a similar plan by the British Medical
Association2 ' assume that the professionals will be able to agree among
themselves. No written opinion applying the existing law is issued, in con-
trast to the proposal here.
A better method for the development of communication among the pro-
fessions is to require consensus on the determination and recommendation
for services in each case rather than relying on a chairperson as final arbi-
ter to impose resolution on intransigent members. If all the members of
the tribunal are equal in status, the requirements of the work flow can be
adequately managed by professional standards and prompting from ad-
ministrative staff. Undoubtedly, differences in societies and expectations
218 The Scottish proposal includes an attorney in the role of legal assessor, providing advice on
matters of Iw, but does not include an attorney on the panel.
219 The AMA opposes the designation of a physician as chair of a tribunal on malpractice
claims, stating the practice would be objectionable to the plaintiffs bar or other health care providers.
AMA, SPECIAL SOCIETY MEDICAL LIABILITY PROJECT, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE CIVIL
JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED, ADMINISTRA-
"rivE SYSTEM (1988).
10 James K. MacAlister & Alfred L. Scanlan, Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The
Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 481 (1985). Malpractice arbitration and screening
panels have met with little success regardless of their composition.
201 BRITISH MEDICAL ASS'N, ETHICS COMM. & MENTAL HEALTH COMM., PROPOSALS FOR




will play a role in the outcome of a consensus method, but it deserves a
try because it is in keeping, with the cooperative relationship essential for
limited guardianship.
A final question concerns compensation for the tribunal. Alternative
dispute resolution has been proposed, but alternative dispute resolution
frequently compensates professionals at less than the usual value of their
time. The Scottish proposal, for example, calls for volunteers, and the
British Medical Association would reimburse expenses only.292 In the
United States, professionals may be given a flat fee or honorarium. The
great advantage of utilizing professionals whose principal compensation
comes from other sources is that they cannot be influenced to favor the
interests of authorities by a threat to their livelihoods. The disadvantage is
that they must limit the time devoted to such critically important decisions
in the interest of other professional duties.
A sound system of guardianship adjudication cannot be realistically
maintained with volunteer tribunals alone. Rather, the system of compen-
sation that will minimize conflicts of interest utilizes a reasonable flat fee
per case structure. Such a system would allow physicians, psychologists,
and attorneys in private practice to contribute to the system without un-
due cost.29
The trier of fact in the Court of Proxies should consist of a tribunal of
professionals who have completed assessments of the respondent's medical
condition, mental status, and functional status. The tribunal in collabora-
tion with the guardian ad litem and counsel for the respondent, 9 4 if any,
should reach a conclusion on the respondent's competency and the services
most appropriate to meet the respondent's needs.
3. What Process is Due?
In the United States, the extent of formality required in any legal pro-
ceeding depends on its usefulness in reaching an accurate result. The test
for an appropriate level of due process balances the nature of the private
92 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 1 6.29, at 157.
29I This proposal is in accord with the English system of "judicare," which pays attorneys a fee
per service to the indigent client, rather than the American legal aid system, which provides salaries
for lawyers who devote all their time to legal aid casework.
29 See discussion infra part III.B.3.b.
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interest affected and the risk of error against the effectiveness of additional
safeguards.2
95
In proxy decision-making, many of the ward's fundamental liberties are
at stake. The appointment of a proxy may intrude on the impaired per-
son's right to privacy in personal decision-making, 298 including the rights
to choose where to live and who will furnish assistance . 97 Other constitu-
tional rights subject to restriction include the rights to wander at will 298
and to gather in public places for political or social purposes. 299
The protection of personal rights in proxy decision-making requires ex-
tensive process. Yet it is tempting to place formal due process at the re-
view stage, where the English system places it, because it involves time
and expense and traditionally has not been considered desirable or essen-
tial to the fair outcome of a mental health case. Also, the respondent
rarely has no unmet needs, so the spirit of beneficence prompts the par-
ticipants to meet those needs as quickly as possible. Also, attending a




The hearing procedures emphasized in the comprehensive guardianship
reforms include the respondent's right to be present at the hearing301 and
the articulation of a burden and standard of proof to counter any pre-
sumption of incompetency. The right to be present at a hearing is not
universally or fully implemented, however. The respondent has a statu-
tory right to attend in only twenty-four states, and the respondent's pres-
ence is mandatory in only fifteen. Moreover, the presence of the respon-
"9' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
2" See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing the right, in consultation with a
freely chosen physician, to decide on proper treatment).
29 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944); see also Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating that the right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete
immunity: the right to be let alone).
"' Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1972).
:99 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
00 Erica F. Wood, Toward a Barrier-Free Courthouse: Equal Access to Justice for Persons
with Physical Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 557 (1990) (discussing physical barriers to par-
ticipation in hearings).
' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 744.331(5)(b) (1987).
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dent is routinely waived. In Florida, the appearance of the respondent
may be waived only for good cause. °2 In England, reviews of the appro-
priateness of guardianships under the Mental Health Act do not require a
hearing, and no hearings are held for the vast majority of cases in the
Court of Protection. A hearing is generally available only on appeal.
The appropriateness of a right to attend a hearing affecting one's inter-
ests cannot be disputed. The right to a hearing is based on the respon-
dent's interest'in confronting adverse witnesses, and on the right to advo-
cate his or her own interests. In limited guardianships, even an impaired
respondent who needs a guardian very likely has preferences about vari-
ous aspects of life, or about who should serve as guardian.
However, the trend to require the respondent's presence to prevent lax
representation is misguided. It assumes that a respondent in a guardian-
ship is capable of fulfilling this particular function or, at a minimum, of
appearing to be competent for the duration of a hearing. Because that
assumption does not hold true for many respondents, the requirement of
attendance works to their disadvantage. For example, if a respondent is
disoriented by stress or strange surroundings, and if the trier of fact bases
conclusions on the assumption that an individual who is sufficiently com-
petent to live in the community with voluntary assistance either should
conform to conventional courtroom behavior or should be articulate
enough to speak in his or her own interest, then the respondent's attend-
ance could lead to an inappropriate loss of rights and autonomy. Many
very impaired people can conduct their lives outside an institution with
appropriate assistance, while the pressured circumstances of a hearing in
a strange setting unfairly tests their functional abilities.
In the interest of justice, any person who understands, however mini-
mally, the nature of the proceeding should be given the option to attend,
but should be assured that he or she will not be compelled to speak
against his or her wishes. When the respondent attends the hearing, the
setting should maximize the respondent's participation, while minimizing
stress. One important way of reducing the stress that usually results when
physically and/or mentally impaired individuals must function in strange
surroundings is to adapt those surroundings to compensate for the impair-




should be bright but indirect to reduce glare, speech should be low
pitched, slow, and phrased in layperson's terms as much as possible, and
any written communications should be made available to the respondent
in large, clear type. The pace of the hearing should be slow enough to
avoid generating unnecessary tension.
Perhaps the best solution is to hold the hearing in the respondent's
usual setting, observing all the strategies noted above, to assure the best
possible communication. Taking the hearing to the respondent, rather
than the reverse, should not significantly disrupt the proceedings, particu-
larly when the triers of fact have already visited the respondent to conduct
their assessments. Indeed, all matters relating to the conduct of the hear-
ing can be simplified by appointing experts as triers of fact, since they will
have experience in communicating with the respondent.
Hearing formalities in the reform statutes include placing the burden of
proof on the petitioner and setting a standard of proof that the party must
meet. In traditional United States guardianship- proceedings and in the
Court of Protection, the evidence consists almost exclusively of the peti-
tioner's allegations and the report of the examiners. This traditional pro-
cedure unintentionally shifts the burden of proof to the respondent to
show competency, a task that is difficult or impossible.
With any limited guardianship, there is less tendency to shift the bur-
den of proof because all the evidence does not fall on one side of a yes-or-
no question. However, the tribunal must still be wary of the weight of the
most specific testimony: though a disability and some diminished functions
are identified, they do not necessarily dictate a legal conclusion regarding
competency. The tribunal and particularly the attorney have the responsi-
bility to assure that all the expert evidence is considered before reaching a
decision.
The reform guardianship statutes also have sought to clarify the stan-
dard of proof the petitioner must meet. Because the standard was not
stated in traditional, informal proceedings and in English mental health
proceedings, it might be presumed to be the usual civil standard of pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The current trend in mental health proceed-
ings, however, is to require clear and convincing evidence to justify any
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findings.3"' The higher standard of proof fails to provide a clear guide in
proceedings seeking to identify appropriate services based on a variety of
competing factors. In fact, one probate court judge observed that in every
guardianship case in his court that called for a clear and convincing stan-
dard of proof, his decision would have been the same even if the standard
had been beyond a reasonable doubt.3 4
b. Advocacy
It is most unlikely that a frail, somewhat confused, elderly person will
be able to respond effectively in guardianship proceedings without assis-
tance. Virtually all respondents are impaired in some way, if only by the
need to depend generally on their caregivers in daily life. The threat of
unwanted changes and the tension of interaction with attorneys and au-
thorities are also likely to produce irrational responses or apathy.
Respondents have had the right to be represented by legal counsel in
hearings, guardianship proceedings in the United States, protective ser-
vices hearings that are not ex parte, and Court of Protection proceedings.
But often few prospective wards are represented because of the difficulty
in identifying, communicating with, and paying an appropriate advocate.
Reform guardianship statutes generally provide a right to. appointed
counsel.305 Legal assistance for a reduced fee is available on appeal before
England's Mental Health Review Tribunals.306 The Law Society in Eng-
land also has established a referral panel of attorneys experienced in work
with the Tribunals.3 0 7
Whether the appointment of counsel will become routine is unclear be-
cause Florida's law is new and mental health appeals are relatively rare.
Arguably, appointed counsel is as necessary in guardianship as in crimi-
nal proceedings since the risk of institutionalization is as great and the
"0I See id. ch. 744.331(5)(c) (requiring clear and convincing evidence for an adjudication of
incompetency).
3" Judge Floyd E. Propst, Probate Court of Fulton County, Georgia, Address at the Thrower
Symposium on Elder Law (Mar. 18, 1992).
30 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 744.331(2) (1987); U.PC. § 5-406 (1988).
3o' Legal assistance is available under the Green Form Scheme for preparing the case, and under
the Assistance by Way of Representation Scheme for advocacy at the hearing. Legal Advice and




respondent is in no better position to advocate his or her own interests.
The need for counsel does not differ significantly whether the proceedings
concern guardianship, conservatorship, or protective services because all
create substantial risk to liberty."' 8
Nevertheless, there is reason for doubt that representation will become
routine. Florida's former statute authorized the court to appoint coun-
sel, 30 9 but it virtually never did so. Therefore, the authorities may not see
the need for counsel for the respondent in most proxy decision-making
cases.
The failure to perceive the need for counsel for the respondent arises
from 'more than the desire to conserve funds; it is linked to continuing
confusion about the role of such counsel. The normal relationship between
attorney and client is that of an advocate for all the client's legal inter-
ests.310 The Model Rules of Professional Responsibility instruct the attor-
ney to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship to the extent reasona-
bly possible. 11 Some jurisdictions (e.g., those acting under the Uniform
Probate Code 12) may allow or require counsel to act as guardian ad
litem.
Serving as guardian ad litem and legal advocate poses an unresolvable
dilemma for the attorney. The guardian ad litem role requires the lawyer
to make a personal assessment of the client's competency in order to
choose which of the client's express wishes to advocate. Most attorneys are
incapable of performing such an assessment of competency because it must
be based on medical, psychological, and functional knowledge. An attor-
ney, like any layman, may mistake physical problems and poor communi-
cation for incompetency. Also, the point at which the attorney makes the
transition to an advocacy role is hazy; clients are certain to be confused.
Legal codes of ethics provide no effective way for the attorney to seek
assistance in determining the client's competency. The attorney is allowed
by the Model Rules to "seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
300 See supra notes 66-150 and accompanying text.
309 FLA. STAT. ch. 744.331(4) (1987).
310 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.1 & 1.2 (1983).
311 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) (1983).
312 U.P.C. § 5-406 (1988).
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protective action . . . only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the
client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. 3 13 The com-
ments to Rule 1.14 recognize that disclosure of the disability can adversely
affect the client's interests and that the appointment of a proxy decision-
maker may be expensive or traumatic for the client. The attorney's
knowledge that the client's competency shortly will be determined by the
court fails to clarify the lawyer's role in guardianship proceedings. The
lawyer's only option, as provided by comment 5 to Model Rule 1.14, is to
seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician. The comment fails,
however, to reveal the qualifications of such a diagnostician, whether the
attorney can disclose the identity and condition of the client, and whether
the consultation is on behalf of the client or the attorney. If the attorney
consults the client's physician without the client's consent, any disclosures
by the physician would violate the duty of confidentiality in the physician-
patient relationship.314 It appears unlikely that the client would willingly
submit to a preliminary examination for competency simply to provide
information to legal counsel. Even if an attorney could obtain a waiver
from the client of the right to confidentiality in medical records, such a
waiver may be invalid. The AMA requires that such a waiver be written,
and legal ethics require that it be voluntary. Certainly, such a waiver
obtained by counsel would be subject to professional and legal scrutiny."1 5
If the respondent expresses any wishes that could be implemented, an
advocate is appropriate and should be appointed. The attorney may disa-
gree with the client, believing that a plan to live alone or to refuse lifesav-
ing treatment is unrealistic. Such a plan may pose risks to health or finan-
113 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.14 (1983).
314 There is considerable commentary, statutory law, and case law on the physician-patient priv-
ilege. See, e.g., Harvey F. Wachman, Hear All, See All, But Silence May be Golden: Confidentiality,
Privacy, and Privileged Communication, 13 LEGIs. ASPECTS OF MED. PRAc. 5 (Feb. 1985) (noting
that the privilege is protected in 43 states and the District of Columbia). Section 9 of the AMA's
Principles of Medical Ethics states that a physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in
the course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless
he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the
individual and the community. Although a number of exceptions are offered, disclosures for compe-
tency determinations, outside of those for civil commitment, are not addressed. See Robert M. Gell-
man, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy,
62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 261-63 (1984).
"1' John R. Murphy, Older Clients of Questionable Competency: Making Accurate Competency




cial well-being; the attorney may believe the plan is unwise, yet within a
competent person's right to choose. The attorney, therefore, is obliged as
an advocate to seek to effect the client's wishes, just as an attorney may be
obliged to argue innocence in a criminal defense case despite the likelihood
that the defendant is guilty.
In some cases, there is no role for legal advocacy: some clients express
no wishes at all, or want results that counsel cannot advocate. The re-
spondent may, for example, express a wish to do something that is impos-
sible, such as living with a spouse who in fact has died. In such cases, the
advocate has nothing useful to do. Such a role should not be created sim-
ply to satisfy the ideal of representation for every person before the court.
Someone other than the prospective advocate must make a preliminary
determination of the respondent's competency and wishes. A guardian ad
litem familiar with the circumstances of the parties, the requirements of
an assessment of competency, and the potential for the proceedings to af-
fect respondent's circumstances, is qualified to identify those respondents
who might benefit from representation. The guardian ad litem should be
an officer of the court familiar with competency proceedings and not asso-
ciated with either party or with a social services provider. The most sensi-
tive responsibility for the guardian ad litem is communication with all the
parties to determine when interests are in potential conflict. If there is
such potential, the guardian ad litem should make a binding recommenda-
tion to the tribunal to appoint counsel.
4. Funding a System
It has been proposed that the state rather than the ward should pay the
costs of guardianship. 31 One United States case, Rud v. Dahl, arguing
against the use of counsel in competency proceedings, unwittingly sup-
ported state payment.31 The court observed that costs associated with
counsel for the respondent undermine one of the essential purposes of the
conservatorship proceeding: protection of the incompetent's estate. The
case might be made that the ward's assets should be protected from the
cost of compulsory process as well because it violates a sense of fairness to
force an individual to pay for unwanted assistance.
316 GOSTIN, supra note 95, at 12.
1 7 Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 1978).
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On the other hand, many wards have the resources to pay for a deter-
mination of competency and services from a guardian. There may be no
better investment for the ward than securing a skilled guardian. Providing
public legal assistance to all wards also would require a change of policy,
since recipients heretofore have been required to demonstrate financial
need for subsidized legal assistance.
A middle road suggests the ward should not be required to pay if the
proceeding fails to reach an adjudication of incompetency. This would sat-
isfy the sense that an individual should not have to pay for an unpleasant,
unwanted experience that has no beneficial outcome. It probably does not
pose a great burden to the state, since most petitions result in appointment
of a guardian. If the state is the petitioner, however, it is logical to assume
some petitions will not be filed because of the risk of incurring costs. As a
result, individuals who are incompetent may not have a guardian ap-
pointed. Research is needed to determine the impact of this approach on
guardianship proceedings.
There is a significant increase in cost to the state for greater legal pro-
cess. Even if most wards pay the cost of competency proceedings, the bur-
den on the court system is significant. The exact increase in costs in Flor-
ida is unknown, however, because legislators considering guardianship
reform legislation did not make cost estimates for implementation. As a
result, some judges of already overworked local courts have resisted full
implementation of the reforms. Similarly, the Mental Health Act Com-
mission reports that social services agencies are reluctant to use guardian-
ship procedures because no funds have been allocated to meet the obliga-
tions that would be created.""8 Clearly, courts and agencies must have
more personnel to provide more time for hearings, investigations, and
oversight.
The greatest cost of a proxy decision-making system is the setup of a
reasonable array of community-based long term care services, including a
publicly compensated guardian for those who have no one else to serve.
The most conspicuously absent services are emergency shelters to house
elderly people who are abused or neglected in their homes. Other services
318 MENTAL HEALTH ACT COMM'N FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT 8.5(a)(iii), at 21 (1985);
MENTAL HEALTH AT COMM'N THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT 12.7, at 48 (1989).
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are scarce, including home health care for chronic illness, 1 9 homemak-
ing,32 0 * and adequate housing. 21 The state and federal governments can
be required to provide community-based service options to maintain indi-
viduals with legal disabilities who are excluded from institutional care.3 2
The funding of long term care is a major issue just below the surface of
current debate regarding the failure of acute health care coverage in the
United States. As a practical matter, long term care might be included as
another aspect of health care because it is an insurable event; that is, there
is a low probability that any individual will incur substantial costs for
long term care services. Those requiring long term care face costs too sub-
stantial for most people to afford. Private insurance cannot eliminate the
need for a public program because many elderly have incomes too low to
purchase coverage, or are already disabled and therefore uninsurable. The
middle aged person who buys a long term care policy must pay premiums
for decades before benefits are needed, so the likelihood increases that the
policy will lapse for nonpayment during a period of low income. To assist
the individual purchaser, the government might allow an income tax de-
duction for some or all of the expenditures, including the payment of in-
surance premiums.
Public funding might be generated in a number of ways. For example,
Congress could raise the percentage of income deducted for Old Age, Sur-
vivors, and Disability Insurance and Hospital Insurance (these funds cur-
rently support income and health care for the aged and for disabled work-
ers). In addition, income that is not currently taxed, such as most Social
Security benefits, could be taxed.
Choosing the type and intensity of services to be provided is more diffi-
cult with long term care than with acute care because no professional
319 42 U.S.C. 1395x(m) (1988) (Medicare benefits are limited to medical and medically-related
services under the review of a physician.).
"" Homemaking assistance is available only from some state Medicaid programs for income-
eligible persons, and z few other state programs.
"51 As the population ages, there is a growing need for low-cost housing adapted to compensate
for chronic disabilities. However, federal housing policy has drastically reduced the number of new
units throughout the 1980s, and programs in supportive housing have not been encouraged. See DE-
VELOPMENTS IN AGING, supra note 2, at 279. See generally LEONARD HEUMANN & D. BOLDY,
HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY (1982).
"2I See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F.
Supp. 974 (D.C.C. 1975).
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group is ready to make the necessary allocation decisions. Many programs
have developed systems of case management as a means to target and limit
services.323 The implementation of a sound system of care will require
extensive education and man power development.
5. Oversight and Supervision
A guardianship usually lasts for the rest of an elderly ward's lifetime,
and the authority which created that guardian's power has a responsibility
to see that it is properly exercised. Conservators and receivers are re-
quired to file accounts, and in Florida an annual report, of the ward's
personal circumstances. These reports are subject only to the most cursory
review, and in the United States many are not even filed. 2 4 Even if re-
quirements are met, the relationship of provided services to the ward's
needs and well-being are not subject to review.
In England, guardianship operates under fairly close supervision by so-
cial service authorities,32 5 so that standards of care are likely to be main-
tained. It is very likely, however, that supervision would deteriorate rap-
idly if guardianship were widely used and if private individuals were
frequently appointed as guardians. No one is designated to act as protec-
tor for the interests of wards in interactions with their guardians, and the
extent of a proxy decision-maker's duties is vaguely defined. 26
a. A Plan for Assistance
A plan for care is common practice in medicine and social work. The
concept of a plan for care is useful in proxy decision-making. It enables
all the participants to understand prospectively what is expected of the
relationship, and when it might fail to meet the ward's needs. Under the
provisions of the new Florida law, a guardian is required to state in ad-
vance the activities and services to be provided. A plan, typically annual in
3 See generally JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., CHICAGO,
CASE MANAGEMENT: GUIDING PATIENTS THROUGH THE HEALTH CARE MAZE (Karen Fisher &
Ellen Weisman eds., 1988).
324 Good & King, supra note 5, at 59-60.
315 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 3.23.
326 See, e.g., ABUSES IN AGING, supra note 49, at 17 (calling for public supervision to protect
against the over-management of large estates).
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scope, states the services and housing believed to be necessary to meet the
ward's needs. 2" In order to apprise the court of the status and well-being
of the ward, the plan is amended when any significant changes take place.
There is no such requirement in English law, possibly because social
workers or medical professionals who routinely keep treatment or case
plans are involved in every case.
A guardianship plan should be required because it gives legal signifi-
cance to information typically included in other plans. The plan provides
a basis for review by authorities and for accountability of the guardian
and service providers. The guardian ad litem should counsel the impaired
person and family members regarding powers of attorney and health care
directives. The guardian should also assist them in developing a plan for
services to meet the impaired person's changing needs. The guardian ad
litem should visit the impaired person at least annually in order to investi-
gate any potential irregularities.
b. Community Ombudsmen and Professional Review
In mental health and long term care settings, an ombudsman or patient
advocate can provide community oversight and impartial professional re-
view by investigating complaints or questionable circumstances.328 In
England in 1986, a citizens' council was authorized to investigate and ad-
vocate patient interests, 2 ' but it has not yet been funded. Another advo-
cacy and oversight group established as a special health authority, the
Mental Health Act Commission,33 ° serves in a role similar to an
ombudsman. The part-time commissioners review decisions to withhold
mail from patients, visit mental health facilities to review practices and
patient complaints, and appoint physicians to provide second opinions re-
garding treatment plans.
In Florida, as in every state, there is a federally mandated long term
care ombudsman who investigates the quality of care in, and complaints
about, nursing homes and other residences for the elderly. The advantage
"' See FLA. STAT. ch. 744.331(3)(d) (1987).
318 See John J. Regan, When Nursing Home Patients Complain: The Ombudsman or the Pa-
tient Advocate, 65 GEo. L.J. 691, 708 (1977).
"' Disabled Persons (Service, Consultation, and Representation) Act, 1986, ch. 33, § 1 (Eng.).
31' Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 121 (Eng.).
1992]
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
of an ombudsman is that the first methods used to ensure compliance with
accepted standards are education and persuasion, rather than legal penal-
ties. This may be the only method truly effective in private guardianships,
in which any fine would be passed on to the ward in some way. A coun-
seling approach also reduces the risk of causing or aggravating a grievance
between guardian and ward, which could lead to anger and abuse. Such
advocacy systems, merely by existing, probably deter many of the more
blatant abuses in long term care.
There are potential difficulties in the use of ombudsmen, particularly
volunteers. One is the possibility of uninformed and inconsistent decisions
that are based on the ombudsman's own professional values or personal
opinions rather than on the legal and ethical standards the service pro-
vider must meet. Another is the lack of time to provide a thorough re-
sponse to each complaint, because each ombudsman has competing obliga-
tions. Indeed, it may be difficult in some areas to recruit volunteers at all.
The addition of guardianship to the work of ombudsmen increases an
already heavy burden. None of the existing ombudsman-like bodies has
responsibility specifically in proxy decision-making cases, nor would any
have the resources to oversee them. The Mental Health Act Commission-
ers are few in number and are already hard pressed to visit each of the
523 mental health facilities once a year. The Long Term Care
Ombudsman Councils in Florida are comprised entirely of volunteers
whose time is already committed to serving residents of nursing homes
and other residential facilities. Funding must be expanded before
ombudsmen can address the needs of impaired elderly living at home.
The Florida ombudsmen also do not take responsibility for evaluating
the proxy decision-making system's ability to serve the disabled. They
have no particular authority to attempt reform within the system, al-
though they might draw attention to the need for it. The Guardianship
Oversight Commission, created to review implementation of the new stat-
ute, has received no funding and has produced no information. Most of
the English Commissioners, whose responsibilities might include a review
of the system as a whole, are psychiatrists, psychologists, and nurses who
are disposed in favor of the existing system.3 31 Their reports fail to recog-
nize the shortcomings, discussed at length in this Article, that have become
31 Hoggett, supra note 8, at 520.
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apparent to others.8 32
An ombudsman council, in order to be effective, should consist of paid
staff as well as volunteers. The council's primary obligations should be to
educate its own members about the laws and regulations governing the
services it oversees and to educate others about the individual rights of
patients. A rigorous program of training must not be curtailed because of
the chronic problem of recruiting enough volunteers. A separate or over-
sight council should also be established, similar to that planned for Flor-
ida. It should include professionals, advocates, and recipients of proxy de-
cision-making services.
c. Legal Sanctions
There are, of course, limits to advocacy, and ultimately there must be
legal sanctions to assure compliance. In health care and services in the
United States, there is a trend toward the use of intermediate sanctions,
including the levying of fines, for care providers such as nursing homes. 33 3
These measures punish conduct, but allow the relationship between the
caregiver and the impaired person to continue. Fines are useful only with
corporate care providers, however, since there is a risk that individual care
providers, unlike corporate providers, will retaliate against the disabled
person, there being no type of supervision sufficient to prevent it.
Intermediate sanctions might be used effectively to assure that elderly
persons are admitted to nursing home care only when necessary. The de-
cision to institutionalize a ward has been considered to create too great a
risk of error or abuse to be made without review by an outside authority.
The Florida provisions, for example, state that a guardian may not com-
mit a ward to a facility or institution without the formal placement pro-
ceeding required by law. 34 Unfortunately, this requirement does not limit
the guardian's authority to admit the ward to a nursing home, since there
are no legal procedures for admission. Nursing home placement has not
been regarded as institutional confinemeit in the same sense as has con-
finement to a mental hospital.
32 Id. at 519.
3S See Sales & Kahle, supra note 53, at 401 (recommending mild penalties for breach of profes-
sional duty).
334 FLA. STAT. ch. 733.3215(4) (1987).
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The difference between a mental hospital and a nursing home is the
hospital's'purpose of psychiatric treatment. 35 A lack of treatment, how-
ever, can be at least as serious an encroachment on the individual's well-
being. Most nursing home residents are as completely confined as involun-
tary patients in mental hospitals. 36 Under provisions of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, specialized services must be provided
for the care of the mentally ill in nursing homes. 3  Nursing homes, like
mental hospitals, may now be obligated to treat residents.
The decision to place an elderly ward in a nursing home is too impor-
tant to leave to individual discretion.338 However, the need arises too fre-
quently for a separate court hearing to be a practical requirement. Review
by individuals involved in the process of placement is desirable because it
is more efficient, provided there is some assurance the decision is not
tainted with conflicts of interest.
A caregiver should insure the appropriateness of his or her decision by
obtaining an assessment of the need for admission, and the lack of alterna-
tive care, from an interdisciplinary group of professionals such as the as-
sessment team assembled for the tribunal. The report must be provided to
the nursing home, which should have such findings on file for each resi-
dent in the facility. Although these requirements may seem difficult to
fulfill, in fact they are similar to those being implemented under the Com-
munity Care Act by the Department of Health and Social Security in
England.33 9 They are also similar to screening requirements added to fed-
eral law in 1987 and implemented in 1989.340
a35 On issues concerning admission to a mental hospital by a guardian, see Morris, supra note
206, at 112-13.
"' See generally Cathrael Kazin, Nowhere to Go and Choose to Stay: Using the Tort of False
Imprisonment to Redress Involuntary Confinement of the Elderly in Nursing Homes and Hospitals,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1989).
337 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7) (1988). Other residents, including those with Alzheimer's Disease,
must receive "specialized rehabilitative services to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical,
mental, and psychosocial well-being of each resident." 42 U.S.C. §-1396r(a)(4) (1988). The provisions
apply only to nursing homes participating in the Medicaid program, but tend to set the standards
throughout the nursing home industry.
3," See generally Peter Strauss, Before Guardianship: Abuse of Patient Rights Behind Closed
Doors, 41 EMORY L.J. 761 (1992).
330 See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVS., LONDON, CARING FOR PEOPLE: COMMUNITY
CARE IN THE NEXT DECADE AND BEYOND, IMPLEMENTATION DOCUMENTS: DRAFT GUIDANCE:
ASSESSMENT AND CASE MANAGEMENT (1990).
"I See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7) (1988).
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Another intermediate sanction is appointment of a receiver for a service
provider who gives inferior care. Similarly, a proxy decision-maker who is
not serving the ward's interests should be replaced. With unpaid proxies,
however, there is seldom anyone willing to undertake the task. There is,
therefore, a need for a public guardian who can serve as a guardian of last
resort.3 41 In England, the Court of Protection, under the Public Trustee,
provides such a service. A number of states in the United States have
public guardians to serve the indigent, although Florida, for example, has
public guardians in only two court circuits. A public guardian should be
available for any person who has no one else available to serve as guard-
ian. The service might be phased in by initially serving only wards whose
guardians are removed for neglect or abuse of duty.
Private tort actions are problematic because traditional theories poorly
suit the circumstances of proxy relationships and services. For example,
negligence by a professional guardian has been difficult to prove because
of the lack of professional standards. Within the past five years, however,
a nationwide professional guardians' organization has been established in
the United States and has drafted standards for services for its
members.342
Other causes of action have been used in particular circumstances to
provide a theory for suit when an elderly person is subjected to unwanted
services. When the defendant is a care facility, an admissions contract,
facility policies, or federal or state patients' statements of rights3 43 might
be used to establish negligence or breach of contract.3 44 Even the inten-
341 Windsor C. Schmidt et al., A Descriptive Analysis of Professional and Volunteer Programs
for the Delivery of Public Guardianship Services, 8 PROB. L.J. 125-56 (1988).
... The standards of professional behavior for social workers, who make many intervention deci-
sions, may require attention to proxy decision-making issues. In the United Kingdom in 1991, for
example, this need was illustrated by cases of alleged child abuse in Scotland where children were
taken from their parents and held for an extended time before the case was dismissed. See Jack
O'Sullivan, Social Workers Urged to Set Up Regulatory Body, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 10, 1991, at 3.
The American Society of Social Workers has long-established standards of professional ethics that
should be reviewed.
34 The federal nursing home residents' bill of rights, for example, provides such specific rights
as choice of physician, freedom from restraints, and accommodation of needs. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)
(1988). But see Makas v. Hillhaven, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 736 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (holding that the
federal bill of rights does not establish a standard of care).
' But see Free v. Franklin Guest Home, 397 So. 2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that




tional tort of false imprisonment has been used successfully.84 Under sec-
tion 1983 of the Social Security Act, the United States provides a special
cause of action for deprivation of civil rights; this may be available to
aggrieved wards."' It is unclear whether a special cause of action could
be created under English law or whether it would be more in keeping
with existing practice to have a special official take up such causes on
behalf of private citizens.
None of these standards identifies the harm to be the loss of autonomy
itself. The elderly person is harmed because his or her life is radically
altered by purportedly beneficial services. Services might be imposed with-
out an official proxy appointment, or might be the result of a guardian
acting beyond the scope of authorized powers. A decision to provide health
care or admission to an institution may in objective terms be beneficial, or
at least not harmful to health and safety, but it unnecessarily intrudes on
and diminishes a person's right to self-determination.
Autonomy itself has not been recognized as a legally protected interest.
It is protected only as a corollary to the protection of bodily security under
the theory of battery, which recognizes unconsented touching as a basis for
an action, or as a corollary to negligent care as applied in the doctrine of
informed consent. 347 Unwarranted proxy decision-making fails to fulfill
the requirements of battery because the wrong does not include touch; the
wrong is not negligence because the proxy intends to impose the decision
for care on the impaired person. This results in a significant gap in pun-
ishing unwarranted proxy decision-making.
A cause of action should be available to redress injury to self-determi-
nation when another's will is imposed on an impaired individual.348 The
plaintiff should be required to show deprivation of choice, regardless of
physical touching or physical harm, by evidence that such a choice existed
and that the proxy should reasonably have been aware of its existence.
"' See Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Newman, 461 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970)
(resident subject to physical restraint over protest). But see Pounders v. Trinity Court Nursing Home,
Inc., 576 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1979) (resident admitted by family member and told she had no choice
but to remain). See generally Kazin, supra note 336.
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). But see Taylor v. St. Clair, 685 F.2d 982, 988 (5th Cir. 1982)
(applying section 1983 for redress for action by the state only).
' See Kazin, supra note 336; Marjorie Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A
New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 229-32 (1985).
" See Kazin, supra note 336; Shultz, supra note 347, at 229-32.
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The theory could spring from the doctrine of informed consent, which
recognizes the injury from unwanted treatment even though no services
were negligently provided. In negligence, the proxy decision-maker should
be held, by virtue of his or her relationship to the impaired person as
caregiver or guardian, to have a duty to protect the impaired person's
interest in self-determination, which is breached by the failure to provide
reasonable choices 49 and the resulting imposition of unwanted assistance.
6. Conclusion
A comparison of the informal, medically oriented process of English
guardianship with the judicialized limited guardianship reforms of the
United States suggests two extremes on a continuum of values, with au-
tonomy at the reform end and beneficence at the other. Beneficence cannot
be the only motive considered at the creation of a guardianship because
the impact on the individual's rights and freedoms is severe. On the other
hand, the mixed success of guardianship reforms indicates that they re-
present an overly adversarial view of the relationships in a guardianship
action. Usually, the petitioner is not seeking to intrude on, harm, or de-
prive the proposed ward, but to do some necessary good. Although certain
guardianships may be averted by educating the petitioners and family
about other options, most guardianships are needed, and delaying or with-
holding services penalizes the impaired person.
Because beneficence is the principal motivation for most proxy decision-
making relationships, the expense of court proceedings with appointed
counsel may be wasteful. In fact, the appointment of an advocate for a
prospective ward who cannot express clear preferences places an attorney
in an unresolvable ethical dilemma by requiring him or her to determine
whether and to what extent the client is competent, and which of the cli-
ent's interests to advocate. Attorneys are generally unqualified to make
such a determination and, in any case, it represents an attempt to fill
"' An area for development will be the definition of a reasonable or real choice for an impaired
person. Choices depend in part on a person's physical condition. For an analogous discussion in health
care, see Stuart J. Younger, Who Defines Futility?, 260 JAMA 2094 (1988); Dean M. Hashimoto, A
Structural Analysis of the Physician-Patient Relationship in No-Code Decisionmaking, 93 YALE L.J.
362 (1983). Questions about funding for services also arise. See Danielle D. Emery & Lawrence J.




conflicting roles with regard to the impaired person.
All proxy decision-making registration, hearings, and oversight should
be handled by a specialized court. Hearings should take place before a
tribunal of professionals, in disciplines relating to the alleged disability,
who have interviewed the respondent. A guardian ad litem should also
visit the respondent and investigate the petitioner, family members, and
service providers of the proposed ward to make recommendations to the
court on the appropriateness of the petition, the fitness of the proposed
guardian, and the correct scope of assistance. Most importantly, the
guardian ad litem should recommend appointment of legal counsel for the
respondent who has any preferences regarding the need for guardianship,
the scope of the guardian's powers, the identity of the guardian, or any
other matter that can be addressed in the proceeding. The tribunal should
convene a hearing at which it reviews the recommendations of the guard-
ian ad litem, their own findings, and any other relevant information from
such persons as the family doctor, friends, family members, or service
providers.
The special court should retain jurisdiction in every case it hears in
which services are provided to an impaired person. It should review re-
ports on financial and personal management at least annually and when-
ever there is a change in the person's residence or services. In addition, a
local council of volunteer ombudsmen should respond to complaints and
inquiries regarding the status of an impaired person under the protection
of the court. A statewide council should oversee the operation of the local
councils and make recommendations regarding the operation of the court,
the composition of the tribunals, the activities of the ombudsmen, and any
other matter relating to the protection of impaired persons living in the
community.
A new cause of action should be recognized for deprivation of auton-
omy, which would apply when an impaired person is forced to accept
unwarranted services by abuse of authority, threat or implied threat, or by.
failure to provide information about choices. The cause of action would
remedy the harm done to dignity and self-determination, regardless of any
physical contact or injury, or extreme emotional distress.
The specialized tribunals should develop principles for proxy decision-
making in long term care by issuing written opinions. These principles
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should confirm the social value of autonomy, encourage good care, and
provide professionals with guidance about when and how to provide assis-
tance without the consent of the recipient. A central issue should be who
may be subject to unwanted proxy decision-making and assistance.
C. The Nature- of Incompetency
There are two possible bases in law for vitiating an individual's right to
self-determination and authorizing proxy decision-making: lack of under-
standing and need. The distinction is one of perspective. An evaluation of
lack of understanding relies primarily on an examination of the individ-
ual's mental capabilities and the process of decision-making itself. By con-
trast, the standard of need is based on functional capability. It requires a
comparison of the individual's behavior and circumstances with those of
others, and with a socially acceptable minimum in quality of life and
safety. The need standard has been established in American law only as a
basis for short term intervention.
1. Lack of Understanding
Traditionally, incompetency was envisioned as a fixed status with par-
ticular attributes usually expressed by a diagnosis of a mental disorder,
such as senility, an impairment which has more recently, if not more ac-
curately, been called Alzheimer's Disease.3 50 Incompetency has evolved,
with the adoption of limited guardianship, from a status to a variable
condition determined by the nature of the transaction in which an individ-
4" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 744.102(5) (1987) (Prior to amendment, the statute defined "incom-
petent" as "a person who, because of minority, mental illness, mental retardation, senility, excessive
use of drugs or alcohol, or other physical or mental incapacity, is incapable of either managing his
property or caring for himself, or both.").
Senile dementia, or senility, is not a diagnosis of a particular illness or disorder, but a description of
vague collections of symptoms including loss of memory and orientation to time and person. It is
likewise difficult to distinguish mental illness from insanity. The legal meaning of insanity differs
from its medical definition, and the same law - the law of insanity - may be applied to mental
impairments of all kinds, as in England. Generally, "insanity" is applied principally to defendants in
criminal cases to avoid trial or conviction. "Mental illness" is used in civil commitment statutes to
define persons who may be involuntarily admitted to a mental treatment facility. Although guardian-
ship very often results in institutionalization, that is not its purpose, and a special order from the court
usually is needed to place a ward in a psychiatric facility.
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ual must participate.""1 Every person, according to the relative, transac-
tional view, is mentally incapable to some extent and for some purposes.
Whether the individual is also legally incompetent, and consequently his
or her right to choose can be given to another, depends on how long the
mental disability will last and what he or she is unable to understand or
carry out. It necessarily depends, to some extent, on why the impairment
exists.
Guardianship law in England requires a finding of incompetency based
on the mental status of the individual, as have traditional guardianship
statutes in the United States. The English statute does not provide any
further definition of the mental disorder of one who may be received into
guardianship. The question of diagnosis is entirely a clinical judgment, 52
and evidence supporting the medical opinion is not required. The most
common mental status tests are global measures that inquire into orienta-
tion to person, place and time, and short term and long term memory.
Such tests have proven to be reliable in identifying gross disturbances in
thought, but provide little information regarding the causes, duration, or
finer degrees of ability.3 53 Mental status alone, therefore, is relatively use-
less as a legal concept because. it is so broad.3 5 4
The concept of mental status becomes more useful when the nature of
faulty mental process is better defined. To examine decision-making itself,
some inferences must be drawn from the results or conclusion of the pro-
cess. Hence, the link between mental capability and behavior is a decision
based on understanding. An early, seminal study of health care decision-
"" See, e.g., FIA. STAT. ch. 744.102(10) (1987). This section states the following:
"Incapacitated person" means a person who has been judicially determined to lack the
capacity to manage at least some of the property or to meet at least some of the essential
health and safety requirements of such a person. (a) To "manage property" means to take
those actions necessary to obtain, administer, and dispose of real and personal property,
intangible property, business property, benefits, and income. (b) To "meet essential re-
quirements for health or safety" means to take those actions necessary to provide the health
care, food, shelter, clothing, personal hygiene, or other care without which serious and
imminent physical injury or illness is more likely than not to occur.
Id.
a52 JONES, supra note 82, at 14.
"' See supra note 225.
3" On the vague and unchallengeable nature of psychiatric labels, see Jonas Robitscher, Label-
ing and Discrimination in Mental Health, in TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF HEALTH:
PSYCHOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 191 (Paul I. Ahmed & George V. Coelho eds., 1979).
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making in the United States stated that in order to understand and make
a valid personal decision, a person must have a set of values and goals,
must be able to compare likely outcomes, and must make consistent
choices.35 The decision-maker should have emotion in keeping with the
task.356 The decision is not required to be rational,357 and may depart
from conventional standards of good health or quality of life. 8 ' The per-
son needs only to understand in broad terms what he or she is doing and
the likely effects of the action to be competent with regard to that decision
and have preferences honored regardless of a diagnosis of mental illness.
The evaluation of the decision-making process is illustrated by United
States case law on refusal of amputations. 359 In Lane v. Candura,60 for
example, the court observed that the respondent had "a high degree of
awareness and acuity [w]hen responding to questions concerning the pro-
posed operation. She has made it clear that she does not wish to have the
operation even though that decision will in all likelihood lead shortly to
her death." 361 It noted also that Mrs. Candura's train of thought
wandered and her concept of time was distorted.3 62 The court acknowl-
edged the irrationality of her decision,363 but maintained her right to make
a competent, if unwise, choice.
36 4
The case of Mrs. Candura may be compared with that of Mrs. North-
ern.36 5 The court observed that Mrs. Northern was "lucid, communica-
tive, and articulate"; however, she "looked at her feet and refused to rec-
ognize the obvious fact that the flesh was dead, black, shriveled, rotting
'" See MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 183, at 57-62.
356 Id.
35 Reason is the intellectual faculty by which conclusions are drawn from premises. "To reason
is to form or try to reach conclusions by connected thought." CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
CURRENT ENGLISH (8th ed. 1990). To require that decisions be rational implies rejecting those that
cannot be tested by reason.
"' See KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 37, at 212 (suggesting that acceptable irrational deci-
sions are those based on irrational beliefs derived from an established set of values and lifestyle, as
opposed to choices based on a temporary delusion).
35 For a summary of significant cases in this area, see Barbara Mishkin, Determining the Ca-
pacityfor Making Health Care Decisions, 19 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOMATIC MED. 151-63 (1989).
360 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
301 Id. at 1234-35.
362 Id. at 1235.
'31 Id. at 1234-35.
3" Id. at 1235-36.
361 Tennessee Dep't of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
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and stinking."""8 The court, therefore, authorized a guardian to consent to
surgery.
The cases suggest that an individual must be cognizant only of the spe-
cific need for the treatment, the purpose of the treatment, and the conse-
quences of refusing treatment. Assistance can then be refused although the
consequences are permanent and may be fatal.367 A more careful exami-
nation of the case of Mrs. Northern sheds more light on the nature of
required understanding. She apparently understood the information pro-
vided by her physicians, and could competently disagree with the doctors
about the inevitability of death from gangrene."6 ' Mrs. Northern failed to
comprehend, however, that her doctors believed she would die, and she
thereby very likely distorted reality in a manner defined by the court as
incompetency. While the majority and concurring opinions drew a correct
conclusion from the fact that Mrs. Northern denied the plain condition of
her feet, they differ on the significance of her perceptions regarding the
doctors.
The court appears to have used a standard that holds an individual
incompetent if he or she believes something that is obviously false. Al-
though employment of such a standard may have led to the correct deci-
sion for Mrs. Northern, it leads to more controversial conclusions in other
circumstances. For example, an individual who believes he or she is not ill
or that medication will not work although shown effective for an illness
would be incompetent to refuse the proffered treatment.
The courts have used many different descriptions of the standard for
competency in personal and property cases. Elyn Saks at the University of
Southern California has identified six different standards in case law and
commentary, and has examined all according to the three competing crite-
ria for identification of the incompetent."6 9 First, the standard must iden-
tify abilities necessary to make the decision, or in long term care, to make
366 Id. at 209.
See In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. P. Ct. 1978) (finding an elderly man reasonable,
although he refused amputation of blackened, partially mummified legs, and therefore declining to
appoint a guardian to consent to treatment).
"' Although the court appointed a guardian, physicians delayed when complications increased
the risk of the surgery to Northern's life. Approximately three months after the court's decision,
Northern died as a result of a clot migrating from the gangrenous tissue to a vital organ. See Mishkin,
supra note 359, at 162-63.
... Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 NC. L. REV. 945, 949-51 (1991).
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the basic decisions necessary to function on a daily basis. The standard
must include the ability to understand what one must decide, some ability
to reason, and knowledge of one's own needs and values.370 A standard for
identifying the incompetent must protect irrational decisions that reflect
the individual's values and beliefs, since the requirements of competency
cannot freely be used to limit individual exiiression to majority standards
of what is true and good.3" 1 It must also identify only a small class of
persons as incompetent since everyone has primitive and irrational wishes
and fantasies; otherwise the appointment of proxy decision-makers would
be made for all of us. The three criteria compete with one another and
cannot all be fully met by a single definition, requiring some conventional-
ity in perception and reasoning while protecting that same unconvention-
ality. The first criterion tends to shrink the class of incompetents, while
the second tends to expand it by accepting a far wider range of thought
processes.
Saks adopts a standard of sophisticated "understanding and belief,"
which requires that the decision-maker comprehend the caregiver's infor-
mation and form no patently false beliefs that affect the decision.3" 2 The
naive version of this view is rejected because it would require that the
individual actually believe, as the caregiver believes, in the need for treat-
ment or assistance. The standard identifies beliefs as patently false if all
evidence that might support them is lacking.373 A mistake based on lack of
knowledge does not affect competency, just as it would not vitiate a will.
Saks criticizes the standard for failing to distinguish the incompetent
from the mildly irrational and idiosyncratic.17  Although the standard is
not a solution in the sense that it identifies incompetency in any absolute
sense, it cannot be rejected on that basis because incompetency is by its
nature a relative state defined here by the law. Very unconventional be-
liefs are likely to be false, and the people holding these beliefs are likely
to be incompetent.3 7 5
S70 See id. at 950.
71 Id.
372 Id. at 955.
373 Id. at 963-65.
374 Id.
375 Saks rejects the higher standard for the truth of beliefs that are "impossible in the nature of
things," reasoning that beliefs that are not susceptible to proof by the senses may be more likely to be
accurate than beliefs that contradict sensory evidence. Id. at 964 (citing Jackman v. North, 75 N.E.2d
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Saks supports her adoption of the "no evidence" standard by citing its
long history of application in testamentary capacity cases.37 6 An alterna-
tive definition of the sophisticated "understanding and belief" standard
approximates the law's standard for a delusion in such cases: a belief for
which there is no evidence and in which no rational person would be-
lieve." ' Matters of personal opinion exclusively, such as the affection of a
family member or the definition of mistreatment by others, can virtually
never be the subject of a delusion3 78 The sophisticated understanding and
belief or delusion standard is the most likely standard for identifying
incompetency.
Saks' standard provides some guidance regarding competency determi-
nation in the context of family interests in property owned by the elderly.
The financial interests of family members often are recognized by grant-
ing property management powers to prevent the elderly person from dis-
sipating his or her assets. Dissipation is most likely to occur when the
elderly person is engaged in some socially disapproved activity70 or has a
new companion of the opposite sex. 80 The new activities may involve ex-
penditures for gifts, housing, or travel. The courts are not so likely to
create a guardianship if the partner is the ward's peer in terms of age and
financial position, or the petitioner is not a close (i.e., deserving) family
member. 81
The courts' decisions may act as a type of social control. The prospec-
tive heirs have no vested interest in the estate and in law there should be
no protection for their prospects of inheritance. Unless it is likely that the
324, 330 (Il. 1947); Scott v. Scott, 72 N.E. 708, 710 (Ill. 1904); Lang v. Lang, 135 N.W. 604, 606
(Iowa 1912)). Saks criticizes the lower standard of mistaken beliefs since testamentary case law shows
that the reasons for such belief may be known only to the believer. Id.
376 Id. at 966-77.
37. Id. at 956.
378 Id. at 953.
37 See Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the Elderly Free-
dom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676, 677 (1964).
380 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (invalidating will
executed one day after testator married his housekeeper); In re Oakes, 8 Law Rptr. 122, 124-25
(Mass. 1845) (holding that respondent widower could be restrained by the appointment of a guardian
for the safety of himself and others when he became engaged); Note, supra note 379, at 677-78
(guardianship following respondent's gift to widowed friend). But see In re Davey (Deceased), [1984]
1 W.L.R. 164 (exploitative marriage of elderly).
18' Barnes, supra note 216, at 961-65.
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elderly person will become destitute and rely on public welfare, the state
likewise has no interest in preventing spending. 82
Mere evidence of spending should not be sufficient to justify substitute
property management, since it is reasonable, or at least not unusual, for
elderly persons to spend the accumulated assets of a lifetime. Rather, the
standard of delusion should be applied to such situations so that new at-
tachments and new interests are encouraged.383
The delusion standard fails to resolve all cases in which competency is
questionable, however, and the individual's right to self-determination
must depend to some extent on the consequences of the decision. The law
requires various levels of understanding according to the weight of the
consequences, so there are a number of different tests for common choices.
In contracts, for example, a low degree of understanding is required when
the subject matter and value are trivial;3 84 a high degree is required where
the decision disposes of a person's sole asset of value. 3 5 This suggests that
a person of questionable competency should decide matters of little conse-
quence, such as what to wear or how to spend pocket money, but not
82 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(b) (West 1987) ("A conservator of the estate may be
appointed for a person who is substantially unable to manage his or her own financial resources, or to
resist fraud or undue influence."). Many states have "spendthrift" guardianship statutes. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 29-5-1 (Harrison 1985 & Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186-201C, §
8 (West Supp. 1987).
..3 The author proposed in 1988 that
Conserving the assets makes little sense in the absence of legally recognized claims of
younger persons, or any need to prevent destitution and reliance on public welfare. If the
rights of family members are to be recognized, the nature of those rights should be articu-
lated. Claims might arise because the elderly person has maintained grown children in a
given lifestyle, or made promises on which others relied. Such claims might be strengthened
if.the assets were inherited wealth, rather than the product of the elderly person's endeav-
ors. A guardianship created for such circumstances would necessarily divide the power to
spend between the preferences of the respondent and the prospective heirs. The resulting
division of spending authority more closely resembles a contractual agreement than the
fiduciary relationship of guardianship. Therefore, one must wonder whether a competency
proceeding is the appropriate form of action.
Barnes, supra note 216, at 963-64. With the introduction of Saks' useful standard, it is concluded that
the appropriate form of action is not a competency proceeding. If the respondent does not engage in
delusional thinking, an alternative basis for providing unwanted money management assistance is
proposed below. See infra part III.C.2.
384 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Morris, 14 Ch. D. 674 (1880). Saks examines the meaning of different
levels of competency for different purposes, depending on the weight of the consequences. See Saks,
supra note 369, at 992-98.
-"' See, e.g., In re Beaney, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 770.
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
matters of importance, such as where to live and whether to purchase
expensive services and health care.
A different standard generally operates in matters of great personal im-
portance, such as making a will or choosing health care. The more intense
and personal the consequences of a choice, the more compelling the claim
for a right to make the decision for oneself. For example, a valid will may
be made during a lucid interval by someone who is frequently subject to
delusions, or at any time if the delusions do not concern the property. An
individual needs only to understand in simple terms the ramifications of
disposing the property and the claims of those benefited or excluded, al-
though the decision might have sweeping consequences.3"'
Long term care decisions have a severe, permanent impact on the indi-
vidual's self-image and ability to function and associate with others. This
includes decisions regarding housing, service providers, and personal and
recreational activities such as travel or sports.387 The nature of lifestyle
and associations is as intensely personal as bodily integrity in acute care,
and in many cases the individual must live with the consequences of a
decision over a long period of time. In addition, the reasons the chroni-
cally ill elderly refuse assistance are similar to the reasons patients give
for refusing medication: anger and resentment of caregivers, a sense of
unworthiness, and the belief that help is not needed. When the delusion
standard fails to provide a clear conclusion about an individual's long
term care decision, the individual should be presumed to be competent
because the nature of such decisions is very personal. One may also con-
sider a different standard, the severity of the need for help." 8
2. Need
The alternative basis for providing unwanted assistance is the individ-
ual's need. The need standard has been applied in community-based ser-
vices, to which the doctrine of informed 'consent has not been specifically
86 Saks finds that courts use a strict interpretation of delusion in cases regarding refusal of
psychiatric treatments, though the cases split on the right to refuse medical treatment out of a feeling
of fear, when the patient's mental state is questionable. Saks, supra note 369, at 984-85.
,1" See DEIRDRE WYNNE-HARLEY, CENTRE FOR POLICY ON AGEING, REPORT, LIVING DAN-
GEROUSLY: RISK-TAKING, SAFETY AND OLDER PEOPLE 14-21 (1991).
388 It is appropriate, however, to subject an individual's long term care decisions to a second tier
of analysis of their impact on others, discussed infra part III.C.3.a.
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applied. The laws of protective services in both England and Florida, for
example, use a definition based on the individual's need for assistance. In
the United States, need is almost never a basis for long term personal
assistance.
Need for personal assistance is determined by a professional, usually a
social worker or physician, who may investigate at the request of others or
on independent initiative.3" 9 Although the Florida statute requires a deter-
mination by the intervening authority that the disabled person has the
capacity to consent but refuses to do so, this cannot be the equivalent of a
legal determination of competency because it is not based on thorough
evaluation. The disabled person may need services because he or she is the
victim of abuse or neglect by a caregiver, but the most prevalent problem
is self-neglect.39°
Statutes that base intervention only on the individual's need permit ser-
vices to be provided without consent to competent individuals who by idio-
syncratic choice live in situations of neglect. Indeed, it is estimated that
only about fifty percent of all individuals receiving protective services in
England are mentally disordered. 91 The inescapable result of applying
the need standard is that anyone managing life less caphbly than someone
else should have a guardian. Unless a clear minimum standard of living or
maximum degree of risk is established, the need standard threatens to im-
pose "better," that is, more logical or conventional, decision-makers on
competent, independent, and eccentric individuals.
The need standard illustrates clearly the relative and transactional na-
ture of competency since it depends on factors beyond the individual's con-
trol and results in different treatment depending on the elderly person's
personal and financial position..The poor are more often subject to protec-
tive removal because they live closer to the standard of need, They more
often live in deteriorated housing in high crime areas and experience fi-
nancial or personal abuse and exploitation, often by caregivers. On the
other hand, more affluent elderly may be subject to unwarranted interven-
I'9 Need might also be determined by the Court of Protection under emergency powers. Mental
Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 98 (Eng.).
390 Self-neglect represents between 30% and 60% of the protective services caseload. Federal
Response, supra note 249, at 4 (testimony of Eleanor Cain, former President of the National Associa-
tion of State Units on Aging and current Director of the Delaware Office on Aging).
391 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, % 3.16.
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tion when they choose a greatly altered lifestyle in order to maintain inde-
pendence despite impairment. For example, a double amputee or a severe
arthritic may choose to live in virtually complete isolation, spending ex-
traordinarily long hours confined to a bed or a chair, rather than leave
home. 3 2 The decisions and lifestyles of these individuals are inevitably
weighed against their well-organized, middle-class past. They are subject
to intervention because society expects them to be cleaner and better
attended.
The Florida Supreme Court examined the standard of need sufficient
for intervention in In re Byrne. 93 In Byrne, respondents lived without
plumbing and with exposed, dangling electrical wiring. They were naked
and surrounded by debris and excrement. One had fallen to the floor and
was unable to rise even with the other's assistance when protective ser-
vices workers intervened to remove them to a facility for care.
The court considered that only the state's right to preserve life was suf-
ficient to counterbalance the individual's right to self-determination and
privacy." 4 It held that the circumstances were sufficient to justify a tem-
porary loss of liberty, without notice and counsel. 95 Each of the respon-
dents would have to be declared incompetent under state law for involun-
tary services to be continued.
The protective services cases leave unresolved the question of the level
of neglect or risk necessary for long term intervention. Limited guardian-
ship statutes provide a basis for permanent appointment of a proxy deci-
sion-maker, but virtually all require evidence that the destructive condi-
tions are caused at least in part by mental disorder.39 ' The cases are
unclear as to the level of impairment necessary to cross the threshold from
capacity to incapacity.
"I Based on Florida social services cases observed by the author between 1980 and 1984.
033 402 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1981).
394 Id. at 383, 385-86.
395 Id. at 385.
'9' New Hampshire has adopted a pure, functional statute, which has survived constitutional
scrutiny in that state. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464-A (1985). Florida's limited guardianship
statute is somewhat ambiguous, in that "incapacitated person" is defined in functional terms, and the
report of the examining committee must include a mental health examination. FLA. STAT. ANN. §




It is reasonable to establish some level of self-neglect at which the
state's intervention is justified regardless of a psychiatrists' ability to iden-
tify mental illness; or, in terms of the level of understanding recommended
above, despite a lack of delusions as the source of self-neglect. Otherwise,
responsible service providers may be trapped into providing emergency
services that avert danger only to return the recipients to a predictable and
demoralizing cycle of deterioration, rehabilitation, and abandonment. The
respondents in Byrne, for example, might maintain a marginal existence
througho*ut the month, but with the arrival of Social Security checks
purchase intoxicants and remain nonfunctional for several days, during
which they neglect to eat or to maintain themselves in any way. The re-
sulting physical deterioration causes another crisis warranting interven-
tion, but cannot lead to guardianship if neither has the mental disability
required for a determination of incompetency. The assistance provides no
real improvement for the recipients, but taxes the energy and morale of
the service providers.
Logically, the level of self-neglect justifying intervention should be more
stringent than the level of risk required to show that an individual with
an identified mental illness needs a proxy decision-maker. The issue usu-
ally does not arise because psychiatric diagnosis is flexible enough to lend
a name to the mental disorder that prompts the behavior, so a kind of
circular reasoning finds that the behavior indicates mental impairment
and this in turn indicates that the behavior is likely to recur. The courts
have shown some skepticism about loosely applied psychiatric labels as a
justification for extended intervention in civil commitment.
In the New York case In re Boggs, 97 for example, Boggs was commit-
ted by the local courts to Bellevue Hospital for assessment after social
workers' attempts to provide her with clothing and assistance were re-
jected and she was taken into temporary protective custody. Social workers
testified that Boggs was barefoot, inadequately clothed, and lived over an
air vent on a New York city sidewalk. Boggs verbally abused passersby,
particularly black men, whom she felt threatened her sexually, and she
used the sidewalk as a toilet. She begged each day for just enough money
to purchase one hot, reasonably nourishing meal. Disputed testimony al-
397 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom., Anonymous v. New York City
Health & Hosps. Corp., 520 N.E.2d 515 (N.Y. 1988).
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leged that she once ran into traffic, but there was no evidence that she had
ever been harmed. The court determined that petitioners had failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that she was dangerous to herself.3"8
The judge concluded from her demeanor and testimony that Boggs was
not irrational and that harmful or neglectful behavior might be absent,
and ordered release. 9 ' On appeal, the Supreme Court Appellate Division,
with two judges dissenting, found sufficient evidence of dangerousness and
accepted it as evidence of mental illness4 00 A subsequent appeal of right
(permitted in cases with two dissenters) was dismissed as moot since
Boggs had already been released by the hospital.401
The court that released Boggs rejected the psychiatric conclusions as
unwarranted because she did not seem to be dangerously delusional and
the hospital's testimony failed to support an inference that she had been
so. The dissent on appeal found Boggs' hostility to be justified by a record
of intrusions by social workers, and specifically noted that evidence of de-
lusional thinking was absent.40 2 Each rejected the circular reasoning be-
... The "dangerousness" standard was adopted for civil commitment proceedings in Humphrey
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (adopting a
standard for all jurisdictions in the United States by decision of the Supreme Court that requires
dangerousness in addition to mental illness for civil commitment); Reed Groethe, Comment, Overt,
Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 44 U. Csi. L. REv. 562 (1977). In the Wisconsin case of Lessard v. Schmidt, the court
defined dangerousness in four components: the type of behavior, the recency of behavior, the severity
of resulting harm, and the likelihood of occurence (or recurrence). The evidence must show "immi-
nent dangerousness to self or others ... based, at minimum, on a recent act, attempt, or threat to do
substantial harm." Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (internal quota-
tions omitted). In many jurisdictions, dangerousness can accumulate from a pattern of neglect. See,
e.g., In re Carl C., 511 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1987); In re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1983).
... In re Boggs, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71.
400 Anonymous v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 520 N.E.2d 515 (N.Y. 1988).
401 The same court heard a subsequent case on a similar question, In re DePass, 531 N.Y.S.2d
427 (1988), although DePass, like Boggs, had been released after his appeal was filed. DePass admit-
ted himself for treatment because he believed his body was turning into a woman's, and that he was
pregnant. Although his delusions and paranoia abated with treatment, the psychiatrist proposed to
hold him beyond the 60 days provided by law. The psychiatrist stated that DePass posed a danger to
himself because he might seek nonstandard treatments to alter the size of his penis or change his
hormonal balance. The court held the hospital had no right to hold a patient who, although delu-
sional, presented no substantial threat of harm to himself or others. Id.
402 In re Boggs, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92 (Milonas, J., dissenting). The dissent also argues that
the state must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the person sought to be retained is
mentally ill and that she poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to self or others. Id. at
88-89.
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cause the behavioral evidence was too unconvincing. If Boggs had undeni-
ably placed herself in danger, it is reasonable to infer that the courts
would have authorized her extended detention. When the risk of harm is
very high in civil commitment proceedings, the psychiatric label is
irrelevant:
Dangerousness to self is an appropriate standard to justify involuntary
long term intervention. It excludes the many annoying or obnoxious be-
haviors engaged in by elderly eccentrics. Indeed, a 1980 study of mental
hospital inmates suggested that only one fifth could be subject to involun-
tary services under a dangerousness standard.403 Applying the standard to
community-based services would allow some ongoing assistance to individ-
uals who engage in patterns of dangerous neglect, but would require that
significant effort be applied to offer services of a quality and type that will
be accepted voluntarily.4"4
As implemented, proxy property management under the English Court
of Protection and the Uniform Probate Code is also based on evidence of
need alone. Although the Court of Protection requires a medical opinion,
there is no standard by which the individual's capability in financial mat-
ters must be measured and no requirement for psychiatric evidence. The
appointment depends solely on the allegation that the individual needs
financial management assistance. Cornservatorship statutes modeled on the
Uniform Probate Code require no more evidence of impairment than does
the Court of Protection. Despite the language of the Code, the standards
for mental impairment are so vague as to pose no evidentiary barriers to
appointment.
If the standard of need that justifies personal assistance is dangerous-
ness, the requirements of the conservatorship statutes are too lax since
they require little evidence of the harm threatened by an elderly person's
money management. Florida's reform guardianship statute attempts to set
a standard by defining "management of property" as taking those actions
necessary to obtain, administer, and dispose of real and personal property,
"" See Virginia A. Hiday & Stephen J. Markell, Components of Dangerousness: Legal Stan-
dards in Civil Commitment, 3 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHiATRY 405, 418-19 (1980) (noting that such a
barrier to assistance would cause many of the mentally disordered to "die with their rights on"). Note,
however, that under the standard of Lessard v. Schmidt, it was uncertain whether dangerousness
could accumulate from a pattern of self-neglect.
4" See discussion infra part III.D.2.
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intangible property, business property, benefits, and income. It fails, how-
ever, to identify "bad" choices. A prima facie case should consist of evi-
dence of a recurring pattern or an extraordinary expenditure and an ob-
jective reason for why these expenditures could not be in the individual's
interests. In the absence of evidence that delusional thinking is motivating
the expenditures, a proxy decision-maker should be appointed only when
there is proof that the individual will irreparably and seriously damage
his or her financial situation.
3. The Limits of Risk
The delusion and dangerousness standards set limits for individuals
who can implement their decisions independently. For most impaired in-
dividuals the implementation of a decision depends upon the cooperation
of others. The impaired individual's right to choose, therefore, may be
restricted by the interests of others.40 5
a. Family Interests
In any long term care situation, family concern for the burden of care
must be balanced with the individual's interests. Families may endure
heavy practical and emotional burdens if they are called upon to help with
long term care in the community. An obligation to provide service unwill-
ingly or at too great a personal cost is an invitation to neglect and abuse.
Unless the family is willing and capable of serving, the elderly person
must accept alternative assistance. If other community-based assistance is
inadequate, the individual might have to live in a nursing home or similar
facility.
The balancing of family concerns and personal interests does not justify
restrictions on the individual's choices because of the family's conscience
or values, however. For example, family members may be distressed to
know that an elderly relative chooses to live in squalor or want, but they
are unable to intervene because the individual is not delusional and the
circumstances do not reach the requisite level of dangerousness. Just as
105 See MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 183, at 47-49 (noting that regardless of
its rationality, a decision may be rejected if it causes harm to others).
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there is no duty compelling family members to assist,40 6 the elderly person
can be under no compulsion to conform to their values. Similarly, the
individual cannot be compelled to arrange his or her expenditures for the
family's financial satisfaction or improvement. 47
b. Professional Liability
An individual's interest in self-determination may also conflict with a
professional caregiver's interest in providing proper care. In a long term
care environment, there is widespread anxiety concerning possible legal
liability.40 8 A non-institutional care environment imposes on the care re-
cipient a duty to comply to a reasonable extent with instructions for self-
care and to cooperate when care is provided. However, in an effort to
reduce their risks and to prevent the possibility of failure, service provid-
ers may impose unnecessary restrictions.
This conflict is illustrated by the debate between nursing homes and
patient advocates over the use of physical restraints (including bed ties,
vests that confine a person upright in a chair, hand mitts, and other de-
vices) and chemical restraints (such as psychotropic drugs).40 9 Many
health care providers in the United States claim that the use of restraints
is necessary to avoid liability for harm to residents who could wander
away, fall, or injure other residents. While the use of restraints is much
less common in England, it is still more prevalent than necessary for good
care.
41 0
Yet there is no doubt that sitting or lying motionless usually causes
physical deterioration, and confinement often causes severe emotional dis-
tress. Although fear of liability dictates the practice, a review of the case
law reveals that the United States courts are very reluctant to find a duty
to restrain patients. In each case where liability has been imposed for
residents' who wandered away and were subsequently injured or killed, a
"I See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
407 See discussion infra part III.E.3.
408 See generally Marshall B. Kapp, Improving Choices Regarding Home Care Services: Legal
'Impediments and Empowerments, 10 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 441 (1991).
109 See SYMpOsiUM BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 101ST CONG., lST SESS., UNTIE
THE ELDERLY: QUALITY CARE WITHOUT RESTRAINTS (Comm. Print 1989).
4" See HEALTH ADVISORY SERVICE JUNE 1985 & JUNE 1986 ANNUAL REPORT.
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pattern of irresponsible care and inadequate supervision was apparent.""
For example, in one facility, the door alarm system was not operating as
intended, and all staff were attending to another patient, so nothing pre-
vented the resident, a known wanderer, from exiting unnoticed. 12 This
case suggests that there will be no .liability if sound care practices are
established and maintained. Not all risk of harm must be prevented, and
residents may be permitted to take risks in order to continue the ordinary
activities of living. If individual choice is a recognized value respected by
the caregiver, it will also be respected by the courts.4 13
D. The Least Restrictive Alternative
The standard of the least restrictive alternative weighs against the care
provider's inclination to impose restrictions designed to minimize risk.
The principle of the least restrictive alternative requires that the services
provided should be those that least restrict individual freedom and that no
unnecessary assistance should be provided over the recipient's objection.
1. The Division of Rights and Powers
Traditionally, the law broadly distinguishes between an individual's de-
cisions about property management and personal affairs. In England, the
division is so complete that there are two systems, guardianship and re-
ceivership, with different rules and standards. In some United States juris-
dictions, conservatorship statutes provide an option for property manage-
ment separate from standards of guardianship.
This division has some basis in practical reality. Individuals are likely
to lose property management abilities while they are still capable of mak-
ing health care and other personal decisions. By appointing a conservator
or receiver, a court retains for the.individual the legal right and responsi-
bility for making important personal decisions. This bifurcation, however,
41 See, e.g., Booty v. Kentwood Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 483 So. 2d 634 (La. Ct. App.
1985); see also Fields v. Senior Citizens Ctr., 528 So. 2d 573 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
412 See, e.g., Booty, 483 So. 2d 634; see also Fields, 528 So. 2d 573.
413 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 and subsequent regulations provide exten-
sive guidance regarding the correct standard of care. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (1988) (Medicare); 42




merely leaves the ward more powers than a plenary guardianship; it fails
to consider the possibility of dividing the powers further.
In legal theory, personal liberties have received a higher degree of pro-
tection than property rights. In the United States, constitutional protection
of economic interests ended in the Supreme Court decisions of the 1930s,
which refused to strike down President Roosevelt's economic reform laws.
Since that time, property rights have received less procedural protec-
tion,41 4 and courts have failed to take into account the circumstances of the
elderly, whose interests encompass both personal and property matters. 41 5
One advocate of conservatorship as an estate planning tool disingenuously
writes: "Seldom will there be a need to appoint a guardian for an elderly
person [who has a conservator] ...since appointment of a conservator
will be adequate in most situations. The conservator's powers are ample
to enable him to arrange whatever physical care is necessary, typically
nursing home care. "41
The parameters of an aged person's existence are defined by the right
to make economic choices, whereas a younger person may substitute for
economic resources energy and time that are not available to a person of
advanced age. For example, the ability to pay a companion with personal
funds rather than go to a state-supported nursing home may drastically
affect an individual's mental capabilities, physical health, ability to main-
tain contact with the world, and satisfaction with life. Within a family
unit, the elderly person's ability to spend has a direct relationship to his or
her status and well-being. Indeed, it may establish, maintain, or destroy
the individual's role within the family unit. As in no other age group, the
property interests of the elderly are identified with and identical to their
fundamental personal interests.
The right to spend is also important to those elderly who are unable to
receive government-supported medical care because of age-based -restric-
tions. Although age-related restrictions such as the National Health Ser-
vice withholding kidney dialysis from individuals over age fifty-five are no
414 SHANNON M. JORDAN, DECISION MAKING FOR INCOMPETENT ADULTS: THE LAW AND
MORALITY OF WHO SHALL DECIDE 538 (summarizing United States case law on fundamental con-
stitutional rights and property rights).
411 PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY, supra note 16, at 40.
41' Effland, supra note 52, at 378-79.
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longer maintained, less formal priorities are still common. 1 In the
United States, the soaring cost of health care has caused legislators to limit
benefits under the subsidized Medicare health insurance program for the
elderly by increasing copayments and by withholding payment for new
drugs and treatments. 418
The use of age restrictions as health care policy implies that the cost of
treatment is disproportionate to the benefit received by any person over
the age limit. The ability to purchase a preferred treatment that is not
available as a public benefit might, therefore, mean the difference between
health and illness, life and death. This need for the elderly to purchase
the same health care services that are available without cost to younger
persons illustrates very clearly the essential identity, for the elderly, of
property and personal interests.
Existing guardianship systems tend to blur the distinction between per-
sonal and property issues. In the United States, conser-vatorships clearly
are used for personal decision-making powers.419 The Court of Protec-
tion's authority to do what is "necessary and expedient" has even included
instituting divorce proceedings,4"' and might include any matter in which
financial affairs have a role. Only medical decisions in which the financial
aspects are not acknowledged are excluded. Because the identity of per-
sonal and property interests is not acknowledged, conservators and receiv-
ers are able to make decisions for their patients that their patients do not
fully understand, and for which they are not accountable.
The distinction between personal and property powers tends to be fur-
ther blurred by the multiple divisions of rights in limited guardianship.
Any statute that includes categories of powers in addition to those of per-
4" Typically, the physician will not recommend a treatment that is not supported by public
payment when treating a patient who intends to rely on public payment. The important issue of the
effects of funding restrictions on medical advice lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, for
enlightening comments on treatments that might be considered inappropriate for the elderly or poor,
see E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 J.L., MED. &
HEALTH CARE 356 (1939) (proposing two standards: the standard of medical expertise and standard
of resource use) and Younger, supra note 349.
411 See, e.g., Goodman v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1990) (denying payment for magnetic
resonance imaging, which was included in Medicare's list of experimental and investigative proce-
dures on the date of plaintiff's treatment).
419 Dale L. Moore, The Durable Power of Attorney as an Alternative to the Improper Use of
Conservatorship for Health-Care Decisionmaking, 60 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 631, 645-54 (1986).
420 Re W, [1970] 3 W.L.R. 87.
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son and property creates a form of limited guardianship statute. Limited
guardianship requires more discriminating analysis regarding the individ-
ual's capabilities in order to transfer to the guardian only those powers
the ward cannot exercise.
Guardianship reform laws such as Florida's clearly are intended to cre-
ate limited guardianships; they divide a ward's rights and powers into
many parts. The Mental Health Act also creates limited guardianship by
transferring only "essential powers."421 Limited guardianship benefits the
ward in that it has the potential to be the least restrictive form of
guardianship.
Detailed categories might, however, be more trouble than benefit to the
ward if the guardian's authority is uncertain or must be altered fre-
quently. In property matters, third parties might be unwilling to enter
into a transaction with either the guardian or the ward if they are uncer-
tain where the authority lies or unwilling to bear the expense of a court
determination. If the ward's property cannot be encumbered or sold when
he or she needs funds, the loss of choice might well be greater than if the
guardian held powers broad enough to satisfy purchasers. Also, it is costly
to the ward if the guardian .must frequently return to court seeking au-
thorization of broader powers. Therefore, a number of powers should be
catalogued in the statute in order to guide the courts and the parties.
The Florida statute fails to make an adequate distinction among differ-
ent property ,management powers. It includes one indivisible power to
manage property or to make any gift or disposition of property. Many
people are fully capable of handling small checking accounts and paying
their own bills, although they are unable to manage occasional and ab-
stract transactions involving other assets. A statutory division of power
into at least these two parts would be useful and usually easily understood
by third parties.
The artificial distinction, which accords property rights for the elderly
substantially less protection than personal interests, should be eliminated
from the law. Differences in treatment of personal and property rights
should occur only for the purpose of enabling the incapacitated elder in a
limited guardianship to receive maximum benefit from the services of his
421 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, §§ 7-10 (Eng.).
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or her proxy decision-maker.
2. Voluntary Assistance
The restriction of liberty created by appointment of a substitute deci-
sion-maker is severe. The rights enjoyed by all competent adults to associ-
ate with persons of their choice, to engage in recreational, political, and
religious activities, and to choose their care providers can be controlled by
the substitute decision-maker.
Voluntary assistance is a less restrictive alternative than any type of
involuntary assistance because the stigma associated with incompetency is
absent and the individual may have the opportunity to choose the type of
assistance and the manner of delivery. Voluntary services therefore are to
be preferred.422 However, once an authority has intervened and recom-
mended assistance, it is difficult to be sure that services are not accepted as
the result of coercion.
The categorization of the hospitalized mentally ill provides an instruc-
tive example of the way that the seemingly good concept of voluntary ser-
vices has gone astray. In England, the 1959 reforms emphasized voluntary
participation by patients, allowing those who did not actively protest to be
admitted as informal patients.423 As a result, the number of involuntary
patients shrank from approximately seventy percent in 1955 to just over
five percent in 1989.424 The United States has a similarly bifurcated sys-
tem despite law establishing legal rights for all patients. Most long term
mental facility patients have voluntary status.4 5
Such patients should not be considered as consenting patients. Some are
unable to give consent regardless of the circumstances, while some have
simply been pressured into accepting services by circumstances that pro-
vide no opportunity for objection before an impartial authority. The eld-
erly and the mentally retardedare more likely than the mentally ill to
422 Barnes, supra note 216, at 972-73 (advocating guardianship diversion services in lieu of
guardianship).
421 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 11 3-13, at 13.
42' See LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, H 3-13, at 13; REPORT OF
THE ROYAL COMM'N ON THE LAW RELATING TO MENTAL ILLNESS AND MENTAL DEFICIENCY,
THE PERCY REPORT, 1957, CMND, 167.
425 See Morris, supra note 206, at 109-10.
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submit without protest, and many have no one responsible for making
decisions on their behalf and no one to raise their interests for them.
Similarly, the. proposed ideal of offering voluntary services as an alter-
native to limited guardianship should be treated with caution; it will in-
crease the number of people subject to proxy decision-makers as the result
of pressure and persuasion. Once patients are categorized as voluntary,
they have no basis to challenge the services that are provided. Kapp notes
that the usual way of handling home care consumers who are de facto but
not de jure incompetent is to use a process of informal negotiation, bar-
gaining and cajoling among home care providers, the incompetent person,
and family or friends who assist and support the consumer.426 Although
the exposure to complaint and liability is small, the possibility of unfair-
ness to the incapacitated consumer, who typically has little bargaining
power and limited capacity for self-advocacy, is great.
The use of the term informal42" 7 for such patients acknowledges the
blurred line between voluntary and involuntary.42 It suggests a middle
ground that might be considered acquiescence and which implies that the
right to make some choice in the future has been preserved. If there were
prescribed procedures in the law for ongoing efforts to obtain consent
from acquiescent persons, the category would have real meaning. It would
be the cue for service providers to explain to an impaired person the
choices being made and their significance and to allow him or her the
opportunity either to make the decisions or to continue in a dependent,
acquiescent role. This opportunity for choice, for persons neither autono-
mous nor incompetent, is essential in community-based care where deci-
sions regarding housing, services providers, and other matters must be
made periodically. It also implies that a range of choices is available, even
for the individual who is unable to pay privately.42
426 KAPP, supra note 408, at 19.
427 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 131(1) (Eng.); Mental Health Act, 1959, ch. 72, § 5(1)
(Eng.).
428 LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, spra note 4, 11 3-13, at 12-13.
,26 Currently, Medicare and Medicaid support only very limited community-based care, which is
seldom sufficient to meet the needs of mentally and functionally impaired elderly. Limited funding is
provided under the Older Americans Act. Generally, however, the United States system is acknowl-
edged to be fragmented and inadequate. There is no direct reimbursement system for board and care
providers who house a substantial proportion of impaired elderly in nonmedical, community-based
facilities. See supra notes 313-23.
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Rather than create a situation in which individuals have no rights be-
cause they are deemed to be consenting, a separate status should note that
the choice of assistance at the outset was either voluntary services or
guardianship. The term informal should be abandoned since offering
choice as described here is a formal process. The term non-consenting is
suggested to remind caregivers of the provisional status of their services.
E. Standards for Proxy Decision-Making
Substitute decision-makers for incompetent persons base their choices
on one of two standards: the best interests of the patient, or substituted
judgment. The best interest standard represents commonly held views of
health, safety, and well-being, shown by such factors as physical and fi-
nancial risks, harm or pain, and benefits. Substituted judgment, by con-
trast, attempts to reach the decision the incapacitated person would make
if he or she were able to choose. For example, if Mrs. Candura, in Lane
v. Candura, were unable to express an opinion, the correct substituted
judgment would be to refuse the amputation even if her best interests in
continued life would be served by giving consent.4 30
1. Substituted Judgment and the Quality of Advance Directives
An advance directive by an individual expresses that person's current
choices on the course of future caregiving in the event the person becomes
incapable of making or expressing a decision. Advance directives are the
alternative to professional determination of the course of care, as is typi-
cally the practice in England, and family consent, which is approved by
statute in a minority of states.
Advance directives for both property and health care decisions have re-
ceived growing support in the United States.431 They have been endorsed
by the American Medical Association as being both for the good of the
patient and for the protection of the health care provider.4 2 Recently, the
United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
43o 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978). See discussion supra part III.B.4.
431 See Bruce Vignery, Legislative Trends in Nonjudicial Surrogate Health Care Decision
Making, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 422, 424 (1990).
41' Linda L. Emmanuel & Ezekiel J. Emmanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive
Advance Care Document. 261 JAMA 3288 (1990).
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ment of Health confirmed this view, indicating that an advance directive is
clear and convincing evidence of a person's' wishes.43 Other courts, with
the exception of a single case in the state of New York,484 have acknowl-
edged the need for a surrogate decision-maker absent advance instructions
by the patient.
Advance directives have been treated with greater caution in Eng-
land,436 where the physician usually is allowed to determine the treatment
to be provided to an incompetent patient based on professional judg-
ment.436 Very likely, this system is acceptable because English physicians
have been statistically far less likely to be sued and are therefore more
willing to accept the responsibility that accompanies the power to choose
for a patient.
It has been suggested that English courts might follow the view of the
New Jersey courts in In re Conroy,437 in which it was held that the in-
competent patient's wishes, if known, would determine the course of
care,438 at least in matters concerning life-sustaining treatment. This as-
sertion contradicts evidence that the patient's right to dictate the course of
treatment through informed consent is quite limited in England, compared
with the extent of the right in the United States. Perhaps all that can be
said with certainty is that there is a gap in the English statutory law of
substitute decision-making.
The earlier and more widespread type of advance directive in the
United States is the living will, which allows one to give instruction to a
future care provider regarding the type of treatment preferred or rejected.
Instructions are usually limited to life-prolonging procedures for persons
who are terminally ill, although instructions on other types of care can be
433 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the right to refuse life sustaining treatment as within the
fundamental right of privacy and permitting the states to adopt a dear and convincing evidence stan-
dard regarding the refusal of life-sustaining treatment; implicitly endorsing advance directives as the
only reliable means to provide the required proof).
11 In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981).
131 AGE CONCERN, LAW AND THE VULNERABLE ELDERLY 70-73 (1986).
4" The law is somewhat unsettled in this area. See LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER,
supra note 4, at T 1.2(b)-(c) (if not permitted by necessity, treatment without consent is a technical
assault); Hoggett, supra note 269, at 86.
137 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
438 AGE CONCERN INST. OF GERONTOLOGY AND THE CTR. OF MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS,
THE LIVING WILL: CONSENT TO TREATMENT AT THE END OF LIFE 37 (1988).
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included in the document and treated as evidence of the individual's
wishes. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have living will
laws.4 9 An advance directive cannot represent an informed choice among
the alternatives available when the decision is to be made.44  The older
the directive, or the more specific its instructions, the greater doubt re-
garding its validity. It is, however, a means by which the individual can
direct the caregivers on his or her behalf.
Substituted judgment seeks to implement the will of the formerly com-
petent person in the circumstances of the currently incompetent person.
The legal concept originated as a form of property management in an
1816 English case, in which the court authorized gifts from an incompe-
tent adult to destitute siblings on the theory that the incompetent would
have done so. 441 United States courts have applied the standard in both
property442 and medical, decision-making cases. 441 In England, however,
the best interest standard has more often been applied in medical decision-
making.4 4 The substituted judgment and best interest standards nearly
always lead to the same decision because a person usually wants what is
in his or her objective best interests. The substituted judgment standard
has come to be preferred on the theory that elderly and disabled persons
need not make decisions in their best interests because an adult can choose
to deviate from the norm.445
The cases involving substituted judgment in health care decisions reveal
considerable confusion about the issue. In the well-known case In reQuinlan,446 for example, the New Jersey court purported to apply a sub-
stituted judgment standard while admitting that evidence of Quinlan's
wishes was lacking. In another case, the Massachusetts court applied the
439 Robert F. Weir & Larry Gostin, Decisions to Abate Life-Sustaining Treatment for Nonau-
tonomous Patients: Ethical Standards and Legal Liability for Physicians After Cruzan, 264 JAMA
1846, 1847 (1990).
440 See MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 183, at 49.
41 Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Mer. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
412 See, e.g., In re Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. 257, 260 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
141 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 658-62 (N.J. 1976).
." See Gerald Dworkin, Law and Medical Experimentation: Of Embryos, Children and Others
with Limited Legal Capacity, 13 MONASH U. L. REv. 189, 200 (1987).
4,1 See KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 37, at 181 (explaining that the concern of autonomy is
the individual, so the determination of its proper exercise must be individual and subjective).
440 355 A.2d 647.
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test to one who had been incompetent since birth.4 Insistence on the use
of substituted judgment in such cases is a fiction subject to misunderstand-
ing and misuse.44"
The Supreme Court of New Jersey proposed to fill the gap in the ap-
plication of substituted judgment with a new test in In re Conroy,44
which it termed the "limited objective" test. This standard represents a
middle ground between a subjective test, which restated the substituted
judgment standard, and a pure objective test, which is used in the com-
plete absence of any evidence of personal preference.
The Conroy court saw that a combination of the two tests was neces-
sary to reach appropriate proxy decisions, but failed to see that the two
standards remained confused with one another. The cases show an evolu-
tion in medical decision-making that is not a shift to the use of substituted
judgment as the first choice, but a shift to a broader view of the options
that are in the subject's best interests. Clearly, society no longer agrees
that all technically possible medical care is necessarily in the best interests
of a very impaired patient. In some instances withdrawing care is deemed
to be in the patient's best interests. It is preferable, however, to base such
a decision on an individual's personal choice, by way of substituted judg-
ment, to avoid raising the spectre of other third party decisions that result
in death.
Some commentators would assert that an individual's choice to forego
treatment in a future, extremely impaired state, is never reliable. Cer-
tainly, there is room for doubt that the incompetent patient's own treat-
ment choice, if known, would follow or include the preferences expressed
when competent.450 Such patients would make choices that reflect their
"4 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
"4 See James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Sirens' Lure of Invented Consent: A Critique of
Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decisionmakingfor Legally-Incapacitated Older Persons, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 779 (1991).
"4 486 A.2d 1209.
o See Rebecca Dresser & John Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for
Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 J.L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 234,
236 (1989). Theories that distinguish the interests of the competent from the incompetent frequently
make reference to the work of philosopher Derek Parfit, who proposed that a person's life is a series
of successive selves with new values and beliefs. Parfitian theory would preclude the present self from




current and future interests as incompetent, severely physically incapaci-
tated individuals, no longer involved in the pursuits of work, friendships,
or good health that are paramount for most competent persons. An exis-
tence that seems demeaning and abhorrent to the competent patient yet
may be valuable when it is all of life that remains. Those who take issue
with advance directives as an expression of substituted judgment would
argue for an evaluation of the incapacitated person's current interests in
the perception or appreciation of being alive, the capacity to relate to
others, and, when the patient has no competing interests, the balancing
interests of other persons significant to the patient. 51 The restatement of
the incompetent's current interests is a somewhat refined version of the
best interests standard, followed by considerations'appropriate to substi-
tuted judgment.
In long term care substituted judgment is also second to the best inter-
ests standard. If it" were not, a proxy decision-maker would be obliged, in
caring for a person who had made self-destructive choices by refusing
medical assistance or living without shelter, to continue to make destruc-
tive choices. Proxy decision-making in the best interests of a person who
had not made self-destructive choices can be confused with substituted
judgment because the choices are identical.
The best interest standard cannot be a simplistic standard, however. An
individual's best interests in long term care, for example, have been identi-
fied as the least restrictive form of care that meets the individual's needs.
These needs include the need for security, which might call for more care
or a more sheltered environment, and the need for privacy and choice,
which might create more risks than the caregiver believes are optimal.
From this array of choices representing the individual's best interests, the
proxy can then use substituted judgment to select the choice most appro-
priate for the individual.
This reevaluation of substituted judgment suggests the need to limit ad-
vance directives to' life-sustaining treatments for the critically ill and se-
verely impaired rather than following the popular path to detailed direc-
tives regarding all foreseeable contingencies. Because life and objective
best interests are restored to a preferred status, advance directives refusing
treatment would be applicable only when future life and quality of life
4"' Dresser & Robertson, supra note 450, at 240.
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are compromised regardless of treatment. While an expression of prefer-
ence regarding less critical care might provide proxy and health care prov-
iders with guidance, these preferences should not be binding. For exam-
ple, a diabetic's directive refusing an amputation that would restore an
active life would not be binding when refusal is likely to result in death. If
the patient were over ninety and already a single amputee, however, the
proxy might refuse surgery, reasoning that (1) little extension of life is
likely because of advanced age and deteriorated health; (2) quality of re-
maining life would be severely compromised since the patient would lack
upper body strength to transfer without a leg for support, and would be
totally dependent on care; and (3) the patient's directive indicates a strong
commitment to independence. The limits on the subject matter of binding
advance directives can hopefully open the door to enforcement of individ-
ual wishes to refuse prolonged existence without hope of restored capabil-
ity for relationship or enjoyment of life.452
2. An Inventory of Values
Determining substituted judgment depends upon evidence such as past
wishes, hypothetical choices," 3 or religious beliefs."4  A preference may
also be inferred from past choices in housing and lifestyle. For example,
in a Florida case, Bergman v. Serns,455 the son (and legal guardian) of an
elderly Alzheimer's patient sought to institutionalize his mother, who
lacked comprehension of time, place, or person, and required twenty-four
hour nursing supervision. His sister filed suit to prevent the institutional-
ization, alleging her mother would have preferred to live at home under
her current conditions. The elderly woman's incompetency was not dis-
puted. The court found her interest in remaining at home, expressed only
by her choice of a home while competent, was sufficient to justify expendi-
ture of the substantially larger sum needed for home care.45
"' Kevin P. Quinn, The Best Interests of Incompetent Patients: The Capacity for Interpersonal
Relationships as a Standard for Decisionmaking, 76 CAL. L. REv. 897 (1988).
... See, e.g., In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980).
I" See, e.g., In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y. 1981).
... 443 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
"" Id. at 132. Remaining in the home might not be in the impaired individual's best interests. In
Bergman, for example, the burden may outweigh the benefit of remaining at home if the estate were
insufficient to employ reliable, bonded nurses, because employing untrained home workers to reduce
costs increases the risks of harm and the burden on the family to supervise care. If the elderly patient
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In many cases, the circumstances do not speak so clearly. Indeed, there
is room for doubt that the elderly woman in that case would have pre-
ferred to remain at home in her deteriorating and isolated condition. To
clarify the individual's likely preferences, some commentators recommend
the utilization of a values inventory or history,45- 7 which can be either a
written questionnaire to be completed by the patient and returned to the
physician, or a discussion between the patient and physician to develop
information to be entered in the patient's medical record.458 The values
history can serve as a catalyst for discussion between the physician and
patient and can promote awareness of patients' rights to choose their care.
Most importantly, it can provide the clearest indications of an individual's
treatment preferences, if one accepts the proposition that an individual is
capable of predicting the interests of a future, incompetent self."" The
potential of the values history to become a standard component of the
medical record remains to be developed. 6"
3. Who Should be the Proxy?
A proxy decision-maker, according to the analysis above, must choose
the alternative among the impaired person's interests that most closely ac-
cords with the individual's values and priorities. In short, the proxy first
applies the best interests test, and second, whenever possible, the substi-
tuted judgment standard. The choices among possible proxy decision-mak-
ers include the impaired person through use of advance directives, family
members or surrogate family members, and professionals, including bank-
ers for financial decisions and health care providers for medical and long
term care decisions. The question is who is most likely to make the correct
needed medications to control recurring, severe pain, or had a severely deteriorated lifestyle, exper-
iencing hunger, squalor, and severe deprivation, home care could not be in his or her best interests. In
short, the analysis returns to the standard of substantial risk of harm. See discussion supra part
III.C.2.
""' A detailed model values history was developed at the Institute of Public Law of the Univer-
sity of New Mexico. See Pam Lambert et al., The Values History: An Innovation in Surrogate
Medical Decision-Making, 18 J.L., MED. & HEALTh CARE 202 (1990).
458 Ben A. Rich, The Values History: A New Standard of Care, 40 EMORY L.J. 1109, 1141
(1991).
419 Id. at 1143.
460 Rich proposes that values inventory is becoming standard practice. See id. at 1143-47. He
posits a cause of action for failure to develop and abide by a values history, noting that it requires the
expansion of the concept of wrongful life. Id. at 1161.
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decision. The professional cannot be the first choice, since he or she nor-
mally lacks information about the individual's preferences or lacks a gen-
eral familiarity with the individual that might lead to a correct choice.
Family consent to medical care is common practice. In the United
States, courts have stated that, in an emergency that makes informed con-
sent by the patient impractical, "the physician should, as current law re-
quires, attempt to secure a relative's consent if possible."""1 Despite recent
cases regarding the withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures," 2 judicial
intervention in health care decisions is infrequent. When patients are too
impaired to understand and approve their course of treatment, decisions
are usually made by a family member or an intimate family surrogate.46 3
Elderly people and their families expect to be involved in health care deci-
sion-making.464 Nevertheless, only a minority of states have a statutory
provision authorizing family consent. 65 Florida, for example, includes
family consent powers in its living will and health care surrogate statutes,
by providing a list of family members and others who can give consent if
the patient has not given an advance directive. 66 In England, on the other
hand, the courts have found the consent of family members to have no
legal validity at all.467 English law does recognize the family's authority in
guardianship proceedings, however, by providing the nearest relative with
power to prevent the implementation of an application for guardianship
by the social services authority.468
Health care providers, paradoxically, are least likely to rely on a rela-
tive's approval when the patient's competency is questionable. When fam-
461 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
4" See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
'13 Bruce Vignery, Legislative Trends in Nonjudicial Surrogate Health Care Decision Making,
23 CLEARINGHOuSE REV. 422, 422 (1989).
444 See generally High, supra note 264.
465 The era of resistance to family decision-making may be drawing to a close. A significant
difference between earlier studies of family decision-making and more recent studies is the abandon-
ment of the assumption that substituted judgment is the best type of proxy decision-making. Families'
lack of specific information about a patient's wishes regarding life-sustaining care does not preclude
their ability to fulfill the role of proxy decision-makers.'See Susan K. Gauvey et al., Informed and
Substitute Consent to Health Care Procedures: A Proposal for State Legislation, 15 HARV. J. ON
LF.Gis. 431, 449 (1978).
466 FLA. STAT. ch. 765.07 (1987).
"' T. v. T., [19881 2 W.L.R. 189; Hoggett, supra note 269, at 203.
466 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 11(4) (Eng.).
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ily approval is insufficient, ordinary care, which cannot reasonably be ap-
proved by advance directive, cannot be given. The evolution of attitudes
toward the right to consent has drifted away from traditional practices
with absurd results.
4 6 9
Whether family consent laws are good policy depends upon whether
they are based on the assumption of the family's interest in the patient's
well-being or on the family's knowledge of the patient's preferences. Stud-
ies have shown that close family members, who have ties of affection to
the patient, very often have no direct knowledge of their relative's prefer-
ences in health care. 7 ° It is reasonable to assume, however, that some
family members have an interest in their relative's well-being, unless
other motives for involvement in proxy decision-making are brought to
light.
Only immediate family should be assumed by the law to have a strong,
positive interest, arising from shared experiences and personal histories, in
the patient's well-being. Even this assumption is not without exceptions,
but it is in accord with both the social structure and strong traditions.
Certainly, distant relations are more likely to feel burdened by the need to
participate in decision-making and are more likely to have conflicts of in-
terest with expenditures for care if they are potential heirs. They may be
less reliable as decision-makers than health care professionals or a
thoughtful, impartial stranger.
A good, perhaps the best, prospective decision-maker, who often is
omitted from consent statutes, is the friend and caregiver who has no ties
of blood or marriage to the patient. 47 ' The purpose of choosing a proxy is
to select a decision-maker having some knowledge of and concern with the
individual's personal well-being. The definition of family for the purposes
of proxy decision-making, therefore, should be redefined to include as
family members individuals who have demonstrated an interest in the pa-
469 Incompetent patients who have no proxy decision-makers to provide consent may be fore-
closed from routine medical care, including dental and foot care, until their condition becomes an
emergency.
'" Richard Uhlmann et al., Physicians' and Spouses' Predictions of Elderly Patients' Resusci-
tation Preferences, 43 J. GERONTOLOGY: MED. SCL 115-21 (1988).
4" See Amy L. Brown, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decisionmak-
ingfor Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029 (1990).
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tient's well-being.47 2 The Mental Health Act, which indicates that six
months of cohabitation is sufficient to allow an individual to act in the role
of nearest relative in long term care,473 provides a reasonable basis for
determining the caregiver's interest. In addition, the caregiver should have
undertaken care primarily out of affection and concern, rather than sim-
ply as an employment option. Such a caregiver should have precedence
over a spouse who has lived apart from the impaired person by choice,
rather than because of personal infirmity or obligations to care for parents
or disabled children, and should have precedence over adult children who
have taken no active role in care.
Since the individual's ability to predict his or her future interests has
been questioned, it remains to determine where a health care proxy, ap-
pointed by advance directive, falls on the priority list. Durable powers of
attorney for health care, authorizing the appointment of a health care sur-
rogate, have been introduced more recently than living wills. Such powers
can appoint a proxy to make any type of health care decision, with the
possible exception of refusing life-prolonging procedures. Eleven states
have statutes authorizing durable powers of attorney for health care and
eleven more provide authority to appoint a substitute decision-maker in
living will statutes. 47 4
The appointment of a health care surrogate avoids the difficulties with
advance instructions, because the surrogate can evaluate the circumstances
fully when the need for a decision arises, and can make any treatment
decisions the patient could not .foresee or evaluate. However, a health care
surrogate might mistakenly or inadvertently make a choice contrary to the
patient's values and wishes. In order to place a limit on the possibility for
destructive error, it has been proposed that, in the absence of instructions,
health care agents must choose treatment in accord with a patient's best
interests in health and bodily integrity.475 The argument fails to dispose of
the issue, however, since when the situation arises, health often cannot be
restored and bodily integrity is regularly breached by intrusive treatment
and manipulations. It is difficult to say what is best among the individ-
ual's interests. Therefore, prior values and choices are relevant.
42 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145(d)(5) (1985).
473 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 26(6) (Eng.).
4"' David Orentlicher, Advance Medical Directives, 263 JAMA 2365, 2366 (1990).
171 Bopp & Avila, supra note 448, at 815.
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The question, then, is whether the person most likely to make the cor-
rect decision is one designated by the expanded priority list proposed
above or the individual's designee. A minority of individuals designate a
health care proxy; one can assume some energy and thought went into the
choice.476 Theref6re, a patient's designee should head the priority list.
An individual's ability to choose a proxy for financial management is
not disputed. The potential problems lie, instead, in mistakes, ineffective-
ness, and intentional misuse by the proxies.
4. Oversight for Advance Appointments
A critical point in the use of advance directives is the determination of
incompetency, which is usually made first by the physician for health care
proxies, and by the proxy for financial powers.
The Florida health care surrogate statute requires the certification of
two physicians. 7 The second physician is chosen by the health care facil-
ity, and cannot be in the employ of, or associated with, the attending phy-
sician.478 The Mental Health Act is in general accord with the Florida
statute since it requires second opinions regarding the course of treatment
in particular instances in which the patient cannot give consent. If the first
doctor does not choose the second doctor based on the knowledge that he
will concur with his opinion, this procedure might occasionally result, in
disagreement.
However, the purpose of the second opinion is to include a broader or
different perspective, which is unlikely to occur often within a given circle
of physicians; some outside review is desirable. Unfortunately, neither eth-
ics committees nor patient advocates* have become fully active partici-
pants in health care, and it is unlikely that a third party will be permitted
to invade the privacy of the physician-patient relationship.47 9
M" This reason may require reevaluation if hospital admissions routinely request designation of
a health care proxy. However, it is most likely that the great majority of admitees will choose their
nearest relative or their caregiving relative.
477 S. 748, 1990 Fla. Leg., § 15(1).
478 Id.
170 See Bernard Lo, Behind Closed Doors: Promises and Pitfalls of Ethics Committees, 317
NEw ENG. J. MED. 46 (1987); Richard A. McCormick, Ethics Committees: Promise or Peril?, 12
J.L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 150 (1985); Robert M. Veatch, Hospital Ethics Committees: Is there a
Role?, 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (June 1977).
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Without oversight and supervision, there is great potential for abuse of
financial powers of attorney, and a growing number of problems are being
documented.480 One way to create informal oversight is to provide an op-
portunity for relatives and friends of the disabled person to object to the
appointment or actions of an attorney-in-fact. When registration of an
enduring power is received, the Court of Protection requires that notice be
sent to family members, enabling them to object within a limited period of
time. Recently, Florida also added a provision requiring that notice be
sent to relatives when a durable power of attorney is to take effect. This
provides real protection for an impaired person but is too limited. The
right to object and to require investigation should extend throughout oper-
ation of the power.48' Also, the class of individuals who receive notice
should include unrelated caregivers, and any other person that the princi-
pal designates in the document.
Registration with the court serves as confirmation to third parties that
the attorney is authorized to act and establishes jurisdiction for the pur-
poses of supervision. The Court of Protection requires the power to be
registered before it takes effect. It can also send Visitors to investigate
enduring powers, as in the case of receiverships." 2 Florida law unfortu-
nately provides neither of these sound protections.
However, registration is only a rubber stamp rather than real protec-
tion if investigatory powers are never used. It is impossible at present for
the Court of Protection to investigate or determine which cases need inves-
tigation, because the limited staff of 300 processes 23,000 cases.483 Staffing
should be set at a more realistic level for review of records and field
investigation.
F. Special Exemptions
The purpose of a proxy decision-making system is to assure the appro-
priateness and quality of services with a minimum of expense and formal-
ity. If the integrity of a decision is reasonably assured, as it might be by
the involvement of professionals or a reliable caregiver, no additional for-
480 See LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 3.8 n.29.
461 Id. % 3.8 (noting the court cannot at present direct the attorney's decision-making).
481 Mental Health Act, 1983, ch. 20, § 103 (Eng.); JONES, supra note 82, at 163.
83 GOSTIN, supra note 95.
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mality should be required before the decision can be implemented. In-
stead, education and counseling should be available to assist the decision-
makers and an avenue should be open for appeals for review and
assistance.
Commentators who favor strong legal protection for all impaired per-
sons will undoubtedly feel uneasy about carving out exemptions after go-
ing to great lengths to establish a sound system for appointment and su-
pervision of proxies. However, such a view greatly overestimates the
effectiveness of professional supervision. Proxy decision-making relation-
ships that are based on intimate family relationships or that occur in great
numbers cannot be supervised effectively in the face of an effort to conceal
or deceive. The process of oversight also invites the proxy to undervalue
the responsibility to examine actions and to strive to fulfill the role of
fiduciary.
The requirements for due process are costly and time consuming for the
parties and the state, and the need for guardianship for an increasing
number of people might overwhelm the present court systems. It is there-
fore appropriate to make exceptions to formal procedure when one or
more of the following three conditions are met. First, the power of the
proxy should be narrowly and strictly defined while still meeting the im-
paired person's needs for a reasonable period of time. Second, there should
be an identity of interests between the disabled person and the proxy deci-
sion-maker, so that there is no apparent and immediate reason for adver-
sarial process. Third, a responsible party should oversee all decisions that
the substitute will make. All three conditions need not be present to justify
an exception, but there must be sufficient assurance that the power will
not be abused without detection and correction.
1. Health Care Proxies
Health care decision-making is a collaboration between the health care
provider and the family members or surrogate family, each of whom pro-
vide some oversight for the activities of the other. The expertise of the
physician is balanced to some extent by the need to secure informed con-
sent before treatment can proceed. The physician's preferences place a
check on the families by the simple expedient of declining to offer or to
perform any procedure the physician believes is inappropriate. There is
likely to be a general agreement in interests between the family, the
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proxy, and the patient, based on familiarity and affection. In the event of
a dispute, both family and professionals should have recourse to an impar-
tial arbitrator such as an ethics committee, and finally to the special
court.48 4
The implementation of advance instructions is a special case which re-
quires the appointment of a proxy, usually from the family, to oversee the
physician's work. Physicians have been known to follow their own recom-
mendations in contravention of their patients' express wishes.4" 5 Recent
federal law requires health care providers to mark the medical record to
indicate whether advance directives exist, and to honor such directives,
486
as does Florida's Life Prolonging Procedures Act.48 Family members
should be aware of their role in the implementation of advance directives.
If the patient has no family or caregiver, the public guardian or proxy
should oversee the physician's treatment. To facilitate this, health care
proxies, like other durable powers of attorney, should be registered with
the special court.
2. Spousal Guardianship
A special limited property management power might be given to one
spouse caring for another. Although family members may often have con-
flicts with an elderly person, the spouse's situation is somewhat different.
First, there is a greater identity of interest because of the closeness of the
relationship and common interests in their assets. Second, the need for
such a power is widespread since many elderly persons, usually women,
are caring for their spouses. These two criteria being satisfied, this type of
relationship might be created with less formality and exist with less super-
vision than other guardianships.
The law of Denmark provides a model: a married person in a commu-
nity property jurisdiction is permitted to manage a disabled spouse's prop-
erty. The more capable spouse or guardian must consult with the ward, as
is required in all guardianships under Danish law.4"8 Following this
,' But see In re Nemser, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (admonishing the parties that
medical decision-making is a private matter for the patient, physician, and family).
"I LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, T 6.7.
... Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
117 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.04, .09 (West 1990).
.80 See Jorgen Graversen & Inger M. Pedersen, Loss of Power of Speech - Does it Mean Loss
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guide, a spouse should be authorized to manage all jointly held assets
upon private consultation with the disabled spouse. To minimize the risk
of exploitation and conflicting interests, the marriage must have endured
for at least two years. The authority should be created by a letter of ap-
pointment from the tribunal, based on the recommendation of a guardian
ad litem who has interviewed each spouse in their usual environment to
determine the need for the appointment, and the fact that the disabled
spouse lacks the capacity to provide a durable power of attorney.
3. Representative Payees and Appointees
A proxy decision-maker is frequently responsible for handling a dis-
abled person's public benefits checks. These proxies, called representative
payees in the United States,489 and appointees in England,4 90 are ap-
pointed upon application to the benefits agency stating that the beneficiary
needs assistance with money management.
Proxies in both countries are supposed to be screened, subject to restric-
tions regarding the way the funds can be managed, and are required to
keep records. Unfortunately for some beneficiaries, very little oversight is
provided. Any person may serve, and screening is minimal, so no assump-
tions can be made about the relationship of trust between the parties. The
beneficiary, although deprived of no legal rights, is unlikely to be able to
supervise the representative, and benefits agencies devote very little effort
to monitoring the quality of money management. Although the amounts of
money are relatively small, they may be a beneficiary's sole resource and
support.
G. Conclusion
None of the conditions for a sound alternative proxy decision-making
system have been adequately met, so there are many opportunities for
error and abuse. In the United States, checks are often stolen and mis-
managed.491 In order to qualify representative payeeship as an exemption
of Civil Rights? The Law in Denmark, in AN AGING WORLD, supra note 3, at 531, 533-34.
4 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 306 (1988).
490 Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations, 1987, S.I. 1987/1968, Reg. 33 (Eng.).
491 Lori A. Stiegel, Proposed Solutions to Social Security Representative Payee Problems, 24
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 570 (1990).
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to the formalities of the proposed system, rather than requiring a petition
and hearing to create a guardianship of the property, the proxies should
be supervised as are other financial surrogate decision-makers. That is,
they should file periodic financial accountings that are reviewed by trained
personnel and any irregularities should be investigated.
If supervised, limited property management arrangements are expedient
for other income and property when formal adjudication and administra-
tion are too costly to be practical. The Court of Protection provides an
option under Short Procedure Orders for resources that are limited or
securely invested.492 However, no individual or agency is charged with
responsibility for the impaired person's changing needs so the procedure is
of limited use. A friend or the public guardian should be appointed to
assure that the use of the funds continues to be appropriate, and that the
impaired person's needs are met.
The type of autonomy implemented in the reform statutes is too nar-
row, since it is based on freedom from interference, the right to be left
alone. Simply leaving the impaired elderly alone is, of course, an inade-
quate response. Competency must be recognized generally to be a relative
and transactional concept, rather than a fixed status. While this idea un-
derlies the reform statutes generally, many courts require proposed wards
to meet their needs independently. Instead, an individual should be con-
sidered incompetent only if all assistance available and acceptable to the
person is inadequate to provide basic necessities.
The least restrictive form of assistance is that which least encumbers or
intrudes on the ward's civil rights. Voluntary assistance is preferred to
involuntary appointment of a proxy. For many impaired persons, how-
ever, a third category, nonconsenting, is necessary. This would identify
those who, perhaps temporarily, fail to express any preference.
The proxy decision-making system must fail to fulfill its goal of pro-
moting autonomy with assistance if a reasonable array of assistance is not
available. Long term care is inadequately funded in the United States,
with government benefits concentrating heavily on institutional care and
total coverage not exceeding fifty percent of costs. Long term care insur-
ance is not expected to provide coverage for more than a minority of citi-
... Court of Protection Rules, S.I. 1984, No. 2035, Rule 7 (Eng.).
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zens. To assure access to services for mentally and physically 'impaired
elderly, long term care services should be funded nationwide through a
federal tax. It would be more in keeping with the goal of self-determina-
tion to allocate the funds as a stipend to be spent at the impaired person's
discretion to purchase needed assistance. However, because this is subject
to abuse, tests are needed to determine whether supervision effectively as-
sures good quality services.
With the growing need for proxy decision-making, a confusing and
fragmented array of legal options with conflicting definitions of impair-
ment and due process requirements has developed. The appointment and
supervision of proxy decision-makers should be governed by a unified sys-
tem as described below.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SYSTEM
OF PROXY DECISION-MAKING
A. A Unified System
1. A single, unified system called the Court of Proxies should supervise
the appointment and oversight of all types of surrogate decision-makers.
The term proxy is chosen because it indicates a form of agency rather
than a paternalistic relationship, and because it may refer either to an
individual or to a particular power. An Office of the Guardian Ad Litem
is proposed to provide investigation and supervision in the course of pro-
ceedings and throughout the proxy relationship. All substitute decision-
makers under the supervision of the court shall be called proxies, and
recipients of assistance shall be called principals.
2. The triers of fact in the Court of Proxies should be health care prov-
iders; social workers; psychiatrists and psychologists engaged by the court
to assess the mental, physical, and functional status of the impaired indi-
vidual; and lawyers skilled in proxy decision-making issues. Professionals
shall sit as tribunals of not less than three persons, each of whom has
examined the respondent in his or her usual environment, and each pro-
fessional representing a different area related to the alleged disability.4 "
3. The court should have jurisdiction over both institutional and com-
193 See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
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munity-based care in non-emergency and emergency cases regardless of
whether the petitioner or proposed proxy is a state agency. It should have
authority to appoint a proxy decision-maker or to issue orders for care
and services to the respondent, including adaptation and renovation of the
home environment, and payment from the respondent's assets or other
available funds.
4. A person subject to the court should be one who, because of mental
illness, developmental disability, addiction to drugs or alcohol, or other
mental disorder, is incapable of understanding and evaluating information
essential to making or communicating decisions necessary in order inde-
pendently to secure food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, or to manage
property or financial affairs.494
5. Evidence of incapacity should include a physical examination, a
mental status examination, and a functional assessment.495 Incapacity
should be shown by recurring acts or occurrences within the preceding six
month period, and not by isolated instances of negligence or bad judg-
ment, or by refusal of medical care alone. Disability should include
mental disorders and should be of sufficient severity to cause significant
deterioration in the person's health or circumstances, or to present a likeli-
hood that significant harm will occur.496
6. Emergency intervention should be justified only if it is likely that
significant harm to the individual or others is imminent. If the person has
been maintained by voluntary assistance, the petitioner must show why
that assistance is no longer available or sufficient to meet the person's
needs. 49 7 Long term intervention based on functional status should be jus-
tified only when the individual is dangerous to self or to others.
7. The court should appoint as a proxy any person designated by the
principal unless there is good cause not to do so. If no one is designated,
the court should consider any person in a regular long term caregiving
relationship with the principal regardless of ties of blood or marriage.
'o' See supra notes 214-39 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the evidence required from the examining committee under Florida's
statute, see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
4" For a discussion of the standards of imminent risk and dangerousness used for evaluating
behavior as evidence of incompetency, see supra notes 222-39 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 284-90 and accompanying text.
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Relatives beyond the immediate family should not be preferred because of
consanguinity alone. Only one person should be designated to serve as
proxy at any time. Statutory preference should not substitute for inquiry
by the court into the fitness of an individual to serve as proxy.
8. A public proxy should be designated as a proxy of last' resort for
persons who have neither family nor friend qualified and willing to serve
nor funds to compensate a professional proxy. The public proxy should
not be 'affiliated with any direct service provider. 98 The public proxy may
supervise voluntary services upon order of the court. There should be no
compulsory services or voluntary services subject to court supervision
without designation of a proxy.
9. Fees for court proceedings should be paid by the principal if they
result in appointment of a proxy or an order for assistance.4 9 Fees for
ongoing services, whether personal or financial, should be set according to
their actual cost rather than a percentage of the assets.500 Principals un-
able to pay the full cost should be charged based on a sliding scale of
subsidized fees.
10. An agent for health care decisions, whose decisions are limited to
those made in consultation with health care providers, 01 may be ap-
pointed by directive of the patient. The agent need not agree with recom-
mendations of the health care provider, who may ask the guardian ad
litem for review at any time if he or she believes the agent is not acting in
good faith to carry out the wishes of the patient as the agent understands
them. A representative of the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem should
visit the patient and review the record before the health care surrogate
and health care provider can admit the patient to a nursing facility. Fi-
nancial powers are limited to application for public health and long term
care benefits.
11. A spouse of two years or more who is living with an impaired
spouse may be authorized to manage the property of that mentally im-
'" See supra note 340 accompanying text.
'9' For a discussion of the expense of legal process and who should pay, see supra notes 203-05
and accompanying text.
"00 This provision is in accord with a trend in several states, including Florida, to find that the
traditional percentage basis for billing in probate cases can result in unreasonable fees. The Court of
Protection collects fees on this basis, a practice that has attracted criticism as being unfair.
101 For a discussion of advance directives, see supira notes 306-27 and accompanying text.
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paired spouse upon application stating the nature of the spouse's disabil-
ity, the extent of the assets, and a plan for transactions anticipated in the
coming year.50 2 The guardian ad litem should visit the couple in their
usual environment, evaluate the functional condition of the disabled
spouse, and provide counseling regarding the spouse's responsibilities as a
proxy. The spouse must manage funds prudently and file an annual re-
port and plan with the Court of Proxies. Notice of the application should
be sent to brothers and sisters of the disabled spouse, who may raise any
objections within fourteen days. The spouse should be appointed to exer-
cise the powers of a proxy responsible for financial management upon the
recommendation of the guardian ad litem, who should issue a letter con-
firming the extent of the property management powers.
B. Limited Guardianship
1. The Court of Proxies should consider all matters regarding person
and property of the respondent, and should transfer to the guardian only
those delegable powers the ward cannot exercise. The goal of every pro-
ceeding should be to identify and implement the form of assistance least
intrusive to the principal's self-determination and lifestyle. There should
be no procedure for property management without consideration of the
impact on personal choice.
50 3
2. In the interest of effective property management, the disabled per-
son's powers to manage property should be divided into at least two parts
unless there is good cause for another division: basic money management
and property administration. 50 4 The disabled person should retain the
right to contract for necessities and other goods in keeping with his or her
standard of living and should retain the right to conduct basic money
management unless the court finds cause to remove this right. The dis-
abled person should retain the right to contract for legal counsel regarding
the status of competency and the activities of the guardian.
3. Prompt review should be provided in response to a request from the
102 For a discussion of the burden of guardianship expenses on elderly couples, see supra notes
202-03 and accompanying text.
113 For a discussion of the identity of personal and property interests, see supra notes 275-80
and accompanying text.
'01 See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
19921
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
principal, the proxy, or any interested party to investigate the manage-
ment of the proxy's interests, actions, or powers. A hearing should be held
on all requests to significantly increase the proxy's power or to authorize
institutionalization or medical treatment. 50 5
4. Supervised, voluntary assistance should be available. If an individual
has a mental disability and resulting functional impairment sufficient for
a finding of incompetency and compulsory assistance, but agrees to accept
assistance voluntarily, the court should order such assistance and supervise
the caregiversr °6 The court should constr'ue the principal's consent to ser-
vices as a request to utilize the least intrusive means to meet his or her
needs.
5. The court should effect wishes expressed in a properly executed ad-
vance directive regarding life-prolonging procedures for individuals who
are critically ill or have multiple, debilitating impairments. Any compe-
tent adult may at any time choose a proxy or give instructions for care or
treatment, either in writing or by video or audio tape recording. Such
directives should be effective for seven years, except in cases where the
individual is incompetent to renew, in which case it should continue to be
effective. The health care provider who refuses to comply with authorized
advance instruction or the decision of an authorized proxy should transfer
the disabled person to another health care provider who will comply, or
be subject to sanctions that may include professional censure, fine, or
criminal action.
6. Neither family members nor a designated proxy should have the
power to institutionalize a principal without a medical and functional as-
sessment. The institution should confirm the need for admission to institu-
tional care and should hold these reports on file for review by the court
upon request.5 07
C. Procedural Due Process
1. The Court of Proxies should use formal legal process for non-emer-
gency cases. These formal processes should include notice, time for re-
000 See supra notes 329-31 and accompanying text.
.0. For a discussion of voluntary assistance, see supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
... For a discussion of powers that cannot be exercised by a guardian without court supervision,
see supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
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sponse and answer, a hearing using rules of evidence, and the respon-
dent's right to be present and to cross-examine witnesses. The guardian
ad litem should investigate and, if advisable, recommend appointment of
legal counsel for the respondent. The hearing should be open unless the
respondent, after advice from counsel, requests that it be closed.
2. The petitioner must show specifically the interest of the disabled per-
son that is harmed by any expenditure or pattern of spending offered as
evidence of incompetency, and the court must find either that no reasona-
ble person could disagree or that the petitioner's evidence supports the
contention that the disabled person intended to conserve the assets for
some other use.
3. In non-emergency proceedings, if the respondent's functional capabil-.
ity has recently deteriorated, the system should create a temporary proxy
relationship to stabilize the person's situation and condition. It should be
of sufficient duration to achieve the result in the estimation of examiners,
but should not exceed ninety days. Services provided during the initial,
temporary limited guardianship should not include removal from the
home to an institution or sheltered facility unless there is evidence that no
program of home services would be sufficient to meet the person's need for
stabilization.
4. In emergency proceedings, the Court of Proxies should authorize in-
tervention on an affidavit of need from two qualified professionals who
have evaluated the disabled person in his or her usual environment or
who have been refused access by the disabled person or the primary
caregiver.508 The affiants should propose alternative plans for services in
the home, if advisable, or for transporting the disabled person to a shelter
that is prepared to receive a person with such disabilities, if removal from
the home is necessary.
The court should review the need for intervention within five days. If
there are sufficient grounds, services may continue for up to thirty days.
Within that time, a full hearing on the question of competency should be
held and a proxy may be appointed.




1. The duties of a proxy should be to exercise particular authorized
powers on behalf of the ward, and to assist the ward in exercising other
powers and protecting rights and interests.5"9
2. An Office of the Guardian Ad Litem should be created in the Court
of Proxies to investigate the allegations of every petition and any indica-
tion of irregularity in reports of the financial or personal circumstances of
disabled persons under the care of the court. The guardian ad litem
should receive registration of advance directives and appointments, and
assist appointed agents and proxies in carrying out their duties. The Of-
fice of the Guardian Ad Litem should also be responsible for public, vol-
unteer, and professional education regarding the use and responsibilities
of proxies, and should encourage the use of advance directives.51
3. The Office of the Guardian Ad Litem should oversee regional citizen
ombudsmen, who are charged with the responsibility of promptly and
thoroughly investigating complaints about proxies and other care provid-
ers for mentally disabled persons.5"'
4. A consulting council should be created. It should be comprised of
officials from various agencies and authorities concerned with the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Proxies: professionals, including representatives of
medicine, nursing, social work, health related professions, community-
based services, professional guardians, and law; concerned citizens; and
recipients of limited guardianship services. This council should meet not
less than quarterly to examine the operation of the system and make any
recommendations for changes to law or practice that would improve the
delivery of services, the protection of individual rights of disabled persons,
or any other relevant matter.512
o LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 4, 5.23 (summarizing common
trends in guardianship reform).
"0 For a discussion of the need for investigation, see supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 330-37 and accompanying text.
512 Id.
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